Optimizing the allocation of scarce water resources : a case study of the Gaza Strip by Bösch, Christophe E. (Christophe Eric)
OPTIMIZING THE ALLOCATION OF SCARCE WATER RESOURCES:
A CASE STUDY OF THE GAZA STRIP
by
CHRISTOPHE E. BOSCH
M. Eng., Civil and Environmental Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996
Submitted to the
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in Technology and Policy
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June, 1997
@ Christophe E. B6sch. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper
and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole and in part
Signature of Author .....
r-vt;ifG 1-e
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
May, 1997
...... .... .... ... . ... ........................ ... ... ....... ......
David H. Marks
James Mason Crafts Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Thesis Supervisor
C ertified by .................................. ................. -............................
Richard de Neufville
rofessor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
ChairmartT;echnology and Policy Program
A ccepted by .................................. .. . ..................... ...................... ................
Joseph M. Sussman
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Studies
.. . . . . . .. . . . . . .
JUN 2 41997
y .....................
OPTIMIZING THE ALLOCATION OF SCARCE WATER RESOURCES:
A CASE STUDY OF THE GAZA STRIP
by
CHRISTOPHE E. BOSCH
Submitted to the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
On May 9, 1997
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Technology and Policy
ABSTRACT
The water situation in the Gaza Strip has now reached the dimensions of a crisis, possibly one of
the most serious in the world. In 1948 Gaza had a population of 80,000. Today that population
has swollen to one million, making it one of the most densely populated territories on Earth. This
population explosion has contributed directly to the current water crisis. Current water
consumption is estimated at 135 million cubic meters per year, of which two-thirds goes to
agricultural use. To meet this demand, Gaza's only resource is a shallow aquifer which recharges
at approximately 60 million cubic meters per year. Over-exploitation of the aquifer has led to
falling groundwater levels and deteriorating water quality due to seawater intrusion. Only 7
percent of domestic water pumped into the network is potable according to WHO standards.
Water problems have a direct effect on the quality of life for the Gazans, and also on the
economic prospects of the Strip.
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the water situation in Gaza, define possible options, sketch
various scenarios, and evaluate how analytical tools, particularly optimization models, can assist
in the appraisal of alternatives. The thesis concludes with proposals that could contribute to the
formulation of a water policy for the Gaza Strip. A major issue with models is that they do not
account for the highly unpredictable social, economic, legal and political processes which
influence water planning and management in the Gaza Strip. A technically and economically
optimal solution may be unacceptable to policy makers because it contradicts immediate political
imperatives. Therefore, while models can help in discovering tradeoffs and joint gains, it should
be recognized that there is no one uniquely correct solution, and that the traditional decision-
making approach is incremental.
This thesis contends that the current water crisis is mainly the product of misallocation of water
resources due to historical, economic, and political factors. The long term solution to the Gaza's
and the region's water problems will rest in the reevaluation of agricultural policies. If this is
done, additional water resources will be freed up for urban uses, and opportunities for regional
water trading - based on economic principles - will open up. A social and political crisis is
looming in the Gaza Strip, which will be compounded by the destruction of the aquifer.
However, as discussed in this thesis, solutions to the water problem do exist. They will depend
on the financial support of the donor community, Israel's goodwill, and, the political will as well
as the management ability of the Palestinian leadership to formulate and implement a sound
water policy.
Thesis Supervisor: David H. Marks
Title: James Mason Crafts Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Gaza Strip is facing an acute shortage of fresh water supply. The water situation has now
reached the dimensions of a crisis, possibly one of the most serious in the world. In 1948, Gaza
had a population of 80,000. Today that population has swollen to one million, making it one of
the most densely populated territories on Earth. This population explosion has led to the current
water crisis. Current water consumption is estimated at 135 million cubic meters per year, of
which two-thirds goes for agricultural use. To meet this demand, Gaza's only resource is a
shallow aquifer which recharges at approximately 60 million cubic meters per year. Over-
exploitation of the aquifer has led to falling groundwater levels and deteriorated water quality
due to seawater intrusion. Only 7 percent of domestic water pumped into the network is potable
according to WHO standards, and at many locations water consumption is posing a serious
hazard to human health.
Water problems have a direct effect on the quality of life for the Gazans, and also on the
economic prospects of the Strip. The water shortage affects the quality of agricultural output, and
reduces the scope for the development of water-using industrial processes. According to many
experts, if the extraction rate continues to grow unabated, it is a matter of a few decades, if not
years, before the aquifer is irreversibly destroyed and unfit for both agricultural and human use.
However, the looming disaster can be averted if proper measures are rapidly taken.
At this early phase of Palestinian empowerment, water resources planning is still at a very
preliminary phase. Since its establishment in 1994, The Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation (MOPIC) has performed a rapid assessment of the water situation in the Gaza Strip.
According to the MOPIC, investment needs in the water and sanitation sector are in the order of
US$500 million for the next 10 years. However, the definition of an investment program requires
planning and policy formulation within the water sector. To this end, the Palestinian Water
Authority (PWA) was created in 1995 with the support of the UN system. As stated in the
September 28, 1995 PLO-Israel agreement, the Palestinian National Authority is granted the
power to operate, manage and develop water and sewerage systems and resources in the self-
ruled areas. Accordingly, the PWA will assume policy-making and regulatory responsibilities for
the territories administered by the Palestinian Authority.
Little investment took place during the period of military occupation and the existing
infrastructure is in desperate need of rehabilitation and expansion. The Emergency Assistance
Program prepared in 1993 defined initial investment priorities to be supported by various
multilateral development agencies and bilateral donors. However, there is no national strategy
yet to cope with the water situation and the multiplicity of actors in the water sector has led to a
fragmented approach that fails to address water resources in a comprehensive manner. The
formulation of a sound water policy is indeed an urgent matter.
1.1 Outline
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the water situation in Gaza, define possible options and
scenarios, and evaluate how analytical tools, particularly optimization models, can assist in the
appraisal of alternatives. Implementation issues and non-quantifiable constraints are identified.
The thesis concludes with proposals that could contribute to the formulation of a water policy for
the Gaza Strip. The thesis is divided into seven chapters:
* Following this introduction, Chapter 1 outlines the analytical framework used in this thesis
* In Chapter 2, economic, financial, political, social and institutional issues are evaluated to
form the overall context of the water situation.
* Chapter 3 provides a description of the current water issues in the Gaza Strip and assesses the
overall performance of the water sector.
* In Chapter 4, demand scenarios, as well as a summary of the issues and challenges that the
water sector will face in the future, are presented.
* Chapters 5 and 6 review possible demand- and supply-side options, including management of
existing water and development of new sources.
* In Chapter 7, various optimization models are reviewed, including technical, microeconomic,
macroeconomic and multi-purpose models. Analytical tools are proposed to evaluate the
options and scenarios developed in Chapter 4
* Finally, in Chapter 8, using the conclusions drawn from previous chapters, policy
recommendations are formulated, and future directions for further research are proposed.
1.2 Analytical framework
At the heart of the proposed approach is the development of a comprehensive analytical
framework for water resources management. A possible framework is displayed in Figure 2:
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Figure 1 - Analytical framework
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1.3 Hypothesis
The subject of water allocation and use has gained increasing prominence in the period since
1990, partly because of recognition that some regions have run out of water permanently, at least
for some uses. This thesis contends that the current water crisis is Gaza is the product of
misallocation of existing water due to historical, economic, and political factors. Various options
have been proposed to solve the water problem in Gaza. However, all these options need to be
placed in an integrated framework optimizing the allocation of water. For instance, viewed
individually, desalination may appear to be the long-term solution to Gaza's problems. On the
other hand, if we look at water use in agriculture, we realize that the Gaza Strip is currently
exporting more than 30 million m3 of water per year in the form of citrus, at prices an order of
magnitude below the cost of desalinated water. The prime importance of allocation in any
management policy is typically deemphasized. The problem with any allocation policy is that it
requires that political as well as economic priorities be taken into account. Reallocation normally
means that some party will lose the resource in order that it be made available to another.
Allocation of new resources calls for the evaluation of tradeoffs aimed at maximizing economic
efficiency.
Chapter 2
Context
In the almost fifty years since it became an internationally recognized entity, the Gaza Strip has
been called "the forgotten man of the Middle East", "the black hole of the Arab world", and
"Israel's collective punishment". This tiny, artificial entity has been occupied by foreign powers -
Egypt and Israel - since its creation. This is where the Palestinian uprising (intifada) began in
1987, and where self-rule for the occupied territories began in 1994. As such, the Gaza Strip has
remained a critical part of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
The Gaza Strip is an area of extreme complexity-geographic, demographic, economic, social,
political, and legal. Demographically, it is an area with both the highest fertility rate and the
highest population density in the world. Two-thirds of the residents are refugees, and more than
half are younger than fourteen years of age. Economically, Gaza is facing a deepening crisis and
at present has virtually no economic base. Socially, Gazan society is deeply divided between
groups of different origin: refugees, indigenous Gazans, Bedouin, and recent returnees.
Politically and legally, the territory has been under Israeli military occupation from 1967 to
1994, and was under Egyptian occupation before that. Everyone in the Strip is stateless, and no
one can leave the territory without permission from the Israeli military authorities.
2.1 Geography
The Gaza Strip (Figure 2), a 40 km by 10 km strip of land on the Mediterranean coast, where
Israel meets the Sinai Peninsula, encompasses a total area of approximately 360 km2. This is
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Figure 2 - Map of the Gaza Strip
(Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 1996)
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slightly bigger than Martha's Vineyard in Massachusetts, or twice the size of Washington DC.
Gaza has three narrow, distinct bands of land that extend the length of the territory, a sand dune
ridge 40 m above sea level; a central depression with highly fertile alluvial soils; and a sandstone
ridge in the east extending into the northern Negev. The climate is distinguished by its proximity
to both the sea and the Negev desert, with hot and humid summers and damp and chill winters.
Gaza's climate ranges from semiarid in the north to arid in the south. The warm climate causes
high potential evapotranspiration, between 1,040 and 1,900 millimeters per year (mm/year) for
Gaza as a whole (Kelly, 1996). Annual rainfall ranges from 200 mm in the South, on the fringe
of the desert, to 450 mm north of Gaza City.
2.2 History
The city of Gaza experienced a continuous succession of conquerors and occupiers beginning
with the Egyptian pharaohs and ending with the Israeli army. The city of Gaza has been attacked
and destroyed by a succession of invaders - Isrraelites, Egyptians, Assyrians, Scythians,
Babylonians, Persians, Romans, Muslims, Crusaders, Mamelukes, Ottomans, French, British,
and Israelis - struggling for its control (Roy, 1995). As the key commercial outpost and the first
source of freshwater north of the Sinai Desert for caravans traveling between Asia and Africa,
Gaza was once considered to have great strategic value. The declaration of Israeli statehood in
May 1948 precipitated the birth of the Gaza Strip. Within days of its creation, the territory was
besieged by 250,000 refugees fleeing the war; the Strip's population tripled almost overnight.
The territory fell under Egyptian rule until the Six Day War. From 1967 until the establishment
of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, the Gaza Strip was military occupied and administered
by the Israeli government. The intifada, the Palestinian uprising, broke out in Gaza in December
1987. The shift in PLO strategy from armed struggle to the pursuit of negotiations with Israel
provided a basis for the US peace initiative in 1991 and the mutual recognition by the PLO and
Israel in 1993. The interim agreement (Oslo II), signed in September 1995, extended self-rule
already granted to Gaza and Jericho to other populated areas of the West Bank. The negotiations
on the final disposition of the territories were to have begun in May 1996. Terrorist incidents 
in
Israel, and the subsequent election of a right-wing government in May 1996, put 
the peace
process under considerable strain. The groundbreaking of a housing project in East Jerusalem in
February 1997 plunged the peace talks into crisis. As of May 1997, the political process 
was
stalled.
2.3 Population
By early 1997, the Gaza Strip was home to about 1,000,000 people, the overwhelming majority
of whom (99 percent) are Sunni Muslim Arabs. There is also a tiny and dwindling minority of
Arab Christians (0.7 percent). About 5,000 Israeli Jews (0.5 percent) live in sixteen settlements
spread across the entire length of Gaza's coastline. These settlements comprise about 25 
percent
of the territory's total area. About 70 percent of Gazans are refugees of the 1948 war and 
their
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Figure 3 - Population of the Gaza Strip - Actual and Forecasts
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descendants. Over half of the refugees still live in camps. Comparisons with other areas of the
world underline the gross overcrowding in the Gaza Strip. When calculated on the basis of Arab-
owned land alone, Gaza's population density exceeds 4,000 people per km2. The density levels in
the refugee camps are far higher: Jabalya, the largest camp, has a population density equivalent
to 80,000 people per km2, over twice of Manhattan. The current fertility index - 8.5 live births
per woman - is the highest in the world. The current annual population growth rate exceeds 5
percent and if the rate is sustained, population will double every 15 years. Approximately 10,000
workers are added to the labor force each year. Figure 3 illustrates the tremendous population
growth that took place in the Gaza Strip over the past 50 years.
2.4 Economy
Contrary to popular belief, economic and social conditions in the Gaza Strip have substantially
deteriorated in the more than three years since the Oslo agreement was signed. Gaza Palestinians
are living in a state of economic and social decline never experienced. Many Gazans are
experiencing genuine poverty, unprotected either by an adequate social safety net or by personal
savings; poorer families appear to have used up most accumulated savings to cope with other
recent periods of high unemployment (World Bank, 1996). At least 20 percent of all Gazans now
live at or below an absolute poverty level of between $500 and $600 per capita annually. Prior to
the intifada, close to 70 percent of Gaza's workforce was employed in Israel. In January 1997,
this number was 11 percent (UNDP, 1997). Unemployment has reached crisis proportions in
Gaza, with figures at times soaring to two-thirds of the work force. Over the past three years per-
capita income has dropped from $1,200 to $750 a year in Gaza, mainly as a result of the loss of
employment in Israel and the decline in trade flows caused by the Israeli closure policy. Per
capita GNP is now well below the average for all less developed countries ($950), not to mention
Israel ($15,000). Exports to Israel, or via Israel to other markets, dropped by 50 percent. Worst
affected was the agricultural sector, which makes up 30-40 percent of Gaza's GDP. Industrial
output still accounts for only 7 to 8 percent of GDP (compared with one-quarter in Jordan),
indicating an unusually low level of industrialization. Overall public investment has been very
low, at 3 to 4 percent of GDP a year, which has led to the decay of basic infrastructure (World
Bank, 1997). As a result of the closures, daily losses for the local economy are estimated to have
risen to $10 million per day in 1997. The collapse in exports forced a downward spiral of prices
of agricultural products as stocks built up. In 1995, the total loss amounted to over $600 million,
more than all 1995 pledges by the donor community (EIU, 1996). What is especially worrying
are the consequences of prolonged permanent status negotiations -if the next phase is to be
implemented in stages, each stage becoming a test case - on the Palestinian economy (Kassis,
1996).
According to Sara Roy, a Harvard research fellow recognized as an expert on the Gaza Strip,
"Israel's economic goals in the West Bank and Gaza Strip always aimed to preserve the structural
integration of the Palestinian economy with that of Israel, thereby insuring its continued
dependency and removing all possibility of economic competition (Roy, 1995). Indeed, the Gaza
Strip economy is critically dependent on Israel. Israel's policy vis-a-vis labor and commodity
mobility is central to determining growth rates and, therefore, family and living conditions. The
trade deficit of the PA with Israel is enormous. Israel's exports to the PA stood at $1.55 billion in
1996, with $235 million imported, giving a $1.315 billion trade deficit (EIU, 1997).
Due to falling wage rates and higher consumer prices, a single average worker's monthly income
could only cover 59.6 percent of basic needs and only 42.1 percent of overall expenditures by
mid-1996, indicating that Palestinian families are experiencing significant economic distress
(UNDP, 1997). Evidence suggests households are responding to falling incomes by drawing
down savings, borrowing money, and falling behind on utilities payments. The latter fact is
particularly of concern for water pricing. Assuming a per capita consumption of 100 liters, and a
price of $1/m3 , an average household would be billed $40 per year for domestic water, that is, 6
percent of per capita GNP, or 10 percent of household income.
2.4.1 Agriculture
The agricultural sector has historically played an important role in the Gaza Strip, where citrus
were traditionally marketed through Egypt for export to European markets. The agricultural share
of GDP calculated in 1996 stand at about 30 percent. Although Gaza was traditionally self-
sufficient in food, in 1996 the value of local consumption exceeded the value of local production
by 20 percent (Ministry of Agriculture, 1997). Wheat, barley, rice, sugar and certain fruits are
mostly imported. Since 1967, the composition of agriculture output in Gaza has changed
considerably (Figure 4). Although traditional crops like citrus have, in the past, been the major
part of Gaza's traditional economy, this role has been taken over recently by vegetables and
animal husbandry.
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Figure 4 - Value of agricultural output (World Bank, 1993)
Agricultural decline in Gaza is in part a result of water scarcity. The contraction and degradation
of the water supply has led to significant reductions in crop yields. Production is heavily
influenced by trade imbalances that have their roots in the occupation. While Israel restricts
lu
Israel exports substantial quantities of fruits and vegetables at prices with which Gazan farmers
have been unable to compete.
Palestinian agriculture is at disadvantage vis-a-vis their Israeli counterparts because of the
generous subsidies Israel gives to both sectors. For example, Israel's support for its agriculture
averaged 32 percent of the value of that sector's output during 1984-90 (Elmusa, 1995). Future
access to European and Arab markets will provide potential for higher exports, in turn
stimulating infrastructure development and new investments. However, the water problem will
remain a very significant constraint. The interim agreement did not provide for an increase in
water allocated to Palestinian agriculture, and Israeli restrictions on water use remain in place in
water-rich areas. The accords reached with Israel so far do not address the water resources issue
since it was agreed that there would be no discussion of sovereignty over water (and land and
settlements) before final status talks.
2.4.2 The role of water in the economy
As shown in Figure 5, water plays a significant role in the Gaza Strip, but much less in Jordan
and Israel. The chart below illustrates the relative contribution of irrigation water to the
economy. In Gaza, 65 percent of total water demand generates 35 percent of the GDP and
provides jobs to 40 percent of the workforce. By contrast, 65 percent of total water consumed in
Israel contributes only to 2 percent of the GDP. The role of water in the industrial and service
sectors is much more difficult to establish. In Chapter 4, analytical tools and evaluation methods
that may enable such an analysis are discussed.
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Figure 5 - Relative contribution of the water sector to the agricultural sector (World Bank,
1993, UN, 1994)
2.5 Social issues
For some time, Gazan society has been deteriorating, a result of continuous economic decay and
political repression. This deterioration, still unabated, is characterized by the erosion of critical
support structures such as the extended family, the school, and the political faction and the
breakdown of the community as a social actor (Roy, 1995).
Despite positive changes toward greater personal safety and freedom of expression, the arrival of
the PA has neither healed the internal fractures nor lessened the violence that have characterized
Gazan society for some time (Roy, 1995). The militarization trend is reflected by the presence of
uniformed men everywhere. Almost half the PA employees are members of at least seven
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security services. PA's abuses have been widely documented. While in Gaza, the author was
repeatedly told of instances of abuses by PA officials, ranging from traffic cops to ministry
officials. As one Gazan complained: "under the Israelis the law was bad, but there was a law.
Now, there is no law anymore". Adding salt to the deepening social wound is the popular
perception that the "Tunis people'" are behaving in socially unacceptable ways, refusing to
accommodate the standards of the very conservative society in which they now live (Roy, 1995).
More and more Gazans are wary of the corrupting and perverse changes in society that are
believed to have been introduced and institutionalized by the PA. For example, bribery is said to
have become a way of life in Gaza. One Gazan, a key player in the multimillion-dollar deal to
build a Marriott hotel in Gaza, indicated that one reason for the project's continued delay was that
ministry officials are waiting for bribes from project developers.
Confusion in Gazan society is great. To many people, the future seems less visible now that at
any time of the past; the resulting alienation is palpable. In Gaza, it is normal to go out,
especially during Ramadan; it is a Mediterranean culture. However, during the Ramadan nights
of 1997, Gaza's streets were empty, reflecting the depth of the social and economic crisis. There
were few Palestinian shoppers on the formerly busy Omar Al Mukhtar Street, Gaza main
thoroughfare. There is, in Gaza, a profound sense of end of the dream, of having nowhere to go
and nowhere else to look, something Palestinians have never contemplated. A major factor
producing support for the Islamists is the ongoing economic crisis of the territory. Palestinians
agree that their turn to religion symbolizes a plea of the hungry, although most of them stress
their prayer is not meant to identify with Islamic extremists. As one Palestinian explained:
"There is a rising religious fervor in Gaza. There is nothing wrong with prayer but this is
praying because of being poor. Under these circumstances, going to the mosque is the
first step toward a revolution".(Jerusalem Post, 11/27/96).
Amira Hass, the only Israeli journalist living in Gaza, mocks Israelis who say "Go to Gaza"
(Lech le'Aza) as a way of saying "Go to hell". As she describes the situation:
Tunis was Yasser Arafat's last headquarters in exile, and "the Tunisians" is a nickname which Gazans gave to
those, officially known as "returnees", who came with him when, following the Oslo accord he established himself
here instead. There are about 10,000 of them, and they dominate the Palestinian Authority and its security
apparatus.
"Gaza is a big jail and you are confined to a very small area. People can't move (only
married persons older than 30 are allowed to cross into Israel, provided they hold proper
entry permits). They see television and they are connected to the Internet, and they see the
big differences between what life offers, and what actually happens in reality" (Jerusalem
Post, 1/5/97).
However, while in Gaza the author also met Palestinians that still wanted to believe in a bright
future. When peace will be achieved and economic development takes place, they say, Gaza -
given its unique location - may well become a major center of international trade and industry,
indeed the Hong Kong or Singapore of the Middle East.
2.6 Politics
Political affiliation is the most important form of organization in the Gaza Strip. Political
divisions are deeply felt and cut across social class distinctions. Everyone in the Gaza Strip is a
political being. Politics directly and immediately influence daily life. One cannot understand
Gaza without understanding its politics - not only what is said, but also what is meant (Roy,
1996). In the 1990s, at least seven political factions claimed the allegiance of Gaza's highly
politicized population. Five of them, including Fateh, Gaza's largest party, espouse a secular,
democratic ideology, and fall under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
The last two are based on religious belief and espouse the same objective - the creation of an
Islamic state in all of pre-1948 Palestine. The Islamic movement is far stronger in Gaza than in
the West Bank. Socially, Gazans are far more traditional than West Bankers, whose continuous
exposure to foreign visitors has bestowed a sophistication and a worldview not often found in
Gaza (Roy, 1996). The strength of Islamism is rooted in Gaza's extreme poverty, isolation, social
structure, and a profound sense of popular despair over the steady disintegration of daily life. The
signing of the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles in September 1993, which the Islamists
fiercely oppose, intensified existing divisions with Fateh and led to a cycle of violence and
repression. Since then, however, Palestinian support for Islamic radicals has fallen. Every time a
bomb explodes in Israel - and Israel responds by closing its borders to Palestinian workers and
trade - there is a popular reaction against the Islamists within Gaza. The result of Palestinian
disillusionment with both the PLO and the Islamists has been rising political apathy and
disengagement. While the majority of Gazans continue to hold Israel accountable for the
conditions under which they live, it is clear that Arafat's administration is being held accountable
as well. The survival of the PA in Gaza rests on its ability to balance the dual objectives of
achieving legitimacy in the eyes of Gazans and achieving the stability demanded by Israel
(Kelly, 1996). Many Gazans Palestinians see Arafat as an autocrat committed to a peace process
that ignores their immediate economic needs. However, despite all the criticisms directed at the
PA, the possibility that Arafat could suddenly disappear from the scene causes considerable
anxiety among Palestinians. Arafat's absence could unleash frozen or suppressed conflicts
between the authority and the opposition, and among and within Palestinian factions (Roy,
1996).
2.7 Institutions
The Palestinians are faced with the enormous task of nation building. Although significant
progress has been made in establishing central government institutions, staffing ministries, and
facilitating the reconstruction process, the Palestinian Authority is already plagued by structural
and institutional problems common to most developing countries. There are administrative and
bureaucratic problems that may impede the planning and implementation of infrastructure
projects. Some of these inefficiencies can be attributed to the fragmented nature and composition
of the Palestinian society itself. Cultural, historical and political factors strongly influence the
decision-making process. Strong family ties and obligations, unwillingness to delegate and
coordinate decisions, and long periods of insecurity and uncertainty impinge upon governmental
actions and decisions (Roy, 1996).
Much of the criticism directed at the PNA involves appointments, said to be made more on the
basis of favoritism and nepotism than competence and performance. Such appointments,
according to critics, have taken a serious toll on the PA's efficiency. Moreover, monopolization
of decision making is encouraged by the political divisions and polarization of the Palestinian
public into supporters and opponents of the peace agreement. The major concern is the impact of
all these practices on institution building (Abu-Amr, 1995).
Critics - Palestinian and foreign alike - claim that while Yasser Arafat boasts of creating a free
market, he is running a command economy, dominated by state-run monopolies and choked by
corruption and favoritism Wusta, or bribery, is said to flourish, and the economic
mismanagement worries the international community. (Business Week, 04/07/1997).
Many Palestinians are concerned that the opportunity to lay the solid infrastructure needed to
make the transition to a Palestinian state may be lost. Some go so far as to wonder whether the
failure to create appropriate institutions is due to unpreparedness, which could be resolved given
enough time, or to an intrinsic Palestinian inability to establish an organization transcending
individuals. In any case, the comment is frequently heard that while appointments on the basis of
loyalty may be common in many states, the Palestinians cannot afford this luxury in the early,
crucial stages of state formation, where vision, experience, energy, and efficiency should take
precedence over party politics (Abu-Amr, 1995)
There is a clear risk that the nascent bureaucratic structure may potentially hamper project
planning and implementation. For example, there is duplication and competition between
governmental implementing agencies. The Ministry of Planning and the Palestinian Water
Authority are both involved in water resources planning, although the latter should be the only
implementing agency as stipulated by the 1995 bylaws. There is also the problem of
fragmentation of authority among governmental agencies working in the water sector. Donor
funding strategy also leads to the concentration of power in a few Ministries, with the inherent
risks of empire building. Finally, governmental institutions are hierarchical and centralized, thus
limiting empowerment and accountability. Although the directly elected Legislative Council has
been given a significant role, including approving laws, budget and cabinet members'
appointments, in reality Yasser Arafat is the ultimate authority, and he is increasingly bolstered
by the security services he has created. It has been said that the President of the PA, Yasser
Arafat, selects projects according to his own priorities (Abed, 1996). For instance, the Gaza
Airport project was quickly implemented - although not yet operational yet due to a political
wrangle with Israel regarding security arrangements - because it was one of Arafat's pet projects.
The extent to which the Palestinians take advantage of the opportunities and mitigate the
constraints will depend on the ability of the PA to build the institutions and legal environment
and to formulate proper policies. It will also depend on the security situation, on Israel's
goodwill, and on the PA's relations with other Arab countries.
2.8 The role of the donors
The Gaza Strip is totally dependent on outside support to finance infrastructure projects, and,
increasingly, recurrent costs. The international donor community pledged a total of $2.9 billion
for 1994-98 at the 1994 Paris Conference. The major pledges have come from the EU and the
European Investment Bank ($600 million over five years), the United States ($500 million) and
Japan ($247 million) (EIU, 1996). With a Palestinian population of 2.4 million in the West Bank
and Gaza, this represents a collective pledge of about $240 per person each year, which is
generous by international standards. Donor pledges at the Consultative Group meeting in Paris
on November 19-20, 1996 exceeded Palestinian expectations. Donors committed $880 million to
the 1997 investment program, which will be entirely foreign-financed. Of this total, $215 million
has been allocated for water and wastewater projects (EIU, 1997). Among the projects approved
for Gaza, the Gaza Seaport, the upgrading of Gaza's road network and the construction of a
coastal parkway, and a $100 million power plant. In the water sector, funds have been allocated
to the rehabilitation of water infrastructure in Gaza City, the Gaza Water Management Project,
the construction of a sewage system in Khan Yunis - the second largest city in the Strip, and the
renovation of wastewater treatment plants in Gaza and Rafah. Donor differences over funding
priorities are marked and were aired at the Paris meeting. The PA continues to rely on donors to
cover its growing budget deficit and to offset economic hardships through emergency
employment programs. Despite the pressures on donors to fund the budget deficit and its public
investment program, there is growing unease among some over funding the costs of Israeli
closure. Some donors argue that their funds, intended for long-term development, are being used
to subsidize Israeli government policy. The sense of indignation is the greater since Israeli
restrictions imposed on project material and personnel are also compromising the donor-
assistance program (EIU, 1996). In the coming years donors are likely to show some sign of
fatigue over funding for a Palestinian-Israeli peace process if it remains at its present impasse.
More than 60 aid agencies operate in the Gaza Strip. Each agency is pursuing its own political
agenda and is advocating its own technologies and design criteria. The challenges represented by
the coordination of the aid effort are daunting. Some coordination mechanisms have been put in
place by the UN agencies and the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation, but they are so far largely unsatisfactory. The technical and organizational
problems are compounded by the political factor which plays an overwhelming role in the
design, selection and implementation of projects. The US aid program, the largest in the Gaza
Strip, exemplifies this problem.
Because of the American preeminent role in the peace process, the US aid program is
overshadowed by political constraints. According to senior-level officials in the State
Department, the political and policy decisions are made at a very high level while lower-level
development decisions are left the US Aid Agency. Not only is the aid program centralized in the
Department of State, which defines its magnitude and direction, it appears to be under direct
supervision of Dennis Ross, the coordinator of the Middle East peace process (Roy, 1996). For
example, the Gaza stormwater/wastewater project illustrates the highly political nature of
policymaking and project selection:
The Gaza stormwater/wastewater project was chosen only after Dennis Ross visited the site of an
earlier USAID-funded stormwater project that failed disastrously and lay dormant for several
years - the reservoir supposed to receive stormwater was actually filled with sewage. Apparently
outraged over what he saw, Ross ordered that the project be redone correctly, and the Gaza
project was funded for $40 million, despite the lack of Palestinian involvement and the lack of
local implementation capacity (Roy, 1996).
Political pressures extend to the World Bank as well. Senior-level World Bank officials with
responsibility for the Palestinian territories described the pressure imposed by Mr. Ross and the
State Department generally on the Bank's West Bank/Gaza program as unprecedented, atypical,
minutely detailed and unacceptable (Roy, 1996).
In certain sectors such as water, the Israeli government continues to approve all new project
development, but now within the legal framework established by the Oslo agreements. For
example, USAID's project work in the water sector, which is a central focus of its overall
program, occurs within a clearly defined framework based on water agreements reached between
Israel and the Palestinians. The water agreements are administered by a joint committee of
Israelis and Palestinians (in which Israel retains veto power) who approve all new projects. A
point worth noting in this regard is that the US-funded Gaza stormwater project does not include
the treatment of sewage water, which could be used for agricultural purposes. This is consistent
with the Israeli policy which discourages agricultural activities that would involve reclaiming
and securing land for Palestinian use, and apportioning large amounts of water to the Palestinian
sector (Roy, 1996). The Oslo agreements are completely silent on the question of water
allocation for the Palestinian agricultural sector (and do not provide for additional water for
irrigation, for that matter).
The overall aid strategy is motivated by the necessity to demonstrate political progress and the
immediacy of economic need. Hence, the overall approach is one that is informed not by any
economic vision or long-term planning to which assistance is adapted, but one in which niches of
need are identified within a larger economic and political status quo. The neglect of projects in
agriculture, industry, and trade - where the possibilities of creating long-term sustainable
employment are real - is due, in part, to that fact that donors prefer to concentrate in areas less
subject to Israeli interference and where the probability of project success - defined as immediate
and visible results - is greater. One senior State Department official involved with the West Bank
& Gaza program said: we go where we can and do what we can while we can" (Roy, 1996). It
should be noted that while more than $300 million has been allocated for water-related projects,
there is no known master plan for water in the Gaza Strip (and the West Bank).
The political struggles inherent in the policy-making process are compounded by the
involvement of foreign donors and governments. Not only does the Palestinian Authority
compete within and against itself, and with the donors; the donors also compete within and
against themselves, as they have different goals for their governments' aid program the Gaza
Strip. Donors and consultants must deal with turf battles, organizational and personal rivalries
within or between ministries, and try to implement what they consider to be sound policies.
Sometimes competition between ministries is so stiff that there is little discussion between them
and at times it requires an outsider to act as a catalyst for change (Roy, 1996).
This highlights the negative aspects of the foreign-assistance program: the problematic nature of
technology transfer -buying foreign equipment and supplies-, the lack of understanding on the
part of donors of the country's real needs, and the fostering of dependence on foreign consultants
to the detriment of Palestinians. There is a real need to implement more efficient means of
solving development problems and enhance the technical and managerial capacities of
Palestinians..
2.9 Cultural Factors: Importance of Water
Since ancient times, water has been a central political factor in the Middle east. Water is deeply
rooted in both Islamic and Jewish religions, and evoke feelings that transcend its strictly
economic value.
The mezuzah, a precise Hebrew parchment placed on the doorpost of Jewish homes, refers to
both the problems of water and the key crops in ancient Israel: grain, wine and oil. The Talmud
teaches that since the temple was destroyed, the table in a Jewish home replaces the temple altar.
The challah bread (flour), the candles (olive oil flames), and the ever present wine (grapes)
symbolize the most crucial and problematic crops of ancient Israel. "If there is no flour, there is
no Torah; if there is no Torah, there is no flour", said Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria, a third-century
sage (Starr, 1995).
Ibn Manzur, the most famous Arab lexicographer, mentions in his dictionary Lisan al -'Arab
under the root "sh r" that shari'a in the acceptation of Arabs is the law of water concerning the
source which is regulated by people who drink, and allow other to drink, from. The same word is
also used for what God has decreed for the people in terms of fasting, prayer, marriage etc. The
connection between shari'a as a generic term for Islamic law and shari'a as the law of water
illustrate the centrality of water in Islam (Lowi, 1993). Antecedents to rules regulating water
allocation can be found in Islamic law, which had evolved a sophisticated set of principles to
regulate water management in order to minimize conflict (Hillel, 1993).
After the Holocaust in Europe and the progressive assimilation of their Diaspora elsewhere, the
Israelis considered their Zionist enterprise to be the last chance for Jewish survival and rebirth
(Hillel, 1993). To the Zionist movement, water was important because it was part of the
"ideology of agriculture" in Zionist thought. Encouraging agricultural activity in Palestine was
central to the achievement of its goals. Water, because it is an essential ingredient of agriculture,
was and continues to be considered important to the State of Israel, and has always been linked to
ideological, economic, political and security-related concerns. Water would help to make
possible the absorption of increasing numbers of immigrants and develop the land. In addition,
with water Israel could implement its policy of population dispersal, spreading Jewish
settlements throughout the country and, after 1967, the occupied territories, as well (Lowi, 1993).
Prior to 1948, the Arab population of Mandate Palestine constituted a largely agricultural society
that worked and lived off the land. Given that traditionally, agriculture was the principal
economic activity, water, whether in the form of rainfall or groundwater, was vital to the
livelihood of the Palestinian peasant. Zionist efforts at buying up land in Mandate Palestine
during the first half of the century caused the gradual alienation of Arab farmers from their land.
The establishment of the State of Israel following the 1948 war exacerbated this process.
Palestinians were restricted access to land and water, and this denial was viewed as a threat to
their survival (Lowi, 1993).
Chapter 3
Current water issues
The water issue in the Gaza Strip is extremely compelling. The importance of water for human
survival and economic growth makes it an issue of extreme political importance and sensitivity.
The water situation has already reached the dimensions of a crisis, possibly one of the most
serious in the world. What makes the water problem especially pernicious is that there is no
shortage of water, but rather a gradual decline of quality. Therefore, there is no sense of real
emergency and the political will to tackle the problem is lacking.
3.1 Water resource
Groundwater is the only current source of water for the Gaza Strip. Gaza does not have access to
any permanent source of fresh surface water.
3.1.1 Water sources
The water resources of Gaza are by and large restricted to the shallow coastal aquifer. The
aquifer consists mainly of recent dune sand and calcareous sandstone and clay layers of limited
thickness (MOPIC, 1996). Fresh groundwater typically occurs in the form of lenses that float on
top of brackish and saline groundwater (see Figure 6). This characteristic explains why deeper
wells - designed for higher discharges - produce a more saline water than shallow wells. The
shallow aquifer contains roughly 5 billion m' of groundwater. It was estimated in 1994 that
around 1.4 billion m3 of fresh groundwater was left in the shallow aquifer, roughly one third of its
total volume (IWACO, 1995).
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Figure 6 - Hydrogeological cross-section (MOPIC, 1996)
The major source of fresh groundwater in Gaza is rainfall. Rainfall records indicate that annual
rainfall ranges from 200 mm/year in the south to 450 mm/year in the north, giving an average of
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around 315 mm/year. Only 40 percent of total rainfall replenish the groundwater. The remaining
60percent evaporate or flow to the sea as runoff. A minor source of fresh groundwater is the
inflow from Israel - about 7 million m3/year (WRAP, 1994). Palestinians claim the natural
groundwater inflow has been significantly reduced due to the drilling of wells directly to the east
of the border of the Gaza Strip, within Israel. This has, however, been a point of contention
among hydrologists. Israeli sources argue that these wells are blocking the flow of saline water
which could damage the aquifer. Others contend that these wells draw on a separate part of the
coastal aquifer system and do not affect Gaza's aquifer.
The groundwater pumped in Gaza originates from a mix of rainfall, seawater, deep stagnant
groundwater, and inflow from the surrounding areas of Israel and infiltrating surface water. In
addition there is wastewater that infiltrates and irrigation return flow. As a result, groundwater
quality varies greatly over small distances, reflecting the origin of groundwater. For instance, in
rural areas where recharge is high and abstraction is limited, rainwater dominates. In urban areas,
a mix of rain and wastewater is found. Sea water or deep brackish water can be expected where
well density and pumping rates are high (MOPIC, 1996).
In 1995, 3,000 wells of which only 2,100 are registered and licensed tap the aquifer in the Strip
and abstraction is estimated at 135 million m3 of groundwater per year. The average production
for domestic use can be estimated at 130 1/c/d (47 m3/year) for the whole Gaza Strip. 11 percent
of this water is purchased from Mekorot (the Israeli National Water Company), 85 percent
produced directly by municipal departments and the remainder provided by UNRWA or
purchased from private owners (LYSA, 1995). Because water can be cheaply extracted from
shallow wells from the highly permeable coastal aquifer, over pumping has resulted. Assuming a
freshwater safe yield of 65 million m3/year, the negative balance is around 70 million m3/year
(WRAP, 1994). Pumping at a rate larger than replenishment leads to declining groundwater
levels, reduction in well capacities, and increasing salinity, caused by the seawater intrusion and
upconing saline groundwater (see Figure 7). If overexploitation continues, salinity will continue
to rise and a situation where damage becomes irreparable could easily be reached. According to
the Director of the World Bank-funded Gaza Water Management Project, the aquifer will
become completely unusable in less than 10 years if no action is taken (Odi6vres, personal
communication, 1997).
3.1.2 Water quality
The advice given to visitors to Gaza today is: "Don't drink the water!". Poor quality is one of the
Gaza Strip's most serious problems. Much of the coastal aquifer could be classified as saline.
Contamination from various sources is chiefly reflected by increasing chloride, fluoride and
nitrate levels.
Salinity
The increasing salinity is the best known and best monitored groundwater problem in Gaza. The
two main reasons are seawater intrusion and brackish water upconing. Seawater intrusion occurs
when hydrostatic pressure in the aquifer drops below hydrostatic pressure in the sea as a result of
overpumping. In the Southern and Central parts of the Strip, groundwater levels at a distance of
1-2 km from the shoreline have dropped to more than two meters below sea level (IWACO,
1995). Assuming an average flow rate of 30 m per year, seawater could have reached around 900
m inland in the last 30 years. Brackish upconing is the mobilization of brackish water - ancient
seawater that intruded in the aquifer thousands of years ago when the sea was at a higher level -
due to increased groundwater abstraction. In 1995, 17 wells supplying 27 million m3 per year of
water to Gaza City had, on average, a chloride content of 750 mg per liter (MOPIC, 1996).
Figure 7 shows the chloride concentration reported in pumped water in 1994. According to the
WHO, chloride concentration should not exceed 250 mg/l. Concentrations above 600 mg/1l are
harmful. The increase in salinity depends on the recharge conditions and the intrusion of brackish
or seawater. A recent survey showed that the average rate of salinization was close to zero in the
north of the Strip, whilst in the central and southeastern parts it exceeded 40 mg/1 per year.
Aquifer deterioration can be very fast; in Gaza, groundwater chloride content increases by 50
mg/l per year. In Deir Al Balah, groundwater salinity increased by 600 mg/l between 1988 and
1994 (LYSA, 1995).
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Figure 7 - Groundwater Salinity (MOPIC, 1996)
The desirable quality of water for agriculture should include at the most 500 ppm of chlorides per
liter, and for such important crops such as citrus and avocado the salinity should be between 130-
250 mg. As a result, agricultural products are drying up, in particular Gaza's major crop: citrus
fruits. Many orchards lie abandoned because water salinity is too high for the crop. Today it is
uncertain whether Gaza citrus production can utilize the full capacity of a newly constructed
UNDP-funded orange juice production plant. As salinity of the irrigation water continues to
increase as a result of overabstraction, farmers are forced to apply even more water in order to
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leach salts that would otherwise accumulate in the soil, thus worsening the already precarious
situation (Ministry of Agriculture, 1996).
Nitrate
In recent years, nitrate contamination of Gaza's drinking water has increased rapidly: in 1987, 84
percent of Gaza's drinking water wells were considered suitable for drinking in terms of nitrate
levels; by 1994, not a single safe well remained. The two major components that cause nitrate
pollution are infiltration of domestic wastewater flow and irrigation return flow. In areas where
domestic wastewater infiltrates, high nitrate concentrations are found. For instance, in Khan
Younis and Jabalya refugees camps, which are not sewered, concentrations of nitrate in domestic
water exceed 500 mg/l, or 10 times the WHO guideline of 50 mg/l. In 1994, more than half of the
wells in Gaza City contained more than 150 mg/1 (MOPIC, 1996). Irrigation return flow is rich in
nitrogen because farmers in Gaza apply far more nitrogen in the form of fertilizers than plants
require. A typical strawberry-farmer applies more than ten times the amount of nitrogen required
for plant growth.. Unregulated use of pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers contributes to severe
pollution, especially since the aquifer is close to the surface. Chemicals banned from use in Israel
and elsewhere, such as DDT, are often used in Gaza. In certain agricultural areas, this has lead to
a nitrogen load that is similar to that in unsewered urban areas. However, if concentrations in the
groundwater exceed 100 mg/l of nitrate, then there should be almost no need for nitrogen
fertilization, as the irrigation water itself would contain enough nitrogen to support plant growth
(MOPIC, 1996).
Other compounds
A survey conducted in 1991 (Palestine Center for Research and Information, 1993) showed that:
* 10 percent of the Gaza City wells, samples showed water containing more than 900 ppm of
sulfur.
* 16 percent of the wells were found with more than 1.7 ppm of fluoride. A study by the Gaza
Health Department Research Center revealed that the fluoride level in drinking water in the
whole of the Gaza Strip averages between 0.8 and 3.8 ppm. The normal ration allowed in
drinking water in accordance with WHO recommendations is 0.7 to 1.2 ppm.
12 percent of the wells were contaminated with bacteria.
These percentages have certainly increased during the past 5 years, but no recent study is
available.
Table 1 identifies three categories, whilst Figure 8 shows graphically how much domestic water
of each quality category is supplied: only 7 percent of domestic water pumped into the network is
potable according to WHO standards!
Water quality category Chloride concentration Nitrate concentration
(mg CI/) (mg N03/1)
Potable (WHO) < 250 < 50
Deteriorated < 500 < 150
Poor > 500 > 150
Table 1 - Categories of Water Quality (MOPIC, 1996)
Potable
7%
Poor
55%
Deteriorated
38%
Figure 8 - Domestic Water Quality (MOPIC, 1996)
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3.2 Water demand
3.2.1 Introduction
In 1995, 46 million m3 (35.5 percent) were consumed by households, 2 million m3 (1.5 percent)
by the industrial sector, and 81 million m3 (63 percent) were used for irrigation (Figure 9).
Currently, more than 135 million m3 are withdrawn every year (MOPIC, 1996). Some experts
suggest that with rapid population growth in Gaza, demand for drinking water alone may soon
outstrip safe supply. It is also possible that Israeli settler demand will increase even if settlement
population remains stable, due to 'increasing per capita demands for both irrigated acreage and
domestic amenities, such as grass and swimming pools. Even if demand remains stable, Gaza's
present water inventory may be in far worse shape than is implied by official figures: some
experts suggest that pumping rates in Gaza are 1.5 to 2 times officially declared levels (Kelly,
1995).
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Figure 9 - Water Demand (MOPIC, 1996)
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3.2.2 Domestic demand
Average daily consumption of water in Gaza is below 80 liters per person per day (lcd),
compared to 300 lcd in Israel and 400-500 lcd in the United States.. While low current income
levels constrain increasing levels of domestic consumption, despite the low prices of water in
Gaza, income levels should rise in the future. Effective demand for water will increase to provide
per capita consumption levels approaching those of Israel, placing enormous pressure on
resources. Viewed individually, the difference in total water consumption between the Arab
sector and the Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip is striking. In 1986, annual per capita water
consumption among the Arab population averaged 142 m3; it was 2,240 m3 among Jews, or more
than 18 times greater (Roy, 1995). This per person difference has not narrowed significantly
since 1986.
The effective demand for water by the Palestinians, given their per capita income level, is
probably much higher than current low usage levels indicate, because of past quantitative
restrictions on irrigation water use and shortages of finance for investments. The real demand, at
economic prices, is not possible to establish precisely due to the above restrictions, intermittent
supply, and current pricing practices which do not have any particular relationship to economic
costs..
3.2.3 Industrial Demand
Industrial demand for water is very low at present (2 percent of total consumption). However,
Palestinian and Israeli authorities are currently cooperating on a plan to build a $50 million Gaza
Industrial Estate at Carni (see Figure 2) to take advantage of Gaza's skilled work force, low labor
costs, and proximity to the Israeli market. Thus industrial demand for high quality water is
expected to increase substantially in the coming years.
3.2.4 Agricultural Demand
Irrigation water use has dropped from 1967 to 1990 (from 120 million m3 to 90 million m3 ) due
to the reduction of the irrigated area from 100,000 to 57,000 dunums and a shift from water-
intensive crops (i.e. citrus) to water-saving crops (i.e. vegetables). Also, because of the relatively
high costs of water ($ 0.14-0.17 per m3) and limitations imposed by the Israeli Civil
Administration - prohibition of new well drilling, strict quotas, uprooting of citrus trees, Gaza
farmers have used water more efficiently. The reasons were a change in cropping patterns and a
rapid and effective transfer of new technology and knowledge from Israel, notably in the area of
water-efficient irrigation techniques and production under plastic. In Gaza, water use per dunum
has fallen by 58 percent since 1966 (World Bank, 1993). Today citrus still makes up 55 percent
of the total irrigated area, consuming roughly half of Gaza's agricultural water supply. Out of the
86 million m3 used by the agricultural sector, 47 percent were applied to citrus (orange, lemon
and grapefruit), 51 percent to vegetables and flowers (strawberry, tomato, cucumber, potato,
etc.), and 2 percent to other fruits (olives and others) (Ministry of Agriculture, 1996).
Agricultural consumption increased immediately after the military orders concerning water
exploitation were canceled (1993). Recent data show a 40 percent increase in water withdrawals
between 1993 and 1996. This is due to population growth (+38 percent over the same period),
and increased agricultural use following the implementation of the self-rule agreements. In
agriculture, present demand per dunum (approximately 1000 m2) of irrigated land is equivalent to
Israeli levels (600 m3 per dunum per year). However, total potential demand is much greater. In
Gaza a further 80 to 100,000 dunums could be irrigated, even though total agricultural area is
expected to shrink gradually due to rapid urbanization (WRAP, 1994). This implies that annual
demand in Gaza agriculture could rise to 120 million m 3.
In the future, agricultural water users will have to compete with water users in other sectors, who
may produce higher value products per unit of water and who would be able to pay more for
water. Consequently, farmers will basically have only two options: they will have to continue
with their efforts to maximize the returns from the limited water available to them through water-
saving techniques and crop selection, or they will have to use treated wastewater which will be
available in increasing quantities.
3.3 Water balance
The groundwater balance is presented in Table 2 and Table 3. Fresh groundwater represents only
one third of the total freshwater volume in the shallow aquifer, but it accounts for 100 percent of
settlement abstraction (settlements appear to have been deliberately placed in areas where
groundwater quality is the best (WRAP, 1994)), 74 percent of domestic abstraction, and 49
percent of irrigation abstraction. The deficit in the fresh groundwater balance amounts to 22
million m3/year and is compensated by brackish and seawater intrusion (20 million m3) and
falling water table (2 million m3) (MOPIC, 1996).
Recharge from wadis
Groundwater inflow from
Israel
Return flow (domestic)
Return flow (irrigation)
Saline/brackish inflow
Purchased from Mekorot
(Israeli National Carrier)
TOTAL
2
10
27*
30
16
4
135
0
7
13
18
0
4
63
sinks
Difference lost to saline
sinks
Difference lost to saline
sinks
* Domestic wastewater and
leakages
Seawater intrusion and
brackish water upconing
1) Groundwater with a chloride content less than 500 mg Cl/1
Table 2 - Groundwater Balance (Inflow Component) (MOPIC, 1996)
jIomesic aRstraction
Irrigation abstraction
Industrial abstraction
Settlement abstraction
Groundwater outflow
Evaporation Mawasy area
Drop in groundwater table
TOTAL
81
2
6
2
1
-3
135
40
1
6
2
0
-2
83
Not included 5 million m3
supplied by domestic water
Excess fresh water
abstraction is 22 million
m3/yr
Table 3 - Groundwater Balance - Outflow Component (MOPIC, 1996)
Out of the 26 million m3 of wastewater produced annually, 8 millon m3 end up in the sea, 4
million m3 evaporate from open pools and gardens (where wastewater from kitchens is used for
watering plants), and 14 million m3 recharge the aquifer. The tables above explain the major
reason why groundwater quality deteriorates. Almost half of the water that replenishes the
aquifer every year is of poor quality: 14 million m3 per year of domestic wastewater, 30 million
m 3 per year of irrigation return flow, and 16 million m3/year of saline water (MOPIC, 1996).
3.4 Level of service
Living conditions in the Gaza Strip are much worse than per capita incomes would lead one to
expect. Nearly three-quarters of the population are registered refugees, and 55 percent of these
people live in refugee camps (WRAP, 1995). Environmental conditions in the camps are
generally poor. Most of the camps have no organized system of sewage collection, and none has
an adequate system of sewage treatment for collected wastes. The sewage system, meant to be
temporary, has remained largely open and exposed an extremely unsanitary playground for
children, especially in the summer. Pools of stagnant wastewater frequently develop in the flatter
sites of the Gaza Strip. All of the camps are provided with solid waste collection facilities, but
properly designed sanitary landfills have not been constructed anywhere in the Gaza Strip.
Wastes often leach into the aquifer, thereby contaminating drinking water supplies. More than a
half of households in camps are served by a piped water supply in the dwelling, and two-thirds
have good access to some source of piped water. However, piped water usually contains
unacceptable levels of salts, nitrates and other contaminants. In more than 90 percent of the
cases, the water is disinfected at the source (PWA, 1996).
In the current institutional framework, Municipalities are entrusted for Water and Sanitation
utilities, and face problems with very limited means. With the exception of the Municipality of
Gaza, most local utilities have not reached the critical size to structure their activity and to
develop a technical competence, resulting in a very low level of service. Water undertakings
have serious problems in maintaining systems, reducing unaccounted-for water, maintaining
adequate pressure and in supplying the available water to customers. 20 percent of the nearly
100,000 connections are unmetered or illegal, and estimates indicate that about 50 percent of
water in municipal distribution networks is lost through leakage, illegal connections and
inaccurate, or lack of metering (LYSA, 1995). If 50 percent of the water pumped into the
distribution network, or 26 million m3 in 1995, actually reached the households, then the average
water consumption is around 80 liters per person per day (Odibvres, personal communication,
1997)
Water can only be supplied in rotation in certain urban areas, sometimes only for a few hours
once or twice a week. This endangers the quality of the water as contaminated water can infiltrate
into supply pipes when the water pressure drops drastically.
3.5 Benchmark analysis
The following table presents a selection of performance indicators. For the purposes of the
analysis, data for the Gaza Strip are compared to Israel's current performance as well as
internationally acknowledged benchmarks.
Benchmark analysis underline an overall very poor performance of the water and sanitation
sector in Gaza. For instance, only 7 percent of domestic water pumped into the network is
"potable" according to WHO standards. In many locations, water can be considered as harmful to
human health. However, large populations are consuming this water due to lack of affordable
alternatives.
Indicator (1995 data) Gaza Gaza Acceptable Israel percent vs. Performance
(average) (range) limit (average) Israel
(benchmark)
Chloride concentration 700 50-2000 max. 250 100 700 very poor
(mg/1) (WHO)
Nitrate concentration 150 20-500 max. 45 15 1000 extremely
(mg/1) (WHO) poor
Water availability per 50 250 500 10 very low
capita (liters/day)
Water treatment (percent) 2 80 3 extremely
poor
Households with access to 35 0-80 100 100 35 poor
piped water (percent) (target)
Households with sewerage 10 0-40 100 80 12 extremely
(percent) (target) poor
Unaccounted-for water 50 up to 65 15 15 330 very poor
(percent)
Water considered "potable" 7 100 100 7 extremely
(WHO guidelines) (percent) poor
Table 4 - Benchmark Analysis (MOPIC, 1996, Shuval, 1995, WRAP, 1994, LYSA, 1995 )
3.6 Water infrastructure
Under Israeli rule since from 1967 to 1993, basic infrastructure has remained primitive and is in
desperate need of rehabilitation. This has had major impacts on the management and sustainable
development of water resources (WRAP, 1994). Years of economic and political dislocation,
neglect of local institutions and under-investment in the public sector have contributed
significantly to the present grossly inadequate level of infrastructure and services. Overall public
investment has been very low, at 3 to 4 percent of GDP a year or less-as compared to 6 percent
in Jordan and 7 percent in Egypt in the 1980s-which has led to the decay of basic infrastructure
(World Bank, 1996). Most areas in the Gaza Strip suffer from recurring and severe flooding
problems, and some have the double problem of flooding and inadequate septic pits. In the rainy
season, low-lying areas experience sewerage discharge into floodwaters on the streets. Some 50
percent of the roads in Gaza are unpaved and virtually all streets and footpaths are unpaved, and
extremely difficult to transit in the rainy season. With respect to wastewater, less than half the
urban area is sewered, and untreated or inadequately treated wastewater presents serious health
and environmental risks. A few municipalities have wastewater collection systems but only about
60 percent of houses are connected. Moreover, the few treatment plants that exist have generally
failed to operate as designed. In most cases, sewage is discharged untreated into wadis or the sea.
3.7 Public Health Issues
The routine consumption of contaminated or saline water by Gaza Palestinians contributes to
deterioration of the overall health of the population, and are likely to cause permanent health
damage to a large segment of the population.
Some experts think that high salt concentrations are already producing adverse health effects:
Gaza physicians are convinced that salty water is responsible for the high incidence of kidney
and liver complaints among Gaza residents (Saleh, personal communication, 1997). Salinity has
also been linked to hypematremia, ought to be responsible for a large percentage of 'crib deaths'
and early brain damage (Kelly, 1996). Elevated nitrate levels are also suspected of contributing
to infant mortality by causing acute anemia or blue baby disease. Nitrates have also been linked
to cancer and to increased incidence of spontaneous abortion, both in humans and in animals
(Kelly, 1996). Gazans are exposed to high fluoride concentrations in their groundwater and also
in the fish and the tea that are staple foods. When consumed in large amounts, fluoride is toxic
and contributes to ulcers, kidney failure, soft-tissue calcification, and skeletal and dental
fluorosis. The fluoride content of the groundwater in the area north of Gaza City is reported to be
high enough to lead to the mottling of teeth and bone disease (WRAP, 1994). Studies in the West
Bank show that absorption through the skin or ingestion of groundwater chemical polluted with
fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides can damage the nervous system.
The most prevalent and serious health problem in Gaza is infectious disease caused by
waterborne bacteria, viruses, and parasites. In Gaza, waterborne diseases, especially diarrheal
diseases, are second only to respiratory diseases as a cause of mortality and morbidity among
children in the age group 0-14 (World Bank, 1997). Intestinal parasites are prevalent. A recent
UNRWA report stated that at Beach Camp (the largest refugee camp in Gaza) by the age of four
years, from 50 to 85 percent of children are infested with roundworms and other intestinal
parasites (Roy, 1995). The Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, which operates
clinics in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank, reported that three-quarters of all clinic patients
suffered from infectious diseases, which were responsible for 74 percent of all childhood deaths.
These diseases largely result from poor personal hygiene and inadequate sewage disposal, which
are, in turn, exacerbated by insufficient water for washing and waste removal. Moreover, open
sewers are common in urban areas. Thus in November 1994, heavy rains caused sewage to mix
with freshwater supplies, producing an outbreak of cholera in Gaza City, with fifty cases and one
death in a week (Saleh, personal communication, 1997).
World Bank estimates for the Arab region show that nearly 8.4 million DALYs (disability
adjusted life year) are lost due to waterborne diseases (Table 5). Although data is lacking for the
Gaza Strip, it is very likely that the incidence of waterborne disease is at least as high as in the
Arab region as a whole.
Principal diseases
Diarrhea, Dysentery, Cholera
and Typhoid
Trachoma, Hepatitis, Intestinal
Helminths, Schistosomiasis
DALYs lost per year (1990)
Arab Region Gaza (extrapolated)
7,700,000 154,000
690,000 13,800
Table 5 - Principal Diseases Related to Unsafe Water and Sanitation in MENA and Gaza
(World Bank, 1996)
3.8 Pricing
Tariffs do not encourage conservation, are generally inadequate to recover O&M costs due to the
high level of unaccounted-for-water, and are subject to poor collection efficiency. In the Gaza
Strip, tariffs are flat or very mildly progressive and set well below marginal cost, providing little
incentive to conserve the very limited water available. . However, due to the poor quality of
water, sales of bottled mineral water at a price of $ 200-500 / m3 are rapidly increasing, and
impact on households' budgets, especially the poorest, is significant. There is no uniform pricing
policy in the Gaza Strip, but a rather disparate mix of fixed and progressive rates. Prices for the
first 10 m3 range from $0.30/m3 (Gaza) to $0.60/m3 (in areas supplied by Mekorot) (LYSA,
1995). In the South of the Strip, local administrations have had no other option than to purchase
water from Mekorot, undermining the financial viability of water services and requiring the
highest tariffs in Gaza. Extraction costs from wells are estimated at $ 0.15-0.20 / m3, and are a
good approximation of current irrigation water cost. The World Bank (1990) mentions costs
around US$ 0.10 / m3 for irrigation water in Gaza. However, tariffs for irrigation water are non-
existent. The significance of these low costs becomes more pronounced when compared to the
subsidized cost of water to Israeli farmers, which was estimated at US$ 0.14 / m3 . The
implication here is that present costs in the Gaza Strip do not reflect the true value of water, its
scarcity and externalities such as environmental damage due to the over-exploitation of the
aquifer. The PWA is currently working on the establishment of a uniform tariff policy for the
entire Gaza Strip. Pricing should reflect O&M expenses to ensure the managerial and financial
autonomy of the water sector. Currently, more than 5 million m3 of domestic water is used for
crop irrigation: a heavy surcharge would dissuade subscribers from using the municipal piped
water for irrigation. According to LYSA, the new price should not be very far from the current
one (LYSA, 1995). On the one hand, the rehabilitation of production and system installation
would enable the municipalities to reduce significantly their O&M expenses. On the other hand,
illegal connection reduction and metering would increase income to the water utility. However,
tariff standardization will require a significant increase of the cost of water in Gaza City, a
politically difficult step to take (Odievres, personal communication, 1997).
3.9 Water law
The extent of water scarcity in the region is an important factor in the designing of water
distribution laws. In areas of the world where water is plentiful, water is usually allocated
according to the riparian rights doctrine, which states that anyone who possesses land next to a
flowing river or stream may take its water as long as enough is left for downstream users. In arid
regions, such as Israel and the Palestinian Territories, the doctrine of appropriative water rights
prevails. The doctrine of appropriative water rights, or prior appropriation, permits diversions to
and allocated quotas among specified parties. The quotas are allocated on a first-come, first-serve
basis and are subject to the "use or loose it" rule. The amount of water initially used determines
the size of a user's quota, and there are severe restrictions on trading in water rights once they are
assigned. (Howitt, 1995). The rigidity of these nonmarket methods of determining water
allocation is a major reason for the relatively excessive water used by agriculture in the region.
The laws in force today in the Gaza Strip come from 5 different sources, reflecting the 5 different
authorities (Ottoman, British, Egyptian, Israeli, Palestinian Authority) which have controlled the
Gaza Strip in the twentieth century. The Palestinian Water Authority is currently preparing a new
water law for the Palestinian self-ruled areas. The principles which are about to be promulgated
by the PWA consist of the following (Box 1):
Box 1 - Water Law - Principles (Abu Hijleh, personal communication, 1997)
Israel retains a veto over all Palestinian legislation "which might jeopardize major Israeli
interests whose overriding power is recognized by the Declaration of Principles (Cairo
Agreement). Consequently, Palestinian legislation cannot "seriously threaten other significant
Israeli interests protected by this agreement and to which the entry in force of the legislation
could not cause irreparable damage or harm" (Cairo Agreement, May 4, 1994).
3.10 The Oslo Agreement on Water
On the Israeli-Palestinian track, water was one of the major sticking points in the negotiations
leading to the signing of the interim agreement in Washington in September 1995 (Oslo II).
Water is referred to under article 40 of Annex 3 "Protocol concerning Civil Affairs" of the
Agreement. Article 40 of the agreement recognizes Palestinian water rights, transfer additional
resources and responsibilities to the Palestinians, and establishes a Joint Water Committee to
coordinate water resources management. The relevant articles read as follow (Box 2):
Box 2 - Oslo II Agreement - Article 40
Regarding the Gaza Strip, Art. 7 provides for an additional supply of 5 million m3 per year from
the Israeli National Water Carrier, to be charged at the full cost incurred by the supplier,
including cost of production at the source and the conveyance all the way to the point of delivery.
Article 8 stipulates that the Palestinians will be responsible for constructing a new pipeline to
convey the 5 million m3/year from the existing water system to the Gaza Strip. Article 8 also
mentions that "in the future, this quantity will come from desalination in Israel".
Art. 25 and Schedule 11 deal with the Gaza Strip specifically:
Art. 25 The existing agreements and arrangements between the sides concerning water
resources and water and sewage systems in the Gaza Strip shall remain unchanged, asdetailed in Schedule 11.
Napoleon once described a treaty as being more striking for the things that it omits than for those
it contains. When contrasted to the Helsinki and International Law Commission Principles
(described in section 6.3.3) Article 40 shows a clear concern for the principle of prevention of
harm, but is silent regarding the principle of equity. The article does not provide for the
mitigation of the disastrous water situation in Gaza. The fundamental principle of Article 40 is
the preservation of the status quo in the Gaza Strip, particularly the continuous supply of existing
water quantities to the settlements. "All pumping from water resources in the settlements and the
Military Installation Area shall be in accordance with existing quantities of drinking water and
agricultural water. Without derogating from the powers and responsibilities of the Council, the
Council shall not adversely affect these quantities". While the recognition of the Palestinians
water rights can be considered as a breakthrough, the second and third principles in the
agreement attempt to undermine the significance of this issue by talking about maintaining
existing utilization and recognizing the necessity to develop new resources, tacitly accepting that
more water is needed to satisfy the needs of both populations (Issac, 1996 [36]). The agreement
states that any additional water made available to the Palestinians will have to come from
undeveloped sources, without consideration for the technical feasibility and economic cost. In
addition, no provision is made in Article 40 for additional quantities of irrigation or industrial
water for the Palestinian sector. Interestingly, the article mentions that the additional 5 million m3
allocated to Gaza "will have to come from desalination in Israel in the future", and not from
Israel's existing resources. The agreement does not allocate sources or aquifer but rather defines a
quantity considered as adequate by the parties. It is clear that, in face of the growing Palestinian
population, a fixed quantity will result in increasing constraints on economic and social
development.
The Oslo II agreement has set in motion a process with an unclear and undefined outcome -
permanent status of water rights and allocations - about which the two protagonists (three if
Jordan is included) have widely differing views and ideas. As a result, the present situation is one
of transition towards an unknown destination.
3.11 Institutions
Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority on May 4, 1994, a full complement of
ministries has been created and a major effort has been made to consolidate these ministries and
to develop administrative capacity. More recently, the Palestinian Water Authority, a separate
national agency, has been established to manage the water sector. Earlier the Ministry of
Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) had established the Environmental Planning
Directorate which was responsible for environmental policy making, including land and water
management. With the development of specialized national agencies, EPD was supposed to have
been restructured or absorbed into one or another of the new agencies, including the Palestinian
Water Authority and the soon-to-be Environmental Protection Agency. For political and
organizational reasons, this has only partially happened. Consequently, there is now a
considerable lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities in the water sector at the central
level. This has slowed institutional consolidation significantly and complicated policymaking in
the water sector. There are also clear signs of competition for power and funds between the
Ministry of Planning and the Palestinian Water Authority, and, on a regional level, between the
Ministries in Gaza and the West Bank (which are virtually cut off from each other). The
Palestinian Water Authority - created with the support of the UNDP and the World Bank - lacks
access to financial resources and the political support that the Ministry of Planning enjoys.
The water sector has long been characterized by the weakness of the institutional sector. 16
municipalities and Village Councils are in charge of the Water and the Sewerage public service
on their territory. Neither the Agriculture department nor the Municipalities are supervised for
these activities (LYSA, 1995). Until 1995, no institution had the responsibility of the water
sector; the situation changed with the establishment of the Palestinian Water Authority on April
15, 1995. Among the important tasks of the newly created PWA are the definition of a water
policy, the preparation of a water law, the management of the water resource and the
implementation of the policy. The PWA will have full responsibility for planning development,
legislation and monitoring of the various water resources. However, water distribution will be
delegated to water utilities. The coordination between the PWA and the Ministry of Agriculture
has been guaranteed by the formation of the Palestinian Water Council which comprises
representatives from the Ministries of Agriculture, local government, planning and international
cooperation, in addition to PWA and universities (Abu Hijleh, personal communication, 1997).
Monitoring stations and information networks will be developed to feed the PWA with vital data
required for planning and policy formulation.
Water supply and sanitation services are delivered by a variety of government agencies: water
departments of municipal governments, village councils, and a UN agency. UNDP and UNICEF,
as well as numerous foreign charity organizations also helped deliver water and sanitation. Some
900 to 1,000 local NGOs, responding to a political and institutional vacuum, provided a vast
array of services, particularly in the health, housing and higher education sectors, but also in the
water and sanitation sector. Most governmental agencies are too small to develop adequate
capacity and have little incentive to perform efficiently. Funding of maintenance is inadequate,
and separate financial accounts for water sector services are generally not kept and performance
monitoring is limited. There is no proper accounting separation of the water departments.
Revenues collected go into a central government fund, with no link to the amounts which can
then be spent on operations and investment. To add to these problems, over 30 percent of
revenue remain uncollected (LYSA, 1995).
The World Bank is supporting a project in Gaza with a focus on improving the performance of
water and wastewater services by merging the existing sixteen service providers into a single
utility serving the entire Gaza Strip. A contract - binding each municipality with the PWA -
would formalize the commitment of the Municipality to implement the water policy, and include
production ratios, quality control, metering, system efficiency, customer management, tariff,
financial balance, maintenance and staffing ratios. In order to strengthen the technical and
managerial competencies of the Municipalities, a "Coastal Services Support Company (CSSCo)"
would be created under the PWA supervision (LYSA, 1995). The CSSCo would provide the
Municipalities with technical services and enable them to fulfil the Performance Contract signed
with the PWA. The proposed autonomous utility would be based on the model of the well-
functioning Jerusalem Water Undertaking (JWU) serving the Ramallah area in the West Bank.
3.12 Human Resources
Historically, Palestinians have always been known as the most educated people in the Arab
world. For those in the West Bank and Gaza, this is no longer true. A recent UNESCO study
comparing 35 developing countries in math and science achievement and aptitude found that
Palestinian students in the West Bank and Gaza scored very close to the lowest out of the 35
developing countries sampled. Classroom education quality is rapidly declining in Gaza due to
poor teacher training and overcrowding and access to higher education has also been severely
curtailed (Roy, 1995).
In the water sector, there is a critical dearth of skilled professionals. According to the director of
the Gaza Water Management Project, recruitment of qualified people is extremely difficult and
water professionals are in desperate need of appropriate skills training. (Odievres, personal
communication, 1997). There are very little water programs offered by local universities and
Israel current security arrangements prevent Gaza students from traveling to West Bank
universities, let alone to universities in other Arab countries or Israel. The main problem of the
donors' program is its lack of emphasis on developing human resources, the Gaza's primary if not
sole asset. In 1995, in response to the sharp rise in unemployment, mainly due to border closures,
the donor community shifted funding towards projects that produce immediate and visible
results. The emphasis remains on infrastructure, not on people. However, a constructive step that
some donors have taken is to assist in the training of the next generation of water experts in the
region. In this regard, the establishment of a program allowing Gazan water professionals to
attend courses in several European countries, including the Netherlands and Norway, is positive
and encouraging. However, this relationship will not be sustainable in the long term. It is more
important to create a regional and informal network of individuals in Israel and the West
Bank/Gaza with personal relationships and shared understanding of the region's management
issues. Water research institutes in Israel, including Technion and Ben Gurion University of the
Negev, rank among the best in the world. Talented Palestinian students and professionals should
be granted access to their water programs.
Chapter 4
Future
4.1 Demand forecasts
Demand forecasting in the Gaza Strip is highly subject to uncertainty. Domestic water demand
will depend upon population growth and, therefore, will be closely related to social and political
developments. In addition, the demand for water is a factor of economics, specifically the
quantities of a commodity that consumers are willing to purchase at various prices. The
agricultural sector is currently the largest consumer of water and will have a significant impact
on water demand scenarios. For the time being, industrial demand is almost negligible, but
water-intensive industries could potentially develop in the Gaza Strip. The following scenarios
are based on information provided by various sources, including the PWA, the Harvard Middle
East Water Project reports, the UN and the World Bank. They do not differentiate between the
various water qualities (freshwater, brackish water, recycled water). It is important to note that
these scenarios are not written in stone and are subject to further updates. The estimated
projections of population for the Gaza Strip are shown in Figure 10 for the low, base, and high
scenarios. Due to the limited land and resources in Gaza, it was assumed that only 100,000
refugees will return gradually to Gaza by the year 2005. However, there is a possibility that the
time frame might change according to political negotiations.
The estimated per capita consumption for all scenarios is listed in
Table 6. The values in the table include 25 percent unaccounted-for-water. It was assumed that
efforts to improve the delivery efficiency and the rehabilitation of the water systems would take
place by the year 2000.
Table 6 - Projection of per capita demands per year (Palestine Consultancy Group, 1995)
Figure 10 - Population projections for the Gaza Strip (thousands)
The total demand for domestic, industrial and irrigation water is projected as listed in Table 7 for
all scenarios, based on the projected per capita consumption and total population.
Industrial
Agricultural
TOTAL
Base
High
Low
Base
High
Low
Base
High
Low
Base
High
2
2
2
81
81
81
129
129
129
3
5
7
80
80
90
135
140
145
7
12
17
70
80
100
150
173
214
Table 7 - Projected Demand for the Gaza Strip
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Figure 11 shows that the anticipated doubling of domestic demand within 15 years will only
increase the gap between supply and demand, thus further deteriorating the aquifer. Possible
options and alternatives to close the gap are reviewed and assessed in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.2 Matching supply and demand
It is clear that solutions to water problems in the Gaza Strip can only be achieved through a broad
approach to resolving many issues: technical, economic, institutional and social. As a first step,
priorities have to be set, given resources constraints and the still limited capacity of the
Palestinian institutions in the field of water and sanitation.
The challenge for the coming years will be twofold (MOPIC, 1996):
* Establish clear and sound priorities. What should be achieved, whom should be supplied with
what quality and quantity of water, and which investments are needed. These priorities need
to be reviewed at regular intervals and may change over time.
* Coordinate activities of the many actors in the field of water. One aspect in this coordination
is to make sure that all different "building blocks" that are currently available are used
effectively within the framework of Integrated Water Resources Management.
In the short-term, the following objectives should be pursued:
* improve the quality of water to acceptable levels
* improve the operation and maintenance of existing systems, with particular emphasis on the
reduction of unaccounted-for water through gradual network rehabilitation
* strengthen regulatory controls over groundwater extraction
* rehabilitate and expand wastewater collection and treatment, while laying the basis for
agricultural reuse
* expand piped water and sewerage coverage
* initiate awareness programs to promote conservation practices
* investigate short-term solutions to increase the quantity of water
* improve data collection and develop an efficient monitoring system
* pursue the institutional reform initiated with the creation of the Palestinian Water Authority
For the medium-term and long-term objectives, a strategy for supply and demand-side
management will have to be developed by establishing an analytical framework for integrated
water resources management. Water planning in a strategic context must have at least three
components: supply augmentation, demand management, and institutional development:
Supply Augmentation
Supply augmentation deals with technical methods to ensure a greater supply of water to users.
Building canals, pipelines, well fields, recycling and reuse plants, groundwater storage and
desalination are among the approaches taken. However, over time the availability of inexpensive
supply augmentation projects becomes smaller and smaller as the best options are constructed
first. It finally becomes apparent that the demand for water cannot be satisfied by continuing to
build more and more expensive surface water facilities (Rogers, 1995). This typically leads to the
examination of other approaches such as demand management.
Demand management
Demand management is the policy component most preferred by economists and other social
scientists. They claim that, as the cost of supply augmentation increases, the most efficient
approach to meeting water demands is to bring demand into balance with supply rather than
increasing supply to meet the demand. This is to say that, by increasing prices the demand can
always be made to match the supply. Not only do price increases reduce the demand for water,
they also expand the supply, since sources that were too expensive to develop in the past now
become economically feasible due to the increased price of water (Rogers, 1995). An increased
price also makes the conservation options more economically attractive. Pricing policy can,
therefore, lead to the introduction of new technologies and practices on both the supply and the
demand sides of the water availability equation (Rogers, 1995).
Institutional Development
In order to plan and manage water resources a set of appropriate institutions must be in place;
these are the indispensable third component of water resource management. Important functions
of water institutions are research, planning, management, public education, and implementation.
Future water investments will be beyond the budgetary capacity of the donors and the public
sector and will require private financing, involving private ownership and/or management. This
new approach will require extensive institutional reform and the establishment of a modem
regulatory framework.
In Chapters 5 and 6, supply-side and demand-side options are reviewed and evaluated.
Chapter 5
Options: Existing Water
This chapter deals with water allocation policies, which are actions affecting the distribution of
given quantities of water among different uses and users.
* reallocation of irrigation water to industrial and domestic uses
* dual system (high quality water for drinking/cooking, lesser quality water for other domestic
uses)
* water system rehabilitation
* pricing and conservation measures
5.1 Fresh groundwater
Given the current political situation, it is unlikely that new water resources will be made
available to the Gaza Strip in the near future. Importation of water from Israel and seawater
desalination are long term options that will not be implemented in the coming 10 years. Due to
population growth, groundwater withdrawals will continue to rise, and as a result deterioration of
groundwater quality will continue unabated. Assuming a 180 m3/hour capacity well (i.e. 1.3 M
m3/year), a new well should be drilled each year to balance the population growth and maintain a
steady allocation per capita. According to the director of the Gaza Water Management Project,
no potable groundwater will be left in less than a decade (Odievres, Personal Communication,
1997). Current withdrawals should be decreased dramatically in order to replenish the coastal
aquifer and restore the quality of the water. However, a return to a normal situation would be
very long and would require very important hydraulic resources, disproportionate compared with
abstracted volumes that have caused the deterioration (LYSA, 1995).
Recharge through ground flow from the east could be significantly increased if Israeli wells
installed on the perimeter of Gaza reduce their withdrawals. The additional quantities at stake
could be as high as 44 million of m3 per year (Palestine Consultancy Group, 1995), although this
figure has been the subject of much controversy. This issue should be part of the negotiation
between Israel and the regarding the establishment of water rights.
Groundwater protection
There is a portion of the Gaza aquifer that still complies with WHO water quality guidelines.
These semi-natural areas are located in the far north and in the southwest of the Gaza Strip (see
Figure 7 in section 3.1.2.). These unique potable resources constitute less than 5 percent of the
total groundwater volume in the shallow aquifer (MOPIC, 1996). In the Emergency Resources
Protection Plan they were all included in the so-termed "Water Catchment 1" category (Figure
12). Their combined surface is just a few percent of the total surface area of the Gaza Strip. This
calls for a specific strategy where these fresh groundwater resources would be reallocated in
order to ensure that high quality water be abstracted for drinking purposes only, and
consequently minimize the need for new water development. Under the current conditions it is
unrealistic in the short- and medium term to aim at a supply of all domestic water based on fresh
groundwater. Only 2 to 4 percent of all domestic water requires drinking water quality. With a
current domestic demand of 46 million m3 and a population of one million, that is 1 to 2 million
m3 per year, or 3 to 6 liters per capita per day (MOPIC, 1996).
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Table 8 shows the potential safe yield that could be withdrawn from the proposed groundwater
protection areas. It should be noted that protecting a unit area in the north is more efficient than
protecting a unit area in the south as the rate of renewal (recharge) in the north is twice as high as
in the south.
Southwestern 25 2 5 0  4 0  2,5 0 0 ,0 0 0
TOTAL 40 6,100,000
Table 8 - Fresh (Potable) Groundwater Potential (adapted from MOPIC, 1996)
Figure 13 shows the projected demand for drinking quality water, assuming the population
projections estimated in Section 4.1 Demand forecasts and a per capita consumption of 5 liters
per day. Provided both aquifers are managed in a sustainable manner, drinking water demand
could be satisfied from those sources for the next 50 years.
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The challenges in implementing this strategy are technical, political and economic. In part, they
relate to the Israeli settlements: more than 80 percent of the areas that meet the criteria for
groundwater protection are located within current Israeli settlements. At present, the Palestinian
authority has no sovereignty over these settlements, and considering the current deadlock in the
peace talks, this situation is unlikely to change in the near future (MOPIC, 1996). In addition,
most of the potential groundwater protection areas outside the settlements are privately owned. A
set of incentives will have to be designed so that landowners will be willing to protect and trade
the water underlying their properties. Land acquisition by the government is probably not
feasible as the cost will be prohibitive. Communal ownership is also an important issue: the
municipalities of Rafah and Beit Lahia - where the potable groundwater resources are located -
will certainly object if the use of their "own" water is restricted (MOPIC, 1996). Incentives and
compensation mechanisms will have to be designed in order to mitigate potential impact on third
parties (see also Section 5.7.3).
Technically, two issues should be studied in detail: (1) sustainable management of groundwater
abstraction. (2) alternatives for distribution to consumers.
A restrictive policy for groundwater abstraction should probably be implemented in a certain
radius around the protection area in order to fence off effects of overabstraction in surrounding
areas. A permanent monitoring of the quality of underground waters - static level, physio-
chemical characteristics - should be installed in order to gain immediate information on the
localization of deteriorated water. A management scheme should be established for the aquifer
based on a groundwater mathematical model (see Section 7.2.2).
With regard to distribution, the questions are whom to supply with the protected water and how.
The strategy should aim at providing every individual household with a safe supply of drinking
water. Distribution alternatives are discussed in Section 5.9: (1) Development of a separate
infrastructure for potable water, completely independent of the current network (that will supply
increasingly brackish water). (2) Construction of water stations -supplied by pipeline or truck -
in neighborhoods. (3) Development of a system of containers to be distributed by the private
sector. Selection of the appropriate alternative will depend on technical, economic and social
factors. Issues of acceptance and willingness-to-pay are discussed in Section 7.2.4.
Costs
Cost of extraction is estimated at US $ 0.15 - 0.20 / m3. Additional costs would include
transactions costs, land acquisition, compensation to third parties, and distribution costs.
Estimated costs of distribution for each alternative are provided in Section 5.9.
5.2 Reduction of Unaccounted-For- Water
Efficiencies of the networks are everywhere particularly poor, with an average unaccounted-for-
water (UFW) of 48 percent, and 63 percent in Rafah and Jabaliya. Considering the very low
efficiency of the systems, the quantity really available to households is about 70 liters per capita
per day (lpcd), ranging from a low of 33 lpcd in Nuseirat and El Bureij to a high of 84 lpcd in
Gaza City (LYSA, 1996). Municipal distribution systems that have losses exceeding 50 percent
as a result of years of neglected maintenance might suffice for the distribution of low-value non-
potable water but are quite unsatisfactory for water costing up to $ 1 / m3. Often just 20 per cent
of the leaks account for 80 per cent of leakage (Secretariat for the Global Consultation, UN,
1990). World Bank research suggests that, as a rule, if more than 25 percent of the water is not
accounted for, a program to control the losses may prove to be cost-effective. Implementing a
formal policy to reduce both physical losses (through leakage detection and repair) and non-
physical losses (through improved management practices) can allow investments in new works to
be deferred or at least reduced in scope, with significant savings. In addition, by improving the
system of meter reading and billing or by detecting and charging for illegal connections, revenue
can be greatly increased to pay for the costs of treating and distributing the water, as well as the
costs of operation and maintenance of the system. Also, if illegal connections are found and
charged, willingness to pay by all may improve. For example, in urban areas of Thailand, each
10 per cent of unaccounted-for water saved would immediately generate an additional US$ 8
million per annum from the 3.5 million people served (UN, 1993).
A strategy for reducing water losses would include:
* metering policy, with systematic metering on the production sites and installation of meters
in buildings
* evaluation and reduction of leakage by setting out a leak detection program to define
priorities in pipe replacements
* reduction of non-physical losses by identifying unregistered consumers and detecting
fraudulent connections (more than 20,000 illegal connections have been reported in the Gaza
Strip)
* public education campaigns to encourage voluntary conservation, domestic device retrofitting
efforts, and cooperative programs with industry.
Unaccounted-for-water is usually comprised of physical losses and commercial losses. In Gaza,
it was estimated that commercial losses and physical losses account for 20 percent, respectively
30 percent of total water production. Given the current tariff structure and consumption pattern,
efficiency increases - resulting from the reduction of UFW from 48 percent to 30 percent and the
reduction of accounts receivable from 32 percent to 10 percent - would translate in an additional
annual revenue of $2.5 million (World Bank, 1996). A reduction of physical losses from 30 to 20
percent would save more than 5 million m3/year of water in year 2000, and 10 million m3/year in
2020. Assuming a marginal water cost of $1/ m3 , these figures would translate into savings of $6
million in 2000, and $12 million in 2010 (Table 9).
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Table 9 - Benefits of leakage reduction
Assuming a project life of 40 years and a discount rate of 10 percent, water savings would
warrants investments in leakage reduction of more than $300 million (net present value, base
year 2000). In Gaza City, the costs of rehabilitation may well exceed the cost of installing a
second reticulation for potable water (WRAP, 1994).
Figure 14 - Benefits of Unaccounted-For-Water Reduction
-,-Costs
--- Benefits
UFW reduction (%)
Neither a benefit-cost ratio greater than 1.0 nor a positive net benefit ensures optimality. The net
benefit is maximized when Q* is supplied. At this point the marginal benefit is equal to the
marginal cost, so that total benefits exceed total costs by the largest possible amount (Figure 14).
Costs could be further reduced if major rehabilitation of wells is permitted. Well owners in the
Gaza Strip were historically denied permits to carry out rehabilitation. As a result, the condition
of most operating wells is poor; with pumps and well casings not refurbished for 30 years, using
inefficient engines to power pumps (WRAP, 1994). According to specialists, priority should be
given to the rehabilitation of most ancient wells, after a detailed evaluation of current
characteristics of the borehole. New high-capacity well drilling may further exacerbate the
situation by triggering the ascent of brackish water from inferior layers of the aquifer.
Costs
Research conducted in Israel and California show that the costs of water saved through leakage
control vary significantly, from $0.15-0.35 per m3 (UN, 1993).
5.3 Water conservation
This endeavor includes continued efforts (technological as well as economic credits and
incentives) to further reduce water use in industry and urban centers as well as to improve the
efficiency of water use in agriculture. The levels of direct and indirect water production through
savings and improved efficiency of water use are very important as they represent permanent
demand reduction. Water conservation means large-scale application of adequate technology,
changes of industrial water processes and the application of demand-management policies in the
cities. Training, public education and effective extension systems must accompany the promotion
and implementation instruments. Demand management efforts in Israel, Singapore, California
and the Boston area and in other regions with water conservation kits, have produced significant
results. The kits (including toilet flush reduction, two-volume flushing, regulated shower heads,
flow regulators in kitchen and bathroom sink taps, leakage control as well as improved irrigation
in gardens and parks) achieve demand reductions of 10 to 20 percent (sometimes 20-40 percent)
at an approximate cost of US$ 0.10 - 0.15 / m3. Retrofitting is appropriate for both households
and commercial buildings (Singapore stands as a very successful model of this strategy). These
efforts could produce millions of m3 of water at one of the lowest marginal costs in the region. If
the total urban population in Israel used demand management appliances, the water savings could
have reached 100-150 million m3 in 1994 (Palestine Consultancy Group, 1995). Water
conservation policies should be rapidly defined in the Gaza Strip in view of the future increased
water supply, in order to maximize the efficiency of water utilization.
As with water quality and pollution, there is a general lack of understanding and concern about
the value and scarcity of water, especially in the communities that are served with piped supply
systems, even when volumes delivered are small or intermittent supply common. There are
specific practices that suggest limited perception of water scarcity and value, such as illegal
connections and the general misuse of water in both the agricultural and domestic sector (WRAP,
1994). The general lack of understanding and concern about the value and scarcity of water
resources is likely to be a major constraint to sustainable water resources management. Public
awareness campaigns are needed to raise public concern for and understanding of this valuable
resource.
5.4 Improving Efficiency in Irrigation
Water saving technologies in agriculture can lead to a reduction in the demand for water through
substitution of capital for water. Gravity irrigation can be eliminated, old pipes can be replaced
and replaced with modem sprinkling, drip and automation systems. Modern pressurized
irrigation technologies can save 30-35 percent of water per land unit area, in comparison with the
traditional irrigation. An additional 25-30 percent can be saved in the conveying system (Yaron,
1994). A study of the modernization of a traditional irrigation water project in the Jiftlik area of
the West Bank indicated a considerable saving of water per hectare in the modernized project,
which, at the same time, was accompanied by a rise in yields and income
Box 3 - Introducing Drip Irrigation To A Traditional Agricultural Community In The
Jordan Valley (Van Tuijl, 1993)
In the Gaza Strip, the Israeli occupation introduced efficient methods of irrigation, including
sprinkler and especially drip irrigation. Consequently, output increased greatly. Water use per
dunum is now half the Egyptian average. However, the water needed for irrigation in the Gaza
Strip could be further reduced if irrigation technologies were to be introduced on a larger scale.
The current water usage per dunum is about 800 m3 per dunum per year. This quantity can be
lowered by at least 30 percent once sprinkling irrigation is introduced, and by 40 percent if drip
irrigation were introduced. On an annual basis, assuming 8 percent interest and Israeli prices, the
capital recovery costs are $47/dunum and $57/acre for sprinkling and drip technologies,
respectively (Fishelson, 1994). Correspondingly, the cost of saving one cubic meter of water by
converting to these technologies, depending upon the suitability of crops, is only $0.20/ m3.
However, that improved agricultural efficiency will yield substantial quantities of new water is
perhaps the most common misconception concerning the potential sources to meet future water
demand (Frederiksen, 1996). In Gaza, individual irrigation projects may have an efficiency of
only 40 percent. However, most projects pass the other 50-60 percent of project "losses" to the
underlying aquifer, for subsequent uses. The same can be said about urban water where leakages
can be as high as 50 percent. The rest infiltrate the aquifer. This results in a very high overall
efficiency.
Only in situations where irrigation returns discharge into saline sinks is there potential water
savings through improving project efficiency. And it is in these conditions that water-saving
technologies are effective in reducing basin water demand.. The fundamental fact to remember is
that it is basin efficiency that counts, not project efficiency, except where return flows discharge
into the sea or saline sinks (Frederiksen, 1996).
5.5 Optimizing crop mix
Introduction of water-saving technologies and incentives can lead many farmers to alter and
greatly improve their cropping patterns. There is a great deal that can be done with improved soil
and extension systems and further applied research. The concept of measuring the value of water
by its incremental contribution to yields can be developed. For instance, in Israel the trend is
toward higher-value crops, especially as a result of the fluctuations in world prices for cotton (a
major irrigated crop), citrus, oil seeds, export vegetables and others. Pricing, credit mechanisms
and possibly water trading would play a dominant role in the optimization of crop mix , as well
as the availability of incentives and proper technology.
Figure 15 shows that there is scope for crop mix optimization in Gaza. The trend is already
toward the replacement of citrus by higher-value crops such as tomatoes or other vegetables and
will likely continue in the future. Citrus consume more than half of total irrigation water (or 40
million m3 per year) but generates only 13 percent of total agricultural income (Ministry of
Agriculture, 1996). Figure 16 is even more explicit. For instance, for the same amount of water,
crops such as strawberry and tomatoes yield almost ten times more income than citrus. This
suggests that optimizing the allocation of water would mean switching production to crops
shown in the upper part of Figure 16. That is, if the change in cropping patterns is not limited by
land constraints, local demand, restriction on exports, or prices decline resulting of increased
supply. Agricultural optimization models and macroeconomic models presented in Chapter 7
may assist in the appraisal of alternatives.
Tomatoes
Citrus
11i%
0
27%/1
Other vegetables
Other fruits
79%g
53%
46./
12%
12%
30.0% 40.0%
Figure 15 - Gaza Strip - Relative Income and Use of Water
(data from Ministry of Agriculture,
and Land
1996)
for Selected Crops
0% water
i% land
m% Income
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 50.0% 60.0%
13%
Figure 16 - Relative Income from Crop Production per Unit of Land and Unit of Water
(data from Ministry of Agriculture, 1996)
Water use for citrus irrigation appears to have a very high opportunity cost. Income per cubic
meter of water is less than 1 Israeli Shekel (NIS) or $0.30 (US$1=NIS 3.3). The marginal benefit
from water - obtained after deduction of the non-water inputs such as labor and fertilizers - is
therefore much smaller than $0.30/ m3, possibly zero or even negative. This important fact
suggests that a reallocation of water from citrus grove irrigation to cities may be possible at a
much cheaper cost than any other supply-side alternative. Clearly, benefits from such a trade may
be substantial. In addition, water currently used for irrigation of citrus groves - located for the
major part in the North of the Gaza Strip, near Beit Hanoun - is of relatively high quality. By
selling water at prices equal or slightly above $0.30, farmers would be able to maintain or even
increase their income while urban consumers would receive water at a cost well below the
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marginal cost of new supplies such as desalinated water (around $1/ m3). Provided conveyance
systems are built, farmers would then have to choose between several alternatives: grow citrus,
sell water to urban consumers, or swap freshwater for recycled water. Institutional mechanisms
would be needed to promote, monitor and regulate such transfers. In particular, property rights
should be clarified, and third party effects - such as impact on labor and compensation schemes
- should be thoroughly investigated. Possible designs and issues related to water trading and
reallocations are reviewed in Section 5.7.
5.6 Water Pricing
Throughout the world and the Middle East, the absence of price mechanisms has led to
substantial inefficiencies in water utilization. Subsidizing irrigation water creates a "rent
seeking" operation for the development of new resources and higher demand leads to
overpumping from underground sources. Overpumping leads in turn to the development of new
expensive resources where unit cost is higher than marginal benefits. Overpumping is causing
quality damages to existing resources as well (Palestine Consultancy Group, 1993). In 1991, the
Israeli State Comptroller issued a harsh criticism of what she termed "irresponsible water
management for 25 years", which had resulted in overpumping and deterioration in the country's
water quality (Gruen, 1992, Issac/Shuval, 1993). The report called for a comprehensive national
policy and a shifting of priorities for water use, conservation, and ending the subsidies on water
supplied to agriculture. Israel, and to a lesser Jordan, have already begun to deal with their water
problems in a manner that may be forced upon the rest of the region in the near future. The
drought years of the late 1980s forced Israel to rethink its agricultural sector. The rethinking
involves increased water charges to improve efficiency, shifting from water-intensive to less
water-demanding crops, and taking acreage out of production (Waterbury, 1994).
While water for household use should be available to all, its pricing should reflect its value as a
limited resource to be utilized carefully. In the Gaza Strip, several districts already use a block
rate policy, by which several volume levels correspond to a different tariff. The lowest bracket is
so priced so that minimum household water requirements can be met reasonably. By this system,
homes are equitably supplied with the basic requirements for drinking, cooking, and hygiene,
while incurring higher costs for use beyond that which is considered the minimum daily
requirement (LYSA, 1995).
Agricultural water should not be subsidized, but assistance in the form of capital and technology
inputs should be provided to restructure and manage crop growth in the agricultural sector. Other
means might include negotiating for the opening of international markets for certain crops. A
third is assistance in capital investment through loans and grants.
It has been suggested that water should be charged at its opportunity cost (or shadow price).
Price mechanisms would promote the efficiency of the sector and possibly eliminate the "rent
seeking" impact and potential political conflicts. In addition, the system would enable transfer of
water among various users, from agricultural consumers to cities, and within the region, with
minimum conflict with the entities, who would sell part of their allocation. The parties would
voluntarily trade water with the expectation of profiting from the trade. As illustrated by the
citrus case (see Section 5.5), parties would benefit by obtaining water at costs lower than other
alternatives or by selling water at a cost higher than its marginal value to them. One option
would involve the exchange of water based on the shadow price at the transaction site. The
assessment of the adequate shadow price could be done using an economic simulation model like
the one developed by the Harvard Middle East Water Project (see Section 7.2.3). Revenues from
transactions could be used for investments to improve and expand the water transfer systems or
to decrease transaction costs. The economic model could assist in the appraisal of alternatives.
The great challenge in irrigated agriculture is how to ensure that farmers take into account the
opportunity costs, which are often an order of magnitude higher than current charges. A recent
review by the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage concluded that it was
inappropriate, on a number of counts, to think of rolling opportunity costs into water tariffs. This
is so for three main reasons (Briscoe, 1997):
* Because the information requirements are very onerous (opportunity costs vary dramatically
by place and season)
* Because the levying of such charges would be perceived as expropriation by those who
currently use the water
* Because it would defy common sense - using the numbers cited in the earlier section it
would mean that farmers in the Gaza Strip would be asked to pay more than 10 times the cost
of providing the services they receive
Emerging international experience is clear - from a conceptual, practical and political
perspective, the appropriate approach for ensuring that the scarcity value of water is transmitted
to users is to clarify property rights and to facilitate the leasing and trading of these rights
(Briscoe, 1997).
Market-based pricing can achieve significant results: in the USA industrial water use in 1980
stood at 45 billion gallons per day. By 1990 it declined 33 percent to 30 bgd, largely as the result
of tightening controls on effluents and effluents charges imposed over the period. In a study of
industrial plants in Sao Paulo, water use in manufacturing dropped between 42 and 62 percent,
depending on the industry, between 1980 and 1982, after effluent charges were introduced.
Consumption of water in the former East Germany dropped from 400 to 120 liters per capita per
day, or 70 percent, between 1989 and 1994, primarily as a result of cost-based pricing (World
Bank, 1995).
5.7 Reallocation: water markets
5.7.1 Introduction
The early recognition of market mechanisms may be traced back to Coase. He argued that
allocation by means of markets is a favorable solution. He showed that market allocation will be
efficient, given well-defined and nonattenuated initial property right and zero transaction costs.
This means that property rights are to be completely specified, exclusive, transferable, and
enforceable (Shabman, 1995). While the use of pricing to influence allocation of water has
received a lot of attention in future directions for water allocation, very little attention has been
given to the potential for markets in tradable water rights in the Middle East. This fact reflects
the lack of belief of some policy makers in market mechanisms. Policy makers express strong
reservations about market decisions on intersectoral transfers because of the importance of water
to the economy. There is a strong feeling among many that, given the significance of water to life
and security in the region, water is simply too important to be given over to free market forces
(Shatnawi, 1995). Some believe that water policy use is not best achieved by considering water
or water rights as a commodity. It is also argued that if supply and demand were the only forces
that governed the allocation of water, these two mechanisms could eliminate diversified
agriculture and drive out small farmers in the competition for scarce water.
The possible introduction of market-based mechanisms for water allocation in the Middle East is
viewed with considerable suspicion by policy-makers. Agriculture and water resources ministers
from 22 member states of the Arab League have recently rejected proposals to set up water banks
as a way of dealing with regional water shortages:
Egyptian state-run al-Ahram daily quoted the conferees as agreeing that water is a "free
natural resource that may not be sold", and that they reject all projects which promote
banks that would sell and buy water in the Arab region "owing to the dangers these
projects pose to Arab economies". Arab officials called the idea, which the paper
described as forwarded by foreign parties, as an evident attempt "to put poison in the
honey". This and other positions were included in a "Cairo declaration" issued by the
conference. (United Press International, May 1997).
However, many analysts (Seckler, 1996, Briscoe, 1997) note that water markets could instead
encourage diversification into a variety of watersaving crops that are more appropriate to the
agroclimatic environment. Given the reservations about a full market approach to water
allocation, an appropriate approach in the short-to-medium term might be a combination of
integrated water resources planning with market incentives to induce water users to consider the
true opportunity and social value of water.
5.7.2 Water markets: principles
In the Western United States, water initially was allocated simply by putting it to a beneficial
use, mostly irrigation; the doctrine of prior appropriation was indifferent to the economic value
of use. This is the situation that currently prevails in the Middle East. However, as competition
for water has increased, economists and others have argued that water should be transferred
"from low-value irrigation use to high-value noncrop use". The classic rationale for all economic
activity - gains from trade - motivates most water transfers. Buyers - utilities, municipalities -
perceive that the cost of purchasing existing water rights is less than the cost of alternative means
of securing needed supplies. Conversely, sellers - generally farmers - sell when the price offered
is greater than the economic value of the crops or livestock they produce. The economic theory
of water transfers is simple, but for transfers to occur, two conditions must be met. First, the
benefits to buyers must be great enough to outweigh the costs of obtaining water by alternative
sources or by reduced demand, plus all the transaction costs. Second, the costs of buying water,
which can include political costs and legal uncertainties, must be less than the costs of obtaining
water - such as desalination (National Research Council, 1992).
A water buyer and seller are the two primary parties in a water transfer and are not typically
concerned with the interests of third parties, that is, those who are affected by the transfers but
are not represented in the negotiations and lack control over transfer processes. The impacts of
transfers and the parties affected are many, diverse and potentially substantial. The types of
impacts felt by third parties can be broadly thought of as economic, social and environmental.
Economic effects include impacts on incomes, jobs and business opportunities. Social impacts
include changes in community structure, cohesiveness, and control over water resources. Public
policies must be concerned with the interests of third parties, because neither the buyer nor the
seller will be burdened with these externalities (National Research Council, 1992).
Several different types of transactions may be used to transfer water use from one party to
another, including water leases, water banks, dry year option arrangements, and transfers of
salvaged water (National Research Council, 1992).
Water lease
A water lease occurs when a water rights owner and a new user negotiate an agreement to use a
fixed quantity of water over a specific period of time, instead of purchasing a permanent right.
For instance junior rights irrigators with orchards sometimes lease water for their late summer
irrigations from neighboring seasonal crop growers who hold more senior rights.
Water banks
Water banking is a formal mechanism for pooling surplus water rights for rental to other users. In
1991, California responded to a 5-year drought by establishing a water bank to facilitate market-
like transfers of water. One reason the bank worked well was that transaction costs were very
low, estimated by some parties at $5 per acre-foot (water price was fixed at $125 per acre-foot).
An initial study of the operation of the bank showed that it generated a net benefit in excess of
$92 million. Although there are many ways in which the bank's operation can be improved, it
seems clear that water markets will be part of the solution to California's competing demands in
the future.
Dry year option arrangements
Dry year option arrangements allow the senior rights holders to continue to use the water (in
most cases for farming) in normal years and give the option holder (often a municipal user) a
cost-effective way to make its supply more reliable during dry years. For example, the
Metropolitan Water District (MWD) of southern California has proposed a dry year option
arrangement to farmers in the Los Angeles area.
Transfers of salvaged water
Transfers of salvaged water is a variation of a water sale, in which a city or business that needs
additional supplies finances irrigation improvements in exchange for rights to use the water that
is conserved. In California in 1989, MWD and the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) reached an
agreement calling for MWD to pay for irrigation system improvements within IID in exchange
for rights to use the water conserved. Through a multi-million dollar canal-lining project, MWD
hopes to salvage up to 37 million m3 annually for municipal use.
In the United States, many environmentalists, water experts, and urban suppliers have endorsed
water marketing as a desirable reallocation policy. Water marketing can help promote both
efficiency and fairness. Markets respond to price signals and move resources from lower to
higher-valued uses. They also respect existing property entitlements and thus allow water rights
holders both to set the pace of transition and to receive compensation when water is transferred.
In addition, transfers can be used to correct inefficiencies that are the result of a long history of
subsidized irrigation water. Wahl (1989) argued that rather than attempting to reduce the
subsidies embodied in existing contracts, policymakers should seek to make the current property
rights more secure and to allow voluntary market trading of the resource among users.
In the U.S. Southwest, tens of millions of dollars were spent on western water rights during the
1980s. Prices in the late 1980s ranged from $0.80/ m3 of water rights to more than $4.00/m3 in
some areas that have few alternative supplies (National Research Council, 1992).
5.7.3 Water markets: issues and opportunities
Allocation of water through markets in tradable water rights offers a number of potential
advantages (Schleyer and Rosegrant, 1996):
* empowerment of water users by requiring consent to any reallocation of water and
compensation for any water transferred
* security of water rights tenure, which improves incentives for investment in water-saving
technology
* establishment of incentives for water users to consider the full opportunity cost of water,
including its value in alternative uses
* provision of incentives for water users to take account of some of the external costs imposed
by their water use, reducing the pressure to degrade resources
* flexibility in responding to changes in crop prices and water values as demand patterns and
comparative advantage change and diversification of cropping proceeds
However, a number of possible problems with markets in water rights have also been identified
(Lund and Israel, 1995):
* high transactions costs to water trades that could limit the scope of trading
* water rights are often poorly defined
* water transfers can have high transaction costs
* water markets will often consist of relatively few buyers and/or sellers
* water is often costly to convey between willing buyers and sellers
* communication between buyers and sellers may be difficult
Second, the transfer of water can significantly affect third parties not directly involved in the
transfer (such as farm workers, rural retailers and service providers). Strong opposition may be
expected, especially in such institutional settings where water policy is subordinated to
agricultural policy (this is the case in Israel and Jordan, where the water department is a division
of the Ministry of Agriculture). However, there are policies that may encourage water
reallocation by providing satisfactory compensation mechanisms, and that have been applied
with some success in the Western US and Chile, albeit with considerable political wrangling. In
fact, the greatest challenge for implementing water transfers in the future may lie in properly
identifying the affected parties and adequately mitigating the impacts. Several mechanisms have
been suggested to ameliorate the impact of or to compensate groups harmed by water transfers.
These mechanisms include (Lund and Israel, 1995)::
* Taxing transfers to compensate harmed third parties
* Requiring transferors to provide additional water for environmental purposes
* Using State compensation to help economic transitions in water-selling regions
* Requiring public review and regulatory and third party approval of transfers
* Requiring prior evaluation of third party impacts of transfers, similar to an environmental
report
* Requiring formal monitoring of third party impacts
The role of government is so important in many cases that it must be considered part of the
system engineering. Government involvement can improve the prospects for water transfers by
(Lund and Israel, 1995):
* Improving information regarding transfers and transfer impacts
* Establishing a process for managing third party impacts
* Reducing the transaction costs of arranging and implementing water transfers
* Increasing the probability that efforts between the parties to arrange a water transfer will be
successful, and reducing the risks to parties from involvement with transfers
An overriding obstacle to implementing water market concepts in developing countries is the
absence of the required institutions and physical infrastructure. The financial transactions and
physical movement of water require government intervention to provide indisputable means to
measure the water, convey the water, and monitor its movement. There must be an honest broker
to hold the money and take control of the water and an enforcement agency to record and oversee
these movements. And before that there must be a clear and firmly enforced water-rights system
fully in place. The Palestinian Authority has none of these components. Further, water-rights
markets and transfers do not produce any additional water for a country: they only reallocate
water already applied productively. Frederiksen (1994) argues that for that reason water markets
would be largely counterproductive where poverty alleviation is a primary objective. "Awarding
water to the highest bidder would not help, and probably would undermine a country's primary
social, regional development, security and environmental goals" (Frederiksen, 1994). Yaron
(1995) also acknowledged the inherent risks of a pure market mechanism for water allocation
within a country:
* it may lead to drastic changes and deviations from the status quo in agriculture
* it may lead to a conflict with national goals
* large scale projects imply government intervention and coordination
Yaron is in favor of an allocation-pricing policy based on a mix of quota system with market
mechanism, with the latter applied only at the marginal segment of the quotas. This policy should
increase the efficiency of water use over time and at the same time avoid drastic changes in
allocation.
5.7.4 Potential in the Gaza Strip
The bulk of Gaza water supply is allocated to irrigation. As shown in Section 5.5 Optimizing
crop mix, in 1996, 53 percent of irrigation water was allocated to citrus crops which contributed
only 13percent to total agricultural income. This is an explicit example of misallocation of water.
In Gaza, irrigated agriculture has become the dominant "high-volume, low-value" user. Irrigation
water is provided at virtually no cost. Even though agricultural use of water has the lowest value
per cubic meter, there is strong political opposition to diverting water from agriculture to other
sectors. However, the purchase of water rights from a few farmers could be sufficient to provide
water for thousands of urban dwellers. In Gaza, due to the extreme water scarcity, there has been
an endogenous move by local citizens to develop some form of informal market. In 1996, the city
of Gaza purchased water and land rights from farmers in the northern part of the Strip to ensure
access to additional water of acceptable quality (Odievres, Personal Communication, 1997).
These are signs that formalization of water markets may be welcomed because it would reduce
transactions costs. To help transfers, new market-driven methods for reallocation should be
developed. The striking features of these market-based reallocation methods are that they are
voluntary and yield economic benefits for both buyers and sellers. Providing a market for water
to encourage owners of wells to sell water to municipalities would reduce excess demand in
agriculture, and lead to increased efficiency in water use and to a fall in the irrigation of low
value crops. In the first case it would make cultivation of certain crops unprofitable and lead to
new cropping patterns which would benefit the economy. In the second case, the opportunity cost
of applying water to cultivation, as opposed to selling it, would induce owners of water rights to
re-allocate their water to domestic and industrial use (WRAP, 1994). The implied concept is that
diverting a little from the entire irrigation sector should be easy, inexpensive, and painless.
However, urban centers will try to take all their incremental needs from the immediately adjacent
irrigated areas for physical and economic reasons. And if they do so, they will have substantial
impact on the production of the affected farmers and the economy of the villages, creating
serious social and economic consequences. Those impacts will have to be carefully evaluated,
and mitigation and compensation mechanisms will need to be put in place. A particularly
promising alternative would be to swap freshwater for recycled wastewater. To be able to
evaluate reallocation choices and calculate the potential costs and benefits, one should be fully
informed of the true social, economic, and environmental ramifications and costs of the
reallocation options versus other sources.
5.8 Use of Saline Water for Crop Production
According to many experts, Gaza agriculture will become increasingly dependent on recycled
sewage and other types of low grade waters which are unsuitable for drinking. Due to
overabstraction, salinity of irrigation water will continue to rise, and farmers will gradually be
driven out of business unless they can develop techniques to crop crops with increasingly saline
waters. In addition, it is expected that more freshwater will be reallocated to urban consumption
as the cost of opportunity of using freshwater in irrigation will reach critical levels. On the other
hand, quantities of recycled water will grow considerably in the near future, provided plans for
upgrading and expanding existing treatment plants are implemented. Treated wastewater could
be used as a substitute for well water to the extent of 50 million m3 in 2010 (see Section 6.4.1).
Depending on the population and consumption per capita scenarios, wastewater production could
even exceed current irrigation needs in 2010 or 2020. However, it should be noted that salinity
problems could considerably limit uses of recycled water in irrigation under the current
conditions. The high salinity of domestic water may place significant constraints on wastewater
reuse. Indeed, water reallocation and wastewater recycling will increase the salinity of the water
available for irrigation from a current average of 1000 ppm up to 1200-1500 ppm (Amir,
personal communication, 1996). Therefore, wastewater recycling may be viable only in the case
of imports of freshwater, unless technologies and infrastructure are developed in Gaza to use
saline water in agriculture.
Water availability for irrigation could be enhanced through judicious and proper use of saline
water and the recycling of drainage waters for irrigation. Waters generally classified as
unsuitable for irrigation can, in fact, be used successfully to grow crops without long-term
hazardous consequences to crops and soils, with the use of improved farming and management
practices. Recent studies in Israel have shown that there are crops and technologies that allow
agricultural production with water of up to 4000 ppm TDS (or 10 percent sea water) (De Malach
and Pasternak, 1994).
Box 4 - Agriculture In A Desert Saline Environment A Case Study (De Malach and
Pasternak, 1994)
5.9 Supply segregation
An attractive option to address the major issue of water quality for the Gaza Strip is supply
segregation. High quality water could be supplied to meet potable requirements only, while the
current low quality sources of supply would be used for other domestic needs. Such a system is
already developing informally. Many Gazans fill jerricans at sources or wells that still provide
water of good quality. The drinking water consumed at the Ministry of Planning does not come
from the tap, but instead is supplied with jerricans from a standpipe located in the Beit Lahiya
area, the only location in the Gaza Strip endowed with water resources of a salinity lower than
100 ppm/l. Only 2 to 4 percent of domestic water require drinking water quality. With the current
consumption levels, that is 1 to 2 million m3 per year (MOPIC, 1996). The UNRWA report
analyzed the daily household water consumption for a family of eight (the average size of a
Gazan family) living in the refugee camp (Table 10).
ACTIVITY ADULTS CHILD TOTAL TOTAL
Male Female CHILDREN FAMILY
Drinking 4 4 2 12 20
Cooking 2 8 - - 10
Washing clothes 15 15 15 90 120
Home maintenance 10 20 - - 30
Toilet flushing 5 10 5 30 45
Religious ablution 20 10 - - 30
Outside use 10 10 - - 20
1 41 LCD
Table 10 - Household Basic Water Requirements for a Family of Eight
Two hypothesis for the demand for high quality water can be considered:
* 6 lecd (low consumption), more likely for the camps
* 10 lecd (high consumption), more likely for rural villages, medium and high income districts
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According to the LYSA report (1996), 60 percent of the population do not have access to potable
water and should be supplied with high quality water. Total demand will therefore be in the
range of 4,500 -5,500 m3/day (or 1.6 -2.0 million m3/year) for the entire Gaza Strip in year 2000.
High quality water could be drawn from the northern aquifer (production cost: $0.10/ m3) (see
Section 5.1) or produced by small brackish water desalination units (production cost: $0.50/ m3).
Therefore, as a realistic long term objective, groundwater protection should aim at managing a
small portion of the dune aquifer in a sustainable manner in order to safeguard a supply of about
5 million m3 per year of groundwater for the coming 30 years. Thus, the Gaza Strip could be self-
sufficient in drinking water in the long run. The other option would be the construction of small
brackish water desalination units. While the choice of the mode of production depends on
economic and technical factors, the selection of an appropriate distribution system is related to
the desired level of service and economic constraints. Possible distribution channels are
summarized in Figure 17.
Distribution options and levels of service (LYSA, 1996):
* Tap Water (1): this system requires the construction of a second system (dual network) that
becomes the drinking water system. Assuming a total length comparable to the existing
network (about 1000 km), the estimated capital investment would be around US$ 45 million
* Water in Jerrican: for the user, this is the minimum service level, unfortunately borne by an
increasing number of Gazan households. The main constraint for the user is the distance to
the filling station. A service of distribution by truck (4) minimizes journeys of the user. The
construction of filling stations can also be considered (2) and (3). A step-by-step solution
could be implemented where a basic water network would feed autonomous water stations
built at convenient locations. Studies in Africa and in Latin America are concordant to
consider that 300 to 400 m is the maximal distance the user is ready to accept to fill its
containers (Whittington, Briscoe, 1990). This system could be the skeleton of a future dual
system distributing directly drinking water to users.
A survey (and possibly a pilot project) should be conducted to determine the acceptance of the
different alternatives by the potential users. Examples of overestimated demand in similar
projects are numerous (Whittington, 1994). Users may well prefer to buy bottled mineral water.
Methods for determining potential demand - and thus optimizing the supply-demand match - are
discussed in Section 7.5.
Figure 17 - Water Distribution Scheme (LYSA, 1996)
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Table 11 summarizes the distribution costs of the various alternatives. It should be noted that
among the short-term options, "water station fed by network" is the most cost-effective.
Construction of a dual network may well be a promising alternative in the long run.
Distribution Option Distribution Cost ($/m')
Dual network 1.80
Distribution to door by tanker truck 2.69
Water station fed by network 1.95
Water station fed by tanker truck 2.78
Table 11 - Supply Segregation - Distribution Costs (LYSA, 1996)
A dual system could be financed and implemented according to the following incremental
approach:
* The residents of the Gaza Strip collectively pay the production cost of water (whether from
groundwater pumping or brackish desalination), and the additional cost of conveying water to
the autonomous water stations. The current critical economic situation of the Gaza Strip
makes it very unlikely to include capital costs (desalination plant, conveyance infrastructure)
in the selling price. They will have to be borne by international banks or donors if the
objective of supplying all communities with potable water is to be met without any further
delay.
* The residents of a neighborhood served by a water station may decide whether they are
willing to pay for the construction of a distribution system supplying blocks from the water
station. Community organizations should be consulted on basic choices, and the details
should then worked out with the future beneficiaries. Again, external support for
infrastructure financing may be provided to the communities; however, O&M and renewal
costs should be borne by users.
* The residents of a block served by an expanded distribution system may then decide whether
they want to pay for on-lot water connections.
* Households may then decide on the quantity and the quality (dual system) of water they want
to pay for.
Chapter 6
Options: New Water
This chapter deals with water development policies, which can be defined as actions affecting the
increase of quantities of water available for distribution and use.
6.1 Introduction
Even with measures to contain the growth in demand and to improve the efficiency of existing
systems, new water supplies will be needed for the Gaza Strip. The new sources of supply
currently being considered have higher financial and environmental costs than those developed
earlier. The question is to assess whether these alternatives are economically efficient and
feasible, and how and when they should be implemented. Various alternatives have already been
suggested by government agencies and international consultants and donors to solve the water
crisis in Gaza, including:
* desalination of water
* aquifer recharge
* conveyance of fresh water via pipeline from the Sea of Galilee (extension of the Israeli
National Water Carrier) or the West Bank mountain aquifers
* inter-regional water conveyance (from Turkey, Egypt or Lebanon)
* wastewater recycling and agricultural reuse
* virtual water
* weather modification
6.2 Surface Water
6.2.1 Recharge with storm water
In Israel, underground water recharge is an integral part of the country's water supply system.
Part of the artificial recharge is connected with flood water utilization and wastewater
reclamation. Recharge operations replenish over-exploited aquifers, thereby preventing seawater
intrusion ad providing temporary storage. Projected recharge rates in Israel are 200 million m3
through about 150 recharge wells and spreading grounds by the year 2000 (Issac/Shuval, 1993).
Within the Gaza Strip, precipitation collected as storm water is potentially a source of water
which could be utilized. This is especially true of the huge flows which are experienced in the
wadis following heavy winter rains and that discharge unused into the sea, or into open areas
where they partially evaporate. Wadi Gaza which has a catchment area of around 3000 km2 has
the highest discharge. It was estimated that during the flood events of November and December
1994 around 100 million m3 of storm water flowed down Wadi Gaza to the sea in a period of ten
days. This is almost equal to the annual water demand of the Gaza Strip. The Wadi Gaza
arguably could provide 20 to 30 million m3 of water per year (IWACO, 1994). However, Israel
impounds this water before it even enters Gaza. Utilization of the floodwaters within Israel, by
either damming the wadi or pumping the water to side reservoirs has caused infiltration from
storm water to dry up. Negotiation with Israel is necessary to determine the future utilization of
the Gaza stream floodwaters. Wadi Selqa, with a catchment area of only tens of km2 could also
be a source. This wadi has no direct outlet to the sea, but ends in a depression on the inland side
of the dunes at Deir el Balah. Hundreds of dunums are flooded here seasonally. This water
mainly evaporates. (IWACO, 1994)
From a rough water balance calculation for the recharge pools in the dunes at Beit Lahia, it is
calculated that the surface infiltration rate at that specific location is around 11 cm per day
(IWACO, 1995). Comparing this with the evaporation rate (between 2 and 7 mm/day), indicates
that only between 2 and 6percent of the flow is lost through evaporation. Using this infiltration
rate, an area of 0.25 km2 would be needed to recharge 10 million m3 per year. Recharge by
infiltration requires considerable land with not only a suitable aquifer but also soil conditions -
the dunes appear to be the most suitable - and that could be a major constraint. Acquisition of
appropriate land should not interfere with land use planning allocations for higher priority
economic development. A rapid estimate indicates that, assuming that recharged water is valued
at $0.50/ m3 - approximately the shadow price of water in 2000 -, and assuming the above
infiltration rates, income per m3 would amount to approximately $20/year. This value compares
unfavorably to industrial or housing uses, but compares favorably to agricultural uses - high-
value crop such as strawberry yields incomes of less than $3 per m3. Perhaps land should be
found that otherwise would be left abandoned. Recharge ponds may also be developed for
recreational uses, such as swimming or wetland, forest or other aesthetic settings in public areas.
Other recharge techniques such as infiltration wells are much less land-intensive but may be
problematic to operate and maintain. With respect to the Gaza Strip there is an absence of
hydrogeological and geochemical data and testing will be required to establish the characteristics
of potential sites.
In an attempt to enhance water resources in the Gaza Strip and improve water quality, a large
pool has been constructed near Gaza City to collect storm runoff and permit artificial recharge to
the aquifer. The project is estimated to inject some 1.5 million m3 per annum into the aquifer.
Unfortunately, the project has not been completed yet and sewage is flowing into the pool,
creating pollution problems in the area (WRAP, 1994). The USAID-funded Gaza stormwater
project, launched in early 1996 and led by Metcalf&Eddy International, will rehabilitate the
storm water pool.
6.2.2 Recharge with treated wastewater
If a reuse system is in operation there will be times of the year when more water is required than
others. The conditions within the Gaza Strip is that there is a paucity of storage space in which to
hold the treated water. The aquifer could then be utilized by recharging excess quantities of
wastewater.
The quality of the treated effluent is an important constraint when considering either future
potable use or agricultural use. Without the correct hydrogeological conditions then the recharge
of the aquifer will be unsuccessful. If karstic conditions exist - widely fissured strata that
promote preferential flow - the transmission of pathogens to the groundwater table may be
enhanced or it may allow the rapid flow of effluent to a well used for potable supply (IWACO,
1994). It is also important to select a site where the depth to the water table is sufficient to allow
for further purification. A good example is the discharge of anaerobic pond effluent which may
require 40 m depth to the water table to allow for sufficient nitrogen removal (Montgomery,
1988). The geochemistry of the aquifer is also an important issue, especially if the infiltrating
flow could come into contact with water-soluble minerals. Another risk could be recharging
anoxic effluent through an aquifer with iron deposits, which would then become soluble and then
precipitate at other locations causing blocking.
Figure 18 identifies potential locations for recharge of the aquifer. It includes sandy areas with a
high recharge rate, as well as coastal areas where sea water intrusion is expected to take place.
POTENTIAL AREAS FOR RECHARGE
(SANCOY SI0LS.HIGH INFILTRATION))
AREAS WITH SUSPECTED SEA WATE R
[NTRUSION
Figure 18 - Potential Recharge Areas (IWACO, 1994)
6.2.3 Rainwater harvesting
Rainwater harvesting at the household and small community level has always been and remains a
major source of water for domestic purposes in rural areas, as well as in major cities. People
collect rainwater falling on roofs or rock catchments and store it in cisterns, to meet part of
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household water needs. 50,000 households in the West Bank already harvest rainwater for
household purposes, implying a total of 5 million m3 per year (Shabbah and Issac, 1995). The
present volume of water collected in this way in the Gaza Strip as well as the investments needed
to increase rainwater harvesting are not known.
6.3 Water imports (inter-regional water trading)
6.3.1 Introduction
There is a certain fascination with the idea of transferring water over large distances from wet to
dry regions. The Romans built an extensive network of aqueducts and canals to supply their
cities and military outposts. The California aqueduct brings water over hundreds of kilometers to
arid southern California, and the Israeli National Water Carrier channels water from the Sea of
Galilee in the North to the coastal regions and into the South. History shows that large-scale
water supply networks are advantageous. They make economic sense, just as electrical networks,
oil pipelines and telephone connections make sense. Water supply networks can also be
connected across national borders to balance supply and demand over very large areas and
manage networks in a flexible manner (Kuffner, 1993). The International Conference on Water
and the Environment in Dublin (1992) stated that "water has an economic value in all its
competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good". This is a clear departure from
previous declarations stressing the "public good" nature of water. If water is considered to be an
economic good, it could also be traded like other goods.
Several import and trading options have already been proposed to supply water to the Gaza Strip
(and the other water-deficit countries in the region) (see Figure 19).
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* Transfer of water from Israel via the Israeli National Water Carrier (INWC). The Oslo II
agreement calls for the construction of a pipeline connecting the Gaza Strip to the INWC to
transfer the agreed upon quantity of 5 million m3/year.
* Water transfer from the West Bank. The costs of piping water from the West Bank, from high
elevations to sea level, would certainly be lower than estimates for seawater desalination in
Gaza.
* Diverting the Litani in Lebanon into the Sea of Galilee, from where it could go to Gaza via
the INWC.
* Extending the Al-Arish pipeline from the Nile to Gaza
* A more ambitious project is the Peace Canal Project which proposes to bring water from the
Turkish Ataturk Dam Reservoir through Syria to Israel
Figure 19 - Water Transfer Options (Wolf, 1995)
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All options are technically feasible. Recent estimates show that water cost would be significantly
lower than options such as desalination. However, it is difficult to collaborate on water issues
and reach international agreements over water. Water's unique status as a resource has made it a
frequent object of international controversy and conflict. Neighboring states that are otherwise
cordially cooperative like the USA and Canada have found it difficult to achieve mutually
acceptable arrangements to regulate their transboundary surface waters. Even states within a
single federal union have engaged in bitter political and legal struggles over the waters they
share. In the Middle East, the shortage of water impacts relations between states and is
exacerbated by the background of religious, national, ideological, economic and political
tensions. Politics can be watched and evaluated when agreements are signed to share water
resources (e.g. the agreement between Sudan and Egypt regarding the use of the Nile River, the
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty and the sharing of Jordan River waters), when complaints are lodged
with the UN (e.g. regarding development of the Euphrates by Turkey), in strategic threats to deny
access to water resources (e.g. Turkey and Syria) or in the event of a military action (e.g. Syria's
attempt to divert the Jordan River tributaries and the subsequent Israeli strike on Syrian
waterworks in 1964) (Medzini, 1996).
Under certain conditions, water trade among potential users may increase regional welfare and be
preferred over cases where individual entities maximize welfare subject to in-country water
resources. In Gaza, the obvious associated benefits would be the use of purchased water to avoid
higher cost of developing new sources, and the possibility to trade low-quality water (recycled
water) for higher quality water (groundwater). But economic efficiency is not a sufficient
condition for cooperation, especially when it is related to water. One possible problem associated
with this kind of international water transfer is at the engineering level, that is, hardware
complications in moving huge quantities of water between regions. Another problem that may
add to the difficulty in dealing with international water transfer is associated with the special
nature of water as a commodity. International water transfer is influenced by ideological-political
considerations that may affect potential arrangements in the region. Such considerations are hard
to account for in a quantitative modeling framework. A procedure is needed which incorporates
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political and ideological considerations into the decision-making process of the potential
participants.(Dinar and Wolf, 1994).
Very few examples of inter-regional transfers can be found in the world. Several factors may
account for the negligible amounts of water that have been traded between countries:
* Water rights are often poorly defined
* Water transfers can have high transaction costs
* There are uncertainties regarding transfer policies
* Absence of a recognized regional institution that could oversee physical and financial
transfers
* Communication between buyers and sellers may be difficult
* Potential seller/buyer experiences/does not experience water scarcity
* Potential seller/buyer does not/ does have easy access to alternative fresh water sources or
substitutes for water
* Economic benefits are not significantly greater that the transactions costs, including political
costs
* External and internal politics dominate
* Buyer and seller have significantly different strategic power
* The water supply is shared by more than a region or state
* The seller has an advantageous riparian position in the drainage basin
The parties involved in the region's confrontation over water invoke a variety of legal principles
to establish their claims: first-in-use, first-in-right, customary or equitable utilization, absolute
sovereignty, beneficial use, basic justice and fairness, good neighborliness, prior use, etc. In
making claims, each party is selective, choosing the legal principles that best buttress its own
claims (Naff, 1991). The extent of water scarcity in the region is an important factor in the
designing of water distribution laws. In areas of the world where water is plentiful, water is
usually allocated according to the riparian rights doctrine, which states that anyone who
possesses land next to a flowing river or stream may take its water as long as enough is left for
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downstream users. In the Middle East (and in the Western United States), where potentially
productive lands are located far away from water sources, the doctrine of appropriative water
rights emerged. The doctrine of appropriative water rights, or prior appropriation, permits
diversions to and allocated quotas among specified parties. The quotas are allocated on a first-
come, first-serve basis and are subject to the "use or loose it" or "first in time is first in right"
rule. The amount of water initially used determines the size of a user's quota, and there are severe
restrictions on trading in water rights once they are assigned (Howitt, 1995).
Perhaps the most important implication of water transfer planning is the need to increase
integration and cooperation among countries in the region. This necessary coordination of
planning and operations between functionally diverse national water agencies will imply
potentially protracted, and probably controversial, negotiations, at least for long-term transfer
arrangements.
6.3.2 Imports from Israel
From a purely technical standpoint, importation of water from Israel is the most attractive option.
Water trading with Israel would require the construction of a 5 km pipeline connected to the
Israeli National Water Carrier which runs parallel to the Gaza Strip. In addition, the costs of
piping water from the West Bank, from high elevations to sea level, would certainly be lower
than estimates for seawater desalination in Gaza.
The Harvard Middle East Water Project argued that both Palestinians and Israelis would benefit
from a system of voluntary trade in water permits - short-term licences to use each others' water.
In addition, this system could become a mechanism for flexibly adjusting water allocations to the
benefit of all parties - thereby avoiding the potentially destabilizing effect of a fixed water
quantity arrangement in a peace agreement (Fisher et al., 1996). At the heart of the proposed
approach is the assumption that, from an economic standpoint, issues of water ownership rights
and water usage are analytically separate. Water ownership is thus a property right entitling the
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owner to the economic value of the water, regardless of who uses the water. By translating the
value of water ownership into money terms, water trade can take place before a final settlement
on property rights is settled. Hence, the dispute over water ownership could be translated into a
dispute over the proceeds of the sales of water. The Harvard study showed that the water in
dispute is currently worth $110 million per year, and will be worth no more than $500 million
per year even by 2020. These values are very small compared to the economy of the region and,
perhaps more to the point, they are small relative to the cost of fighter planes. The economic
gains from trade were illustrated using the total amount of Mountain Aquifer water to be
allocated to the Palestinians under the Oslo II agreement (see Section 3.10).
Assuming that desalination cost at Gaza would be about $0.80/ m3, the net economic benefit
from trade in 2010 would be more than $61 million per year. The Palestinian entity would
receive the largest benefit ($51.5 million per year), partly through its ability to purchase water at
costs considerably lower than the cost of desalination at Gaza associated with the case of no trade
and partly through increased water consumption.
Using the water allocation model developed for the project, a range of shadow prices of water at
Gaza South was calculated assuming a medium scenario for population growth and demand (see
Section 4.1). They are indicative of the real price that would be charged by Israel for water sales
to Gaza. The current price of water sold by Mekorot - the Israeli national water company -to the
villages in the south of the Strip stands at $0.46/ m3.
Gaza South 2010 2020
Shadow price of water (1990 US$/ m3) 0.47 - 0.58 0.69 - 0.77
Table 12 - Shadow Price of Water in Gaza (base 1990) (Fisher et al., 1996)
An awkward outcome of the proposed approach is the existence of an inverse relationship
between the benefits from trade for the Palestinians and the quantity of water allocated to them
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under a final settlement. In other words, benefits from trade would reflect an imbalance between
the quantities allocated to Israel and the Palestinians.
Trade with the Palestinians will mean less water for Israel. Two issues stem from this
inescapable fact. First, for trade to happen, the economic benefits to Israel will have to exceed all
transactions costs, including the political costs of reducing water use, particularly in the
agricultural sector. Many agricultural and water experts in Israel have argued that the region's
water crisis was artificially created by the huge subsidies on water supplied to Israeli farmers
(around $200 million per year), and that "It would be better to hand the farmers cash than to
continue to subsidize water". (Jerusalem Post 01/15/97). However, cutting entitlements is easier
said than done. In Israel and the neighboring states agricultural interests are a well-entrenched
and powerful lobby. The issue here is that water trading entails diffuse benefits but concentrated
costs. Second, Israel will need sufficient guarantees that the sale of part of its water will not be
considered as an implicit relinquishment of property rights. In absence of a fully defined and
enforceable property rights, the probabilities of trade are slim, regardless of the economic
benefits. Israel is reluctant to yield tangible water assets - even temporarily in the framework of a
voluntary trade agreement - unless it is given clear political and economic incentives to do so,
along with solid guarantees of equivalent water supplies either by importation or desalination.
There are compelling examples in many parts of the world, notably in the American West, that,
in the presence of uncertainties regarding transfer policies, transaction costs, and property rights,
trade will not occur, regardless of the potential gains from trade. The fact that California had
much less water transfer activity than most of the other Western states cannot be attributed to the
lack of profitable opportunities for trade. For example, Vaux and Howitt (1984) showed that in
1980 some 2500 million m3 could have been profitably traded from agricultural regions to the
state's major urban areas. This study showed that buyers and sellers would have jointly benefited
by $156 million by 1995. The explanation for the lack of transfer activity appears to lie with
poorly defined property rights and a reluctance to change water institutions.
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6.3.3 Imports from the West Bank
Israel's utilization of the mountain aquifer's entire safe yield (Figure 20) is disputed by the
Palestinians of the West Bank. The water supply potential of the aquifers underlying the West
Bank has been estimated at about 630-640 million m3/yr. Out of this amount about 110 million
m3/yr are consumed by the 1.2 million West Bank Palestinians, 50-65 million m'/yr by the
140,000 Israeli settlers, while the remainder (413 million m3/yr) flows to Israel where it is fully
utilized, and in some years over-utilized (Shuval, 1996).
Figure 20 - Aquifers Underlying Israel and the West Bank (Shuval, 1996)
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To protect its water supplies, Israel has restricted the right of the Palestinian residents of the
West Bank to drill into the underlying aquifer. Stringent measures have been enforced to control
water use there (Hillel, 1993). Clearly, the Israelis are concerned that the drawing of water from
the aquifer in the West Bank is likely to reduce the water yield of wells in Israel by the principle
of connecting vessels. In the words of Meir Ben Meir, a former water commissioner: "If the
demand is for drinking water, we must say yes... But we are not going to stop irrigating our
preexisting orchards so they can plant new ones" (Hillel, 1994). Israel is also concerned that
population and industrial growth in the West Bank may lead to the percolation of sewage and
waste into the aquifer.
These concerns were reflected in the Oslo II agreements which placed a clear emphasis on the
formulation of policies aimed at the protection of groundwater resources. The additional
quantities made available to the Palestinians were restricted to the Eastern Aquifer, thus
safeguarding Israel's current use of the Western Aquifer. However, the taping of additional water
from the Eastern Aquifer - which is by definition of international law replenished and owned by
Palestinians - is currently difficult and may not be economically feasible, considering the depth
of the Eastern Aquifer and its complicated topography (Issac, 1996).
The Israeli Ministry of Agriculture, in a 1990 advertisement dealing with the country's water
problem, stated the following:
Excessive pumping or uncontrolled sewage and waste disposal in Judea and Samaria are
liable to cause serious depletion, salination and pollution of the aquifers. Relinquishing
the western slopes of the Judean and Samarian hills will create a situation in which the
fate of the national water supply could be determined by the actions of whatever Arab
authority controlled the evacuated areas after withdrawal. Given the present critical
scarcity of water in Israel, even with all the available sources of supply at her disposal,
withdrawal and the relinquishing of control of a substantial portion of these sources could
leave the country in a potentially desperate plight (Raphael Eitan, Minister of Agriculture,
Jerusalem Post, 1990)
Many Israeli government officials or policy-makers believe that even after the Palestinians are
granted autonomy or sovereignty, Israel should retain control over the water resources of the
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West Bank. They claim that if there is a major unregulated increase in pumping from the aquifer
underlying the West Bank, Israel's current utilization could be reduced by some 300-400 million
m3/year. There is a fairly broad consensus in the current Netanyahu government that Israel
should annex hydrostrategic areas - the Western slopes of the Samarian hills - and that Israel
should be able to exercise its veto power on water projects in areas to be handed over to the
Palestinians.
The contention between the Palestinians and the Israelis regarding the waters of the mountain
aquifer is a classical clash between two principles: sovereignty over the source of water (claimed
by the Palestinians) versus the right of prior use and the natural course of the water (claimed by
the Israelis) (Shuval, 1996):
* The Palestinians claim that the flow of the Mountain Aquifer that is derived from rainfall
over the West bank, 80-90 per cent of which is currently extracted from deep wells mainly
within Israel, should be allocated for their use
* Israel claims that it has legitimate historical riparian rights to the Mountain Aquifer, based on
the principle of prior use, major portions of which flow naturally into its territory and which
has been developed at great expense and fully utilized over a period of time going back some
60 years
International water law may possibly contribute to the resolution of these seemingly
irreconcilable claims and counter claims of the parties. Indeed, Israel and the Palestinians will be
expected to negotiate a settlement based on the assumption that they share common water
resources and that the principles of international law should apply.
Geneva Convention (1949)
The Palestinians claim that any water extraction within the West Bank for Israeli civilian
settlements is in violation of the Geneva Convention concerning the rights and obligations of
what is defined as a "belligerent occupier". The Geneva Convention prohibits the "belligerent
occupier" from using natural resources, including water, for its own benefit. In this case Israel
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will not be able to claim prior historic use since all of these wells were drilled by Israel after the
1967 occupation of the West Bank (Shuval, 1996). The quantities that may be relinquished to the
Palestinians would be around 50-60 million m3/year.
Helsinki Rules (1966)
One of the best known examples of international law of international water resources was the
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, formulated by the International
Law Association and adopted in 1966. The Helsinki Rules promote the concept of restricted
sovereignty through adoption of a rule of "equitable utilization". They propose that water
disputes be settled by negotiations (Dellapenna, 1995)
Helsinki Rules, Article VII
Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the
beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.
International Law Commission Rules (1991)
The International Law Commission, an organ of the United Nations, embraced both the principle
of equitable apportionment and the obligation not to cause appreciable harm to other States in its
Draft Articles submitted to the General Assembly in 1991 (Khassawneh, 1995).
The three main obligations in the draft articles are:
Art. 5 the duty to effect the equitable and reasonable utilization of the
watercourse
Art. 6 the obligation not to cause appreciable harm
Art. 8 the general obligation to cooperate in the attainment of optimal utilization and
adequate protection of international watercourses
Article 7 attempts to appreciate the strength of the absolute sovereignty doctrine vis-d-vis natural
and historic rights by providing a factor-analysis approach (Caponera, 1993):
Box 5 - Article 7 : Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization
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The Bellagio Draft Treaty and the Seoul Rules on Groundwater (1989 and 1991))
While there is far less experience regarding disputes over aquifer management, Helsinki and ILC
Rules would no doubt be applied by analogy. A gathering of experts on the law of international
water confirmed this conclusion in meetings at Bellagio, Italy, and Seoul, where they drafted a
model treaty to assure the equitable utilization and management of shared groundwater basins.
Of these obligations, the duty not to cause appreciable harm appears easiest to understand and
prove, although the term "appreciable" infers the definition of a threshold against which actions
and damages can be objectively measured. Defining reasonable and equitable utilization is more
difficult. To establish that a state has exceeded its equitable share would require the adoption of a
yardstick and the balancing of all relevant factors and circumstances in all relevant states
(Khassawneh, 1995).. To complicate the matter even further, the relationship between the
obligations of equitable utilization and the prevention of appreciable harm is also unclear. The
established position of the ILC is that priority should be given to the prevention of appreciable
harm in a case where the principles conflicted. Support for prioritizing equitable utilization is
likely to come from countries which, like Turkey or the Palestinian Entity, are keen to develop
their water resources. Downstream riparians such as Israel are likely to call for a prevailing duty
not to cause appreciable harm (Khassawneh, 1995).
Informal Israeli-Palestinian tracks on water currently underway, in which Palestinians have been
participating in official capacities, have been confined at Israel's insistence to the economics of
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water management and joint management of the common groundwater sources alone (Elmusa,
1995).. None of the discussions have addressed the question of water allocation. However, an
agreement over sharing the water resources is essential to any peace agreement between Israelis
and Palestinians. Such an agreement will perhaps prove to be one of the most difficult aspects of
the entire negotiating process, yet, if done properly, it could contribute to a lasting peace between
the parties. If the negotiation is based on the principles enunciated in the Helsinki and the ILC
rules - equitable sharing and prevention of harm to the resource - the scarcity of the resource will
render impossible a simple apportionment of the existing resource, and the parties will have no
other alternative than to consider regional water management (Elmusa, 1995).
In the recent years, several scholars have proposed different schemes regarding the sharing of the
water in dispute:
Shuval Proposal
Shuval (1996) proposed a possible approach that would satisfy the minimal human needs of the
parties and would satisfy the criterion of a "reasonable and equitable share" as formulated under
the Helsinki Rules. The proposal is based on a Minimum Water Requirement (MWR) of 125 m3
per capita per year, including 100 m3 for domestic, urban and industrial uses, and a symbolic
allocation of 25 m3/capita/year for minimal growing of fresh vegetables. The MWR does not
include any other direct allocation of fresh water for agriculture, but assumes that about 65 per
cent of domestic/urban/industrial water can be made available to agriculture through recycling.
Thus, the total allocation of water could reach 190 m3/cap/year; 125 m3/cap/yr from fresh water
sources and 65 m3/cap/yr from recycled water.
Table 13 shows that both Palestinians and Jordanians will not meet the MWR in 2025.
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Population (millions)
Israel
Jordan
West Bank 1.3
2025
10
10
2.8
Water
resources
potential
(million
m3/yr)
1,500'~
880
1552)
Water availability
1995
300
250
120
2025
150
90
Table 13 - Minimum Water Requirements and Water Resources Potential (Shuval, 1996)
1) May be reduced (water transferred to Jordan (peacer treaty) and to the Palestinians)
2) Current allocation (Oslo II interim agreement)
Applying the same methodology, Syria would have an excess of 11,750 million m
3/year,
Lebanon 8,460 million m3/year and Turkey 239,600 million m3/year. Shuval proposed that these
countries contribute to cover the deficit of the Jordanians and the Palestinians. If Turkey agreed
to contribute all the water needed, it would represent only a reduction of 0.3 percent of its excess
resources (resp. 10 percent for Lebanon and 6.8 percent for Syria)
Moore Proposal (1994)
Building upon Article 7 of the ILC Rules (see above), Moore (1994) proposed that sharing of the
disputed water be based upon a mix of equity standards: equity utilization, recharge area, natural
flow, and population. He obtained the following results (Table 14):
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4 Combination
Existing Recharge Natural Flow Population
utilization Area
Israeli Share 83 5 63 71 63-71
Palestinian Share 17 95 37 29 29-37
Table 14 - Alternative Equity Standards (Moore, 1994)
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1995
5
3
Total
MWR in
2025
(million
m3/yr)
1,250
1,250
350
Excess/
deficit
(million
m3/yr)
+ 250
-370
195 I
According to the Moore proposal, the Palestinians would receive between 29 and 37 percent of
the Mountain Aquifer, or 182 to 239 million m3/year (current utilization: 110 million m3/year).
About 50 million m3/year could be earmarked for the Gaza Strip.
Issac and Kubursi (1996) proposed that Israel instigate some confidence building measures such
as immediately providing Gaza with 50 million m3/year through the National Water Carrier.
According to the authors, such a move would serve as a practical recognition of the Palestinians'
riparian rights.
6.3.4 Imports from Egypt
The idea of the El-Salam Canal project (see Figure 21) was launched by Egyptian President
Sadat following his declaration in Haifa (1979) that he would transfer Nile water to the Israeli
Figure 21 - Nile to Gaza Transfer (Hillel, 1994)
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Negev, Gaza and Jerusalem. The project stemmed from a study carried out by Elisha Kally who
contended that Israel's water problems could be solved, and for a long period of time, by using
1percent of the Nile water (i.e. 800 million m3 annually). Kally believed that the Ismailia Canal
that extends from Cairo to the Suez Canal could be enlarged to produce 30 m3/sec. The water
would then be carried in pipes under the Suez Canal near Ismailia to the northwest in a concrete
canal until it reached Al Arish, and then from there to Khan Yunis (Gaza Strip). In Khan Yunis
the water would be divided into two branches. The first would flow towards the Gaza sector and
the second towards the Western Negev. Sadat viewed Israel's supply with a part of Egypt's share
of the Nile water as an incentive conditional to the resolution of the West Bank and Jerusalem
issues. In a letter to Menachem Begin, Israel Prime Minister then, Sadat wrote:
As we embark on the comprehensive resolution of the Palestine issue, we shall make
these waters a contribution from the Egyptian people and in the name of the hundred
millions of Muslims, a monument to the peace accord. The Nile waters will become
Zamzam 2 wells to all believers. These waters will be an evidence that we are promoters of
peace, life and prosperity. (Anwar Al Sadat, 1979)
Sadat's declarations made severe repercussions in Egypt and the Nile riparian countries,
particularly Sudan and Ethiopia. Ethiopia declared its opposition to the project. Sadat retaliated
by stating that Egypt would declare war if its share of the Nile water was threatened. Egypt's
foreign minister, Boutros Boutros Ghali, said "the next war in our region will be over the waters
of the Nile, not politics". Ethiopia, which controls more than 86percent of Nile water flowing
into Egypt, is increasingly jeopardizing Egypt's water security with new water projects
(Waterbury as cited by Lowi, 1990).
The following points were of particular concern in Egypt:
* The legal aspects pertaining to the project in the sense of whether Egypt has the right to take
an unilateral decision to divert the Nile water to any area outside her borders.
* The fear that even if the sale to Gaza (or Israel) would be considered as a temporary measure,
that Gaza (or Israel) would not surrender to the logic of returning the Nile water after a while,
should the water become more valuable to Egypt in the future.
2 Zamzam is the well that supplies the Muslim holy shrine Ka'aba at Mecca with water.
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In Israel, responses to the Sadat proposal were mixed at best, with then Agricultural Minister
Ariel Sharon voicing the common concern that "I would hate to be in a situation in which the
Egyptians could close our taps whenever they wished". However, Israel would view favorably
(and probably support) a transfer of Nile water to Gaza rather than the alternative of increased
groundwater exploitation from the shared aquifers. On the other hand, the Egyptians may be
reluctant to supply Gaza, as it may be considered as an implicit endorsement of the current water
apportionment between the peoples of the region.
Since the Sadat proposal, Egypt's own water prospects have deteriorated as the water surpluses
enjoyed in the 1970s have dwindled. Egypt may eventually face water shortages as its population
continues to grow and if its upstream coriparians appropriate significant quantities of water.
However, the Nile to Gaza transfer scheme could be revived. The amount of water needed in the
Gaza Strip, estimated to be 150 million m3/year in 2010, is not significant when compared to
Egypt's water budget - less than 0.25 percent of it.
Technically, supplying Gaza from the Nile would be quite straightforward, as it would merely
require the extension (and upgrade) of the pipeline that reaches to Al-Arish City, 40 km away
from the Egypt-Gaza Strip border. Recent costs (Kally, 1994) of Nile Water conveyed to the
Gaza Strip are between $ 0.20 and $ 0.82 / m3, depending on discount rate and water volume. For
50 million m3 /year, at 12 percent discount rate, the conveyance cost Nile-Gaza results in $ 0.74 /
m3 by pipeline. In this route, a canal system can replace the pipeline economically and reduce the
conveyance cost to about a half ($ 0.38 / m3). Additional significant cost decrease can be
achieved here if the project is combined with the Egyptian "El Salaam" project ($ 0.21 / m3 in the
proportional cost sharing). However, there are serious concerns regarding the quality of the Nile
water downstream of Cairo. The water is saline and so contaminated that a very high incidence of
waterborne diseases - notably schistomasis - has recently been reported in the Lower Delta (New
York Times, 03/24/1997). Costly water treatment would be required.
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Economically, the project may be viable even for water-short Egypt. Indeed, Egypt is currently
importing virtual water (see Section 6.6) at a cost of $0.10 per m3 (Allan, 1996). Provided grain
prices do not change considerably in the future, the following arrangement may be envisaged.
Egypt would purchase water (as foodgrain) on the world market, at a cost of $0.10/ m3, and sell
the same amount to Gaza, at a price higher than $0.10/ m3 (not included transportation, treatment,
and other transaction costs).
Dinar and Wolf (1994) have used a particular cooperative arrangement of water conservation and
transfer in Southern California to develop a general regional water trade model. Under the
agreement, the Metropolitan Water District pays the Imperial Irrigation District to finance water
conservation projects over a period of time. In exchange, the Metropolitan Water District
receives the water saved by the conservation projects. The water transferred for urban uses is
water that was previously lost through conveyance leakage, and it does not alter the amount of
water available to farmers for irrigation. Dinar and Wolf (1994) subsequently applied the water
trade model previously developed to a simplified case study that includes the scenario of trading
Nile water for irrigation technology between Egypt and Israel. The annual economic outcome to
the region (in terms of incremental welfare) was $126.5 million and $8.00 million for the full
regional cooperation and for the partial cooperation (Gaza Strip only). Fishelson (1994)
estimated that the cost of saving one cubic meter of water by converting to sprinkling or drip
irrigation, depending upon the suitability of crops, is only $0.10/ m3 . Fishelson proposed that the
sprinklers and drip irrigation equipment would be provided to Egyptian farmers by Israel free of
charge. In return, Egypt would transfer to Israel half of the water saved by the farmers through
the adoption of modern irrigation technologies. Out of this sum, Israel would take for its own use
60 percent, and the remaining 40 percent would be shared by Gaza and the West Bank.
According to Fishelson, the costs of water on the border between Israel and Egypt, in the Gaza
Strip, would be about $0.40/ m3, considering capital and O&M costs of the conveyance system
from Egypt to Israel.
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6.3.5 Imports from Lebanon
To provide water for their increased population, the Palestinians would negotiate with
Lebanon for the annual diversion of 400 million m3 from the Litani River which presently
flows unused to the sea. The water would be carried by a tunnel from the "knee" of the
Litani, below Beaufort, for nine kilometers into Israel and Israel would transfer the same
amount to the Palestinians from the National Water Carrier. The Lebanese would likely
agree to such a plan because it would be part of an overall settlement that would rid them
of the Palestinian refugees. Noting the proposal by Yossi Beilin to transfer to the Gaza
Strip part of the Halutza Sands in the western Negev - to compensate for the parts of the
West Bank that would be annexed to Israel in a final settlement , Weitz says this area
could be made as productive as Gush Katif - "the spearhead of modem Israeli agriculture"
- if water from the Litani were available (Jerusalem Post, 03/09/1997).
This statement by Ra'anan Weitz, the former Director of the Jewish Agency Settlement
Department, reflects the interest that Israel has expressed for a long time for the Litani River.
Israel's pursuit of the Litani waters can be traced back to 1919, when Chaim Weizmann,
Chairman of the Zionist Organization who would eventually become the first president of Israel,
addressed a letter to the British Prime Minister Lloyd George concerning the Zionist territorial
demands. Weizmann argued that "the valley of the Litani for a distance of 25 miles above the
bend" of the river to be important to the future of the national home promised to the Jewish
people by the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 (Wolf, 1995). These and subsequent
requests were turned down when the British, acceding to French demands, agreed to set the
border between Mandate Palestine and Lebanon so as to include the entire length of the Litani
River within Lebanon (Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1919). 1954, Israel put forward a plan for
developing and exploiting the waters of Rivers Jordan and Litani. This plan was devised by the
engineer John Cotton and it envisaged diverting 400 million m3 of the Litani water to Israel. In
1967, Israel still expressed its interest, however indirect, in the Litani waters. The Israeli Prime
Minister Levi Eshkol is quoted as having expressed his concern at seeing half a billion cubic
meters of Litani waters flowing wastefully into the sea instead of being exploited by the people
of the area (Wolf, 1995). Some claim that it is from this perspective that the Israeli occupation of
South Lebanon should be seen. Some Israeli officials have stated that the water shortage in
Jordan and the Palestinians territories could be solved by tapping a share of the Litani River. On
May 11, 1991, Israel declared officially that it would not withdraw from Lebanon without
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assurances of its share of the Litani. Lebanon claim that Israel has already built a diversion of the
Litani to the Jordan River; however, this assertion has been categorically denied by Israel.
It would be technically feasible to divert part of the Litani River into the Sea of Galilee, from
where it could go to Gaza via the Israeli National Water Carrier. The construction of a 8 km long
tunnel from the "knee" of the Litani to the River Brivit - which flows to the Sea of Galilee -
would secure the flow of 400 million m3 of the Litani waters into Israel. The Litani waters would
be especially suitable for domestic and industrial uses because of their purity and very low
salinity (less than 20 ppm). It should be noted that the facilities needed for such a system could
be constructed within a period of two years. Kally (1994) estimated that the costs of conveyance
of Litani water to Gaza would range from $0.25/ m3 to $0.35/ m3, depending on the quantities
transferred and the discount rate.
However, a major part of the Litani waters are currently diverted to a hydropower plant located
in the coastal plain - 450 million m3/year out of a total long-term average discharge of 700
million m3/year - thus significantly reducing the quantities potentially transferable to the Sea of
Galilee. Two alternatives could therefore be envisaged:
* Reduce the hydropower plant output, if trading yields more benefits than using water for
electricity production
* Build a coastal carrier that would be fed by both ex-hydropower plant waters and the Litani
River before it discharges into the Mediterranean Sea. This coastal carrier would then run
southwards, supplying South Lebanon cities and irrigation fields, and on to Israel and Gaza
via the existing Israeli National Carrier. This option would carry the double advantage of
maintaining the hydropower plant output and benefiting underdeveloped South Lebanon.
Diverting the Litani would not be without consequences for the population in Southern Lebanon.
In the early 1970s, the Shiite community of Southern Lebanon staged violent protests against a
plan to divert the Litani to supply the city of Beirut. Irrigation water holds the promise of raising
the standard of living of the impoverished Shiite population, thus bringing economic and
political stability to Lebanon (Hillel, 1993). Diverting the Litani is also predicated on peace with
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neighboring Israel. The present social and political situation makes it unlikely that the Litani
option will materialize in the near future.
6.3.6 Imports from Turkey
One of Turkey's responses to international challenges triggered by the construction of major
water projects on the Upper Euphrates has been to offer piped water to the affected countries
from alternative sources, guaranteeing the supply of drinking water in their main cities. The
project consists basically of piping water from two Turkish rivers (the Ceyhan and Seyhan) to the
Arab countries to the south. It is proposed that the "Western Pipeline" should run across Syria
and Jordan to Mecca, carrying 3.5 million m' of water daily. Its main objective is to supply
drinking water to Damascus, Amman, and possibly the West Bank and Gaza. It is the search for a
multilateral agreement which has suggested the name of "peace pipeline", although this should
not disguise the fact that it also offers Turkey new strategic possibilities (del Rio Luelmo, 1996).
The main obstacles to the peace pipeline are political rather than economic. The balance of
power in the region could easily be disturbed by the high level of dependence on Turkey. Some
of the potential recipient countries do not trust Syria, which will be crossed by the pipeline and
therefore could exercise a high degree of control over the flow of water. There is also a complete
lack of agreement in several matters relating to the use of water in the region. The potential for
disagreements has already been seen in the dispute over the water of the Euphrates when Atattirk
Dam was being filled in 1990. (del Rio Luelmo, 1996). The present political situation does not
inspire confidence that the project will be realized. A further worsening in the Kurdish conflict,
including the occupation of north Iraq, has hardened Turkey's attitude to the water issue,
especially towards Syria. Yet the idea is not dead: Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller appeared
to revive it publicly during her visit to Washington in October 1993 (Hillel, 1993)
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6.3.7 Summary
Table 15 summarizes the water transfer potential of the alternatives discussed in this section.
Million m3/year 1990 2000 2010 2020
Intra-regional water imports
From Israel, West Bank, Jordan 1) 5 50-150 2) 50-150 2) 50-150 2)
Inter-regional water imports 3)
Nile-Gaza canal (Egypt) 100-200? 100-200?
Litani diversion (Lebanon) 100 4)-500 5) 100 4)-500 5)
Mini Peace pipeline (Turkey) 500-1000? 500-1000?
Total potential 5 50-150? ? ?
Table 15 - Water Transfer Potential
1) Via INWC (Israeli National Water Carrier)
2) Depends on outcome of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian
3) Figures represent total quantities shipped to the region. Gaza would be allocated a fraction of these quantities
4) Litani diverted into the Sea of Galilee. Awali hydropower plant output maintained.
5) Coastal Carrier
The potential for the Gaza Strip is huge, but limited due to competing use by several other
countries and entities. Importation of water from the Israeli National Water Carrier is needed for
Gaza on a short-term basis (purchase from Mekorot, the Israeli utility, current price $ 0.65 / m3 ,
but subject to negotiation), before new capacity investments are completed. On a long-term basis,
importation of water from Turkey, Lebanon or Egypt should be compared to other possible
alternatives, including regional water trading, both in terms of relative cost and
management/political issues.
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Table 16 provides cost estimates for the different options, calculated by Kally (1994). These
costs are conveyance only and do not include storing and treatment which may cost more than $
0.30 / m3.
Project Distance cost/ m3 A cost/ m3 B cost/ m3 C cost/ m3 D
Nile-Gaza (pipeline) 390 km 0.38 0.59 0.33 0.45
Nile-Gaza (canal) 390 km 0.19 0.29 0.17 0.22
Litani-INWC-Gaza 150 km 0.27 0.35 0.25 0.30
Euphrates-INWC-Gaza 550 km 0.68 0.91 0.60 0.79
A : 100 million m3/year, discount rate: 6 percent
C : 200 million m3/year, discount rate: 6 percent
B : 100 million m3/year, discount rate: 12 percent
D : 200 million m3/year, discount rate: 12 percent
Table 16 - Conveyance Costs to Gaza (Kally, 1994)
6.4 Wastewater recycling and reuse
6.4.1 Introduction
Efficient wastewater collection and treatment and reuse are of major importance to the cities and
the agricultural sector of the Gaza Strip. Advantages of wastewater recycling and reuse are
threefold. First, it provides an additional water supply for irrigation, thereby freeing groundwater
for other uses, notably drinking water. Second, wastewater reuse yields benefits that can be
reinvested in the development of sanitation systems. Third, construction of sewer and treatment
systems contributes to the protection of surface and groundwater reserves, and reduces health
hazards in cities.
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Figure 22 - Evolution of the Food Growing Cycle (UNDP, 1996)
Wastewater recycling can also contribute to the development of urban agriculture. Urban
agriculture plays a significant role to the socio-economic development of towns and cities
throughout the world. In several economies, particularly developing ones, it is one of the largest
urban productive industries, and a prime generator of jobs. The development of urban agriculture
can enable ashift from the open (unsustainable) loop to the closed (sustainable) loop (Figure 22).
A complete or sustainable design for a city would be a closed loop, with all the wastes of one
process used as input of another process. Simply put, cities can feed themselves (UNDP, 1996).
According to many experts, Gaza agriculture will become increasingly dependent on recycled
sewage and other types of low grade waters which are unsuitable for drinking: the high cost of
new water supplies will render the agricultural sector unprofitable, unless irrigation water is
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Sewage
Manure
massively subsidized. Treated wastewater could be used as a substitute for well water to the
extent of 60 million m3 in 2010 (see Figure 23).
Figure 23 reflects the agricultural demand and the wastewater quantities that can be reclaimed,
assuming that they equal 65 percent of domestic consumption (Figure 23). The chart shows that
there is considerable scope for wastewater recycling and reuse in Gaza. Depending on the
population and consumption per capita scenarios, wastewater production could exceed current
irrigation needs in 2010 or 2020. The excess of reclaimed water could be either exported to the
Negev or used to expand the irrigated area in the Gaza Strip.
Figure 23 - Wastewater Production vs. Irrigation Needs (million m'/year)
According to simulations of the Harvard Middle East Water Project model, the provision of
additional recycling facilities in Gaza would be very beneficial (Fisher et al., 1995). In particular,
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it appears that it will be profitable to build recycling plants in Gaza with the recycled water sold
to Israel for use in the Negev. The benefits from such facilities are $ 24.6 million per year by
2010, assuming household/industrial effluent charges of $ 0.30 per m3 and recycling costs taken
as an additional $ 0.10 above this. These findings suggest that Israel has an interest in assisting
the Palestinian Authority to construct collection and recycling facilities in Gaza. One may point
out the fact that such a system will not solve the water issue for Gaza, if recycled water is
exported to the Negev. However, the model shows that benefits are maximized in this way
because water is more valuable in the Negev than in the Gaza Strip. In addition, the effects on the
price of water to agriculture (which uses the recycled water) are great. In the Palestinian entity,
the institution of recycling lowers the price to agriculture in most districts to about $ 0.12 / m3 --
a reduction in many districts of nearly $ 0.50 / m3 (Fisher et al., 1995).
Water reuse is considered a priority issue in the Gaza Strip for a number of reasons. Firstly, the
fresh groundwater resources are being depleted rapidly; more freshwater is consumed every year
than is added to the resources. Secondly, current wastewater disposal practices form a serious
pollution threat to the groundwater resources. Water reuse is not a new concept in the Gaza Strip.
It has been estimated that around 30 per cent of the potable water is reused (MOPIC, 1996). This
water recharges the aquifer either through leakages from the distribution system or infiltration of
wastewater. These practices assist in decreasing the deficit in the fresh water balance, but at the
same time they cause pollution of groundwater because the effluent is of poor quality. Promoting
the first whilst mitigating the second is believed to be one of the major challenges in water
management in Gaza (MOPIC, 1996).
6.4.2 Issues and constraints
Potential scheme locations
In Figure 24 potential areas for agricultural irrigation with recycled water are indicated. It
includes areas where one type of crop is cultivated over an area of 500 dumams or more. This
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also includes citrus areas in Beit Hanoun and south of Gaza City, where an unsuccessful start
was made with implementing the infrastructure for agricultural reuse.
Figure 24 - Potential Areas for Irrigation with Wastewater (IWACO, 1995)
Infrastructure
The infrastructure needed to collect and treat the sewage in the Gaza Strip is still very poor and
inefficient, and a lot of investment is needed. Approximately 3 households out of 4 are not
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connected to a buried sewerage system. Not connected households discharge wastewater into
infiltration wells, and more or less water-tight cesspit-tanks and gutters. The massive infiltration
of non treated wastewater contributed to the groundwater deterioration and poses significant risks
to public health. Wastewater treatment plants (aerated ponds) are undersized and inefficient.
They had been originally designed to treat water for reuse, but due to their current bad
performance no reuse is possible. Rehabilitation work is currently ongoing. Metcalf & Eddy
International is currently implementing a $23 million USAID-funded program to upgrade the
wastewater infrastructure in Greater Gaza City.
Costs
Conventional sewerage is expensive. Construction of domestic sewage collection systems and
treatment facilities amount to a per capita investment in the order of respectively US$ 300 and
US$ 200 in the Gaza Strip (IWACO, 1995). Hence, total cost for implementation of sewage
schemes in the urban areas and refugees camps of the Gaza Strip amounts to US$ 450 million for
the year 1995. Less expensive solutions are needed, such as simplified sewerage and other
intermediate cost collection systems.
The principal costs of reuse schemes are the costs of storage, conveyance, distribution system,
and on-farm costs. Costs will depend upon the location of the wastewater treatment plant, on
whether or not a reservoir is planned and its size, and the size of the irrigated area. Within the
Gaza Strip the allocation of land is haphazard and often divided into small holdings with some
farmers owing different portions of land over scattered areas. This would make it more costly to
convey, distribute and supply wastewater for agricultural reuse to many different locations. If the
area is irrigated with drip or sprinkler irrigation systems, the investment costs including pumps
will be around $400 per dunam (IWACO, 1995). For the entire Gaza Strip, cost would be 56,000
dunums x 400 = $22.4 million.
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Willingness-to-pay
Currently, sewage fees are not charged efficiently to recover the cost of the network.
Municipalities estimate the household willingness to pay at about $11 per household per month,
or on average $18 per capita per year (LYSA, 1995). Assuming a wastewater production of about
50 l/c/d, this translates into a willingness to pay of less than $1/ m3. Households are likely to pay
for immediate benefits but they are less willing to pay for major externalities, such as improved
environment and better public health.
Salinity problems
The main source for reuse in agriculture is domestic wastewater. An issue of particular
importance for the Gaza Strip is the relatively high salinity of the potable water and consequently
the high salinity of the domestic wastewater. It has been shown that the salinity of wastewater is
about 200 mg/1l higher than the original potable water (Amir, personal communication, 1996).
Thus, assuming an average salinity of 800 ppm for domestic water, recycled water salinity may
exceed 1000 ppm. This could pose major restrictions to reuse for crop production. Wastewater
recycling may be viable only in the case of imports of freshwater, unless technologies and
infrastructure are developed in Gaza to use saline water in agriculture (see Section 5.8).
Environmental and public health problems
Increasing use of treated wastewater in irrigation, and a high level of use of chemicals in
agriculture brings the focus to environmental problems and the protection of freshwater
resources. This nutrient-rich water should be used efficiently, in accordance with environmental
and health standards. There is little doubt that health risks exist when treated wastewater is used
for the irrigation of agricultural crops but these are known and can be assessed (PECDAR, 1994).
The objective is then to minimize this risk both for the workers involved and for the consumer of
the end product. Strict restrictions on the use of treated wastewater in irrigation need to be
declared; the issue of gradual contamination of groundwater by chemicals needs to be discussed;
problems of enforcement of the regulations will need to be solved.
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Storage and aquaculture
Since wastewater is generated by the community 365 days a year and the irrigation season in
most areas is limited to a number a months per year, a suitable solution is the large interseasonal
storage reservoirs pioneered in Israel. These reservoirs are designed to store up to ten months of
wastewater flow until the irrigation season, and may also be designed to catch surface runoff.
Studies indicate that wastewater quality improves considerably in such reservoirs. Another
solution is to develop aquaculture in the final maturation ponds or additional storage reservoirs.
For fish farming, tilapias and the common carp are suitable for wastewater-fed breeding. Mean
annual yield of polyculture fish ponds is about 3-5 tons/ha/year (PECDAR, 1994).
Public acceptance
Reuse of wastewater may also be constrained by socio-cultural barriers. However, acceptance of
wastewater reuse should be promoted by increasing farmers' awareness and implementing
successful demonstration projects. Farmer reluctance of the farmer to utilize recycled water can
be expected especially in the Northern part of the Strip where groundwater quality is still
relatively good. A limited survey conducted by the author in the Southern part - where aquifer
salinization is a major problem - showed that wastewater would be fairly well accepted because
of the lack of alternatives. Untreated wastewater is utilized in Nablus, Hebron and elsewhere for
irrigation even of fresh vegetables so religious and cultural attitudes are not thought to represent
a major constraint. However, local consumers and potential importers can be reluctant to
purchase products which are irrigated with treated domestic wastewater. The EU recently passed
legislation prohibiting the importation of vegetables irrigated with wastewater.
6.4.3 Selection of a wastewater treatment technology for Gaza
Wastewater treatment and reuse requires provision of the correct treatment process, together with
reliable consistent operation. The fact that proper treatment was not provided was one of the
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reasons for the failure of an agricultural reuse project south of Gaza City. The lack of
management skills also contributed to the failure of the project (IWACO, 1995). A variety of
personnel with different skills is necessary to design, operate, maintain and to monitor the
systems. Such skills demand a sound human resource development program and assistance over
a long time frame in order to build real capacity. The technology utilized in a project can also be
an important constraint, especially when human resources are not available for the management
of a certain type of plant. It would then be prudent to select a technology that does not require
sophisticated skills that may not be available in the Gaza Strip in the short and medium term.
A large number of technically feasible wastewater treatment technologies are currently available.
Ten representative systems, arranged roughly from the simplest to the most complex (primary to
tertiary treatment), are selected to show the wide range of treatment capabilities and costs (see
Table 17). All ten systems are proven technologies in full-scale operation in the United States.
The ten wastewater treatment systems can be grouped in the following categories:
* Primary treatment (e.g. stabilization ponds (see box))
* Chemically-Enhanced Primary Treatment (CEPT)
* Primary+biological treatment (e.g. activated sludge)
* Secondary treatment (e.g. nutrient removal)
* Tertiary treatment (e.g. high lime, granular activated carbon, reverse osmosis)
Performance and Costs
Table 17 is based on two surveys of over 100 US publicly owned treatment works undertaken in
1990 and 1991 (Murcott and Harleman, 1992) and also on technical literature (National Research
Council, 1993). Performance is expressed as average performance removal for TSS (total
suspended solids), BOD, (biological oxygen demand), TP (total phosphorus), and TN (total
nitrogen). Costs are expressed as capital cost, operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, and total
cost. All costs are annualized costs. Assumptions include an 8 percent discount rate for a 75,000
m3/day facility with a design period of 20 years. Land costs are not included.
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Low-dose CEPT (2a)
High-dose CEPT (2b)
Biological (3)
Conventional Primary
+ Biological (4)
Nutrient removal (NR) (5)
NR + Filtration (6)
NR + High Lime
(HL) + Filtration (7)
NR + Filt. + Granular
Activated Carbon (GAC) (8)
NR + HL + Fil. + GAC (9)
NR + HL + Fil. + GAC +
Reverse Osmosis (10)
71
92
93
93
94
98
99
99
99
100
55
78
92
95
94
98
81
88
99
94
99
100
91
94
94
96
96
97
0.08
0.08-
0.11
0.11
0.16-
0.19
0.20-
0.23
0.20-
0.23
0.24-
0.30
0.34-
0.45
0.30-
0.38
0.40-
0.48
0.53-
0.60
0.06
0.06-
0.07
0.07-
0.09
0.08-
0.11
0.09-
0.12
0.13-
0.15
0.15-
0.17
0.29-
0.34
0.22-
0.25
0.36-
0.44
0.66-
0.79
0.15
0.15-
0.18
0.17-
0.20
0.25-
0.30
0.29-
0.35
0.33-
0.38
0.38-
0.48
0.63-
0.79
0.53-
0.63
0.75-
0.91
1.19-
1.45
Table 17 - Performance and Costs of Wastewater Treatment Technologies
Technologies 6 to 10 (tertiary treatment) may not be considered for application to irrigation in
the Gaza Strip due to their high nutrient removal and, first and foremost, their excessive
cost..Technologies 9 and 10 are the only potable reuse alternatives, and might be considered at a
later stage for domestic consumption, provided they become economically viable and socially
acceptable.
It is often assumed that low-tech low cost solutions such as stabilization ponds require too much
land in order to create an alternative for large cities. This is not entirely true. The conventional
active sludge and trickling filter process requires around 0.2-0.3 m2/person. For comparison,
facultative aeration lagoons require 0.3-0.4 m2/person, oxidation ponds 1.0-2.0 m2/person; and
stabilization ponds 2.5-3.0 m2/person. For the Gaza Strip, the total pool area required for
132
63
40
38 31
99
99
99
100
stabilization ponds would be 300 ha for a population of 1 million (or 1 percent of the total area of
the Gaza Strip). Although this technology would probably be the most cost-effective and easiest
the operate and maintain, the land requirements may be excessive in view of the scarcity of land
resources in the Gaza Strip
Box 6 - Stabilization Ponds (Shuval, 1990)
Chemically Enhanced Primary Treatment (CEPT) appears to be an appropriate technology to
treat Gaza wastewater before its reuse in the irrigation of agricultural land. Not only are tertiary
treatment levels prohibitively expensive (3-5 times the cost of CEPT), especially in cash-
strapped Palestinian entity, but they remove higher levels of beneficial substance. CEPT removed
only one-third of the organic matter and nutrients, allowing the remaining two-thirds to be
available as fertilizer in lieu of expensive artificial fertilizers (Murcott and Harleman, 1996). In
addition, considering the fact that in the Gaza Strip irrigation consists of dripping systems,
tertiary treatment and probably disinfection are not necessary. Indeed, risk of infection for
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farmers and crops consumers typically exists when water is sprayed or sprinkled (Harleman,
personal communication, 1996]. CEPT is usually accomplished by requiring minimal additional
construction to conventional primary treatment plants. Therefore, little capital cost is required to
convert a primary treatment plant to a chemically enhanced primary treatment plant (Murcott and
Harleman, 1996). In addition, the construction of single-stage CEPT in Gaza will not close future
options for upgrading them to a higher level of treatment, should effluent objectives change.
Box 7 - Chemically enhanced wastewater treatment for agricultural irrigation in Mexico
City (Murcott and Harleman, 1996)
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6.5 Desalination
6.5.1 Brackish Water Desalination
As discussed in Section 3.1.2, the salinity of the water pumped into the network is gradually
increasing. In some locations, well water has already reached chloride concentrations above 1500
ppm, rendering it unfit for human consumption. This has led the Palestinian Water Authority to
consider the option of brackish water desalination as a temporary measure. Brackish water
desalination units would treat water from wells currently operated but whose chemical quality is
deteriorated. For instance, the Municipality of Deir Al-Balah in Gaza now has a pilot reverse
osmosis desalination plant to potentially partially satisfy its needs. The plant has the capacity to
desalinate 45 m3 of brackish water per hour. Brackish water with salinity of 3250 ppm is pumped
from a well to the plant where salinity is reduced to 200 ppm (Frenkel et al., 1995).
Unfortunately, operation of the plant has been frequently discontinued due to frequent border
closures and difficulties in importing chemicals and spare parts.
A brackish water desalination plant has also been considered to supply high quality water to the
proposed Gaza Industrial Estate (GIE) (World Bank, 1996). The proposed GIE would result in
the employment of up to 22,000 persons in some 250 industrial firms at a site on the border with
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Israel, about 5 km south of the center of Gaza City. It has been proposed is to drill 120 meter-
deep into the brackish water aquifer, and provide about 800 m3/day of potable water through the
use of reverse osmosis. Reject waters (brine), which would amount to 200 m3/day would be
trucked initially and piped eventually for disposal in the Mediterranean through a dedicated
ocean outfall.
Interestingly, although it had been recognized that while the potential for cross contamination of
the freshwater upper aquifer and the deeper brackish water exists, this alternative has been
preferred to the purchase of water from Mekorot. The cost of water produced has been estimated
at $0.40/ m3 In January, 1997, Metcalf & Eddy International has been awarded a $6 million
contract by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide design,
construction management, operation and maintenance for potable and brackish water.
However, desalination of brackish groundwater does not ameliorate the crisis caused by
overexploitation of groundwater, because it leads to further lowering of the groundwater table
and enhances salinization. This environmental cost must be added to the cost of brackish water
desalination, offsetting some of the cost benefits over seawater desalination or other alternatives.
Extensive hydrogeologic studies should be carried out in order to determine the maximum
sustainable yield from the confined brackish aquifer.
The costs of desalinating brackish water using reverse osmosis (RO) have dropped from about $
1.30 in the 1960s to $ 0.40 - $ 0.60 per m3 today. According to industry experts, the costs of
membrane processes should continue to decrease in line with improved membrane plant
performance and improved economics associated with larger scale production of membranes.
There do not seem to be any newly developing desalination technologies that will produce major
reduction in overall water treatment costs. On the basis of available data, reverse osmosis (RO)
of brackish water of a quality of 2000-4000 mg/1 with a reduction ratio of 1:2 or 1:3 removing
pollutants, sodium and nitrates to a potable level should cost approximately $0.40-0.60 / m3 (not
including the price of pumping and piping to the nearest network) (Frenkel et al., 1995). In the
Gaza Strip the salinity of brackish groundwater may increase over time because of saltwater
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intrusion. This could significantly increase desalination costs. It is therefore important to
determine the sustained yield and long-term quality of brackish water aquifers.
6.5.2 Seawater Desalination
Desalinating seawater - using either distillation or reverse osmosis (RO) - can be from three to as
much as seven times more expensive than brackish water desalination. Distillation costs are high,
regardless of the salt content, due to the large amounts of energy required to vaporize water.
However, seawater desalination costs have decreased markedly in the last few decades. For
example, typical distillation costs in the 1940s and 1950s ranged from $ 4 to $ 5 per m3 . By the
early 1960s distillation costs had dropped to about $ 1.40-2.30 per m3 (Office of Technology
Assessment, 1988). Recent costs analyses indicate that distillation and seawater reverse osmosis
now have comparable costs of approximately $ 0.80 to $ 1.00 per m3 under near-optimum
conditions. These latter costs can increase if the desalination equipment is not operated
efficiently. One should mention that Israel Desalination Corps (IDE) has informed clients that
"they could go down to $ 0.65-0.70 / m3 (ex-plant) for a large-scale project based on the
successful completion of their R&D program". However, there is no evidence available to
substantiate their cost projections. Dual-purpose plants (for power production and desalination)
can lead to distillation cost reductions of 20 to 30 percent compared to the overall cost of
separate power and desalination plants. In these plants the exhaust steam from the power plant is
reused to provide the energy for desalination, thus reducing fuel consumption.
It is thought unlikely that solar energy from thermal collectors will play a significant part in the
short-term application of desalination because of collection costs and overnight energy storage
requirements. Fuel cost increases could alter this position in the long-term, coupled with further
development in the use of solar ponds. In a study carried out in 1994 by Mekorot Water Co
(Israel), a solar pond powered hybrid (distillation/reverse osmosis) system was found to have a
considerable potential to be cost effective if favorable site conditions exist. It was also concluded
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that only for very low specific solar field cost and/or high commercial electricity prices would
the fully solar options be more cost competitive than the partial solar options (Glueckstern,
1995).
Extensive consideration is currently being given to the question of large-scale desalination in the
coastal region, including schemes that would derive hydropower from Mediterranean Sea - Dead
Sea or Red Sea - Dead Sea canals. The inter-sea canal project seeks to capitalize on this 400
meter differential to produce water and electricity. It is estimated that a canal connecting either
the Mediterranean or Red Sea to the Dead Sea could significantly improve energy production and
could supplement water resources by as much as 600-800 million m' of desalinated water
annually. According to a preliminary study by the Israel Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure,
the Gaza-Dead Sea alignment appears to be the most cost-efficient and possibly to most
expedient of all alternatives to implement. Estimated required investment comes to $3.5 billion,
and the cost of desalinated water would be as low as $0.40/ m3 (discount rate: 5 percent)
(Government of Israel, 1995).
In addition to financial constraints due to high capital and operation costs, seawater desalination
in Gaza would be problematic for a number of reasons:
* There are no indigenous sources of energy in the Gaza Strip. All the electricity is imported
from Israel. A $100 M large combined cycle power has been proposed for Gaza that would
ultimately provide power for much of the area. However, this power would not be available
over the short term.
* Gaza - which has virtually no industrial base - will lack the technical and organizational
ability to implement and operate a desalination project. Its management will require major
investments in human, technical, and organizational resources at the national level.
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Excessive reliance on large-scale desalination may render a country particularly vulnerable to
terrorist attacks or acts of war; a clear illustration of those risks was provided by the
destruction of several plants in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait during the Gulf War.
6.5.3 Selection of an appropriate technology
Selection of the most appropriate technology depends on many site-specific factors including the
concentration of organic and inorganic material in the feed water, the desired quality of the
treated water, the level of pretreatment that may be required prior to desalination, the availability
of energy and ease with which waste concentrates can be disposed (Office of Technology
Assessment, 1988). However, cost remains the primary factor in selecting a particular
desalination technique.
Type of water Brackish water Brackish water Seawater Brines I
Salinity (ppm)
Distillation
Electrodialysis
Reverse osmosis
Ion exchange
P: primary application, t: technically possible, but not economic
s: secondary application
Table 18 - Desalination techniques and typical applications (Office of Technology
Assessment, 1988)
Figure 25 illustrates the cost breakdown of reverse osmosis systems for brackish (2,500-6,000
ppm TDS) and sea water (40,000 ppm TDS).
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Figure 25 - Cost estimates of Large RO Systems (Glueckstern, 1991)
6.6 Virtual Water
While issues of local and inter-regional water marketing and trading are still the subject of
considerable debate, increasing quantities of water are indirectly traded in the region and the rest
of the Middle East. Virtual water, that is the water contained in food imports or exports - not
only the actual water content but also the quantities used to grow the crop - is now a significant
contribution to the water budgets of most countries of the region. This fact is typically
overlooked in most water planning exercises. However, the quantities of water at stake are huge.
For instance, because 1000 tons of water are needed to grow 1 ton of wheat, the decision to
import one ton of wheat - instead of growing it at home - results in the saving of a quantity of
irrigation water one thousand times bigger. Figure 26 illustrates irrigation water use per ton of
crop produced in Gaza.
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Figure 26 - Irrigation water use for selected crops (per ton produced)
The economy of water in the Middle East depends on the economy of global trade in water
supplies. Virtual water, priced for two decades at much less than its production costs on the
world market, has been a remedy to the Middle East's water deficit. Countries in the Middle East
region are the most dependent on imported cereals, importing an average of 56 percent of their
total cereal consumption, up sharply from 39 percent in 1970 (Ingco et al., 1996). It has been
shown that the option of moving virtual water has proved to be an extremely effective and
economically efficient method of meeting water deficits (Allan, 1996). Virtual water allows
water-short economies to balance their water budgets without confronting water using interests..
Policy-makers have done so in the Middle East for the past 25 years when water has been priced
advantageously through subsidies born by producers in industrialized countries (Allan, 1996).
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Recognition of the increasing severity of the problem of shortage of water in the area has led
many researchers and politicians to the assumption that the future of the area is linked to the
issue of water, and they believe that water will be the main cause of a future regional armed
conflict. Thus Frey and Naff (1985) argued as follows: " The shortage of water is a zero-sum
security issue and thus creates a constant potential for conflict". Actually, they do not realise that,
taking the economic approach water is not a zero-sum, because it is expendable when food is
imported, and armed conflict is thus prevented (Medzini, 1996). The import of food from the
world market is the most effective means of compensation for water shortage. At the same time it
must be recognized that wealthy countries generate enough income to handle food imports while
poorer countries, such as the Gaza Strip, will need to develop their economies. Meeting future
food requirements such as food means that exports will have to grow; in the region merchandise
exports are the biggest opportunity for the future if there is sufficient progress on trade
liberalization and competition policies (Ingco et al., 1996).
As surprising as it might appears, water-short Gaza is exporting large quantities of water to
Europe and other Middle Eastern countries. In 1996, Gaza citrus exports were equivalent to more
than 30 million m3 of water, that is, three-quarters of the total domestic water demand. current
Europe and the US. Exports of water - even from water-short countries - might be reasonable if
the marginal benefit from water embedded in crop exports is higher than the marginal cost of
new water supplies. However, Gaza citrus exports are priced at less than $0.30/ m3 (see Section
5.5). It means the marginal benefit from water - obtained by deducting the cost of non-water
inputs - is much less than $0.30/ m3, probably zero or even negative. In Israel exports of virtual
water - more than 300 million m3/year or slightly less than total domestic and industrial
consumption - contributed to less than 0.4 percent of the GNP.
The cost of imported virtual water for a given crop can be calculated as follows:
PMx - Cx
PVx = ,where:
qx
PVx: market price of crop x
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Cx: total cost of non-water inputs in crop was grown locally (land, labor, fertilizers,
irrigation systems)
qx: water consumption for crop grown locally
For instance, assuming that the price of wheat on the world market is $200 per ton, the cost of
non-water inputs is $100/ton of wheat, and the water consumption for wheat grown locally is
1000 m3/ton of wheat, the cost of virtual water is only $0.10/ m3.
This example points clearly to what is the most important point to bear in mind with regard to
irrigation water, namely that it is possible to substitute other inputs for water. Instead of using
1000 tons of water to produce one ton of wheat, it is possible to spend $200 and to purchase the
same weight of the crop on the world market. Allan (1996) valued the cost of virtual water for
Egypt at $0.10/ m3, which is significantly below the real cost of existing water ($0.25/ m3).
Virtual water is a cheap and attractive source of water, provided the importing country generates
enough exports to afford purchases on the world food market. Importing water from foreign
sources at a costs above $0.501 m3 (e.g. from Turkey or Egypt) for use in irrigation is certainly
less efficient than importing food (or virtual water) at costs less $0.10/ m3.
Figure 27 illustrates the steady decline of the cost of virtual water for wheat between 1960 and
1996.
One way of distributing scarce water resources would be to let the world food market do its job.
Reliance on the market to distribute food is now increasing worldwide. Whenever demand
outruns supply, the prices rises, reducing demand while encouraging additional supply. From a
purely economic standpoint, the market does a good job of balancing demand and supply and
distributing food. But from a social point of view, rising food prices can quickly produce a life-
threatening situation for the world's poorest (Brown, 1996).
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Figure 27 - Cost of virtual water for wheat, 1960-1996 (adapted from Ingco et al., 1996)
For Gaza camp residents who already spend 70 percent of their income on food, even a modest
rise in food prices can threaten survival. Rising food prices could lead to potentially
unmanageable inflation, abrupt shifts in currency exchange rates, and widespread political unrest.
The riots that recently took place in Jordan, following an increase of the price of bread, illustrate
the potential dangers of rising food prices.
There is some controversy among agriculture and water experts as to whether cereal world prices
will increase in the future. The cost of virtual water will be closely linked to the situation on the
world food market. Figure 28 shows an overall decline in cereal prices in the past 35 years.
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Figure 28 - World Prices for Maize, Wheat, Rice, 1960-1996 (Ingco et al. 1996)
Only very recently did prices rise significantly. Some argue that the growing demand for food,
notably due to the entry on the market of China and India, will put pressure on limited supplies,
and that prices would rise in the near future. Authors such as Brown (1996) have argued that
rising population and incomes will cause China's demand for food, especially meat, to rise faster
than supply, causing large increase in imports and sharply higher world prices. In response to
these predictions, Crosson (1996) pointed out that Brown failed to consider the fact that the
steeply higher grain prices that he foresees would have demand-reducing and supply-increasing
effects, and that they are huge areas that could be potentially reclaimed, including the US and
Europe where a significant share of cropland has been frozen due to falling prices.
Even if world grain prices doubled, cost of virtual water for cereals would remain in the $0.20-
0.30 range, well below the marginal cost of additional supplies (such as desalination at a cost of
$1/ m3). Therefore, virtual water would still remain a very good deal. In addition, there is still no
engineering measures which could mobilize the between 20 and 30 billion m3 per year of water
needed to produce the grain being imported annually into the Middle East (Allan, 1996).
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Demographic circumstances dictate that the Middle East food and water gaps can only increase
in the future.
Projections of the world food situation over the next ten to twenty-five years by researchers at the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Food and Agriculture Policy Research Institute
(FAPRI), the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) and the World Bank are for slower food demand growth and declining real
prices. IFPRI projections show a relatively good global food supply and demand balance in
2020. Food production grows fast enough to cause real cereal prices to fall nearly 20 percent
between 1990 and 2020. China's grain imports are expected to increase, but not beyond levels
that can be supplied by world markets. India is expected to remain nearly self-sufficient in grain
(Ingco et al., 1996)
The recent Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture is expected to lead to small increases
(about 4 percent) in world grain prices and to higher world grain trade. Currently, about 10
percent of world grain production is traded but this percentage will grow as countries are
liberalizing their agricultural policies. With a more open trading regime, countries will specialize
in producing the commodities that are most profitable for them (Ingco et al., 1996). Water-short
countries will eventually come to the conclusion that they are better off by importing grain while
reallocating scarce water to higher value uses, and refrain from costly policies of food self-
sufficiency.
Decision-makers in the Middle East argue that the chronic political instability in the region
forces countries to adopt food self-sufficiency policies. However, food production depends on
energy, for which Gaza, Israel and Jordan are completely dependent on imports. For instance, in
Israel 20 percent total energy consumption is used to operate water systems, notably the Israeli
National Water Carrier. A potential embargo on energy supply would interrupt the operation of
water systems, cutting off the water supply to irrigated fields. Increased reliance on food imports
(or virtual water), from sustainable and diverse sources, might provide countries in the region
with more security than alternatives such as desalination or inter-regional water imports.
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6.7 Weather modification
Significant increases in long-range precipitation of the order of 10-20 per cent have been
reported worldwide; in Jordan, pilot experiments were carried out using seeding aircraft. The
increase in total rainfall was in the range of 20 percent over an area of 8,000 km2 in the northern
part of Jordan (United Nations, 1985).
However, rain-making is a very risky business and its success is not easy to document
statistically. Because of the high risks involved, many communities depending on rain would not
want to invest in such a venture. Moreover, during a dry or drought period, there are generally
not enough clouds suitable for seeding. The technology works better during wetter periods and is
most useful for filling reservoirs or recharging aquifers (UN, 1985).
The costs involved with cloud seeding are unknown.
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Chapter 7
Optimizing the allocation of water
Several options have been defined and analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6. The development of a
comprehensive analytical is required to define priorities in the implementation of alternatives.
Given the large amounts of complex quantitative and quantifiable information available, models
can be used to quickly evaluate the consequences of various policies. Optimization models
should be developed to assist in the appraisal of alternatives, the ranking and selection of
projects, under various socio-economic scenarios. Economic models are useful for assessing the
social, environmental, and economic effects of development and management policies. Models
can assist managers by revealing opportunities for improvement and providing insight into
problems that would not be apparent through other means. Actual decisions, however, are
constrained social, legal and political considerations and are therefore often influenced by
subjective, nonquantifiable criteria. The solution that is technically and economically optimal
may be socially unimplementable or politically unacceptable. However, decisions can still be
made on the basis of systematic analysis. There is no reason why a model cannot be developed so
that the current decisions can be linked to the long-range objectives.
7.1 Framework
The economic nature of the design of water allocation policies and their integration with other
water-supply-management measures encourages the use of optimization models, in which the
model itself suggests promising combinations of existing and new water options. The water
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allocation and management options discussed in previous chapters can be integrated in the
following analytical framework
Brackish Wate
Desalination
Rainwater Harvesting
Reallocation
Seawater Desalination
Virtual Water
Figure 29 - Optimization Framework
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7.2 Analytical tools
In this section, technical and economic models are reviewed. A number of technical models are
available in the literature, while fewer attempts have been made to develop economic models. It
should be remembered that one of the basic rules of modeling is that models should be kept
simple. Ideally, a model should be only as complex as necessary to obtain the information
desired. Managers and decision makers prefer simple models that they can understand to
complex models whose assumptions may have been hidden and whose outputs may be the result
of obscure mathematical manipulations (Biswas, 1985). In general it is worthwhile not to build
generalized all-purpose models. They are difficult to understand, except perhaps by specialists,
and therefore their acceptability to the decision makers is suspect. The success of a model is
often defined by the role users have played in its development. User involvement promotes a
greater sense of ownership and enhances communication - perhaps the single most important
success factor.
7.2.1 Technical Models
Groundwater Models
Initial efforts to support and improve the development and operation of groundwater systems by
simulation and optimization techniques were made in the early 1970s (Maass, 1964 Loucks,
1973). Since then, various types of groundwater management models have been proposed and
successfully applied to real-world aquifer systems. Reviews on the types of groundwater
management models and their applications are made by Gorelick (1983), Willis and Yeh (1987),
and Yeh (1992). Applications of groundwater management models to the optimal control of
saltwater intrusion in coastal aquifer systems are presented by Shamir et al. (1984), Willis and
Finney (1988), and Finney et al. (1992). While a number of groundwater simulation models have
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been developed for the management of groundwater resources in the Gaza aquifer system, none
have focused on determining optimal development and operating policies via combined
simulation-optimization methodology.
An accurate model of groundwater flow is a prerequisite in developing reliable groundwater
management models. Abu'Juub (1995) conducted an extensive modeling study of the Gaza
aquifer using available data on aquifer hydraulic properties, water levels, and withdrawal rates.
Several groundwater management models can be constructed to provide decision-makers with
optimal management policies to aid planning and operation of the Gaza aquifer. The factors
considered important in the development of the management models are (1) controlled aquifer
drawdown (2) meeting water demands (3) preservation of groundwater quality and (4) well-
capacity limitations. The prediction of hydraulic head at each well location can be represented in
terms of a response matrix. Drawdowns can be constrained so that they do not exceed their
allowable limits. For the Gaza coastal aquifer, the main concern is that groundwater development
does not lead to further intrusion of saltwater into the aquifer that could cause a worsening of
water quality in the wells. Optimal control models have been presented (Willis and Finney, 1988,
Finney et al., 1992) in which movement of the freshwater-saltwater interface is modeled.
Extensive parametric analyses should be conducted in the Gaza Strip to assess the effect of
allowable drawdowns at the saltwater-control nodes, as well as lower and upper limits of well
pumpages or recharge on the optimal aquifer yield, aquiferwide drawdowns and pumping costs.
It should be determined by how much the current water demands should be reduced to maintain
acceptable drawdowns at the saltwater-control nodes.
For a management objective of minimization of the basin-wide drawdowns, the wells located in
highly conductive zones and closer to the constant-head boundaries should be operated. Whereas,
for a management objective of minimization of the pumping costs, water demands should be met
from wells having low static lifts. It may be possible to reduce the pumping costs if the excess
water pumped at low-cost wells is transported to those with high costs. However, this has to be
traded off against the cost of water conveyance facilities that may be required
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Development of an optimal pumping strategy to control groundwater quality can also be
formulated and solved as a multiobjective optimization problem (MOOP). A MOOP is
characterized by conflicting objectives subject to different physical, managerial and economic
constraints. It determines the optimum value of a vector objective function subjected to specified
system constraints.
Network Design Models
The objective is to find the lowest cost network which can supply the demands under the given
engineering and technical restrictions (e.g. pressure). Numerous solution methods have been
developed to solve the network optimization problem, using different formulations. They range
from rules of thumb, based on engineering experience and insight, through heuristic used for
specific network types, to optimization by mathematical programming techniques. The last
category includes linear, nonlinear, dynamic and mixed integer programming. The linear
programming gradient (LPG) method was introduced by Alperovits and Shamir (1977). Eiger
and Shamir (1994) developed a branch and bound algorithm, which demonstrate its superiority
over previous methods.
Ostfeld and Shamir (1996) developed a methodology which integrates the optimal design and
reliability of a multiquality water-supply system. Multiquality water-supply systems are
distribution systems in which waters of different qualities are taken from sources, possibly
treated, conveyed, and supplied to consumers.
McKinney and Watkins (1997) introduced robust optimization (RO) as a framework for
evaluating trade-offs among expected cost, cost variability, system performance and reliability,
and controlling the effects of uncertainty in water resources screening models.
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Water Management Models
Alkan and Shamir (1980) employed multiobjective optimization method to plan the development
and seasonal operation of a regional water resources system. They considered an arid region in
the south of Israel. Six objectives were considered for the planning problem. Spatial and
temporal variations in demand and supply of water were considered.
Brimberg et al. (1993) presented a management model for the optimal development of marginal
water sources in arid zones in conjunction with minimizing the dependence on high-quality
water. These marginal sources included saline groundwater, treated wastewater and runoff water
that are required to augment limited regional supplies. A novel aspect of the model - taking the
form of a mixed binary integer linear problem - was the consideration of water quality as an
additional constraint in the decision model. The model was applied to a case study of the Negev
Desert in southern Israel: an important conclusion was that saline groundwater production should
be increased dramatically for use in irrigation of salt-resistant crops. This model would be
particularly relevant to the Gaza Strip.
System-analysis techniques can be of special use in the study of existing and potential water
transfers, since simulation and optimization models allow various promising alternatives and
combinations to be identified with less trial and error. Lund and Israel (1995) developed a two-
stage nonlinear program that illustrates the potential value of system-analysis techniques in
designing urban water systems with supply uncertainty, water conservation, and several types of
water transfers.
Multi-criterion decision-making (MCDM) theories provide efficient tools to deal with operations
research problems containing more than one objective. Using a quantitative technique called
ELECTRE. Netto et al. (1996) attempted to put into practice extended MCDM concepts in a real
case study from the very beginning of the decision process. Water resource planning is an area
where MCDM techniques can be efficiently used to help decision makers, as reviewed earlier in
Cohon and Marks (1975).
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7.2.2 Economic Models
Water supply projects in developing countries have been largely spared from critical examination
by economists. Generally speaking, neither donor agencies nor national governments look
carefully at the economics of investments in urban or rural water projects. For example, for the
great majority of recent World Bank-financed water supply projects, no attempt was made to
estimate the economic benefits of the investment. The standard practice is to carry out a financial
analysis in which the benefits of the project are the revenues from water sales. The lack of
economic appraisal of water projects has occurred for two basic reasons. First, governments and
donor organizations have defined water as a basic right, and therefore there is no need to estimate
the benefits of water supply projects, because they have implicitly been assumed to be infinite.
Second, the benefits of an improved water supply often prove difficult to measure (Whittington,
1994). Also, water sector policy analysts contend that economics can only be used to evaluate
options which have been identified or invented by others. Economics, therefore, typically serves
to stop mistakes rather than to identify new and better solutions. However, economic analysis
can be particularly useful in situations where, like in the Gaza Strip, the demand for water - at a
certain price - exceeds its supply, and where transfers between users are technically and
politically feasible. Optimization models can allocate water to maximize the use value of water
(the objective function), subject to satisfying a number of constraints.
7.2.2.1 Agricultural models
Agriculture is the main water consuming sector in the Gaza Strip. As shown in Section 5.5, there
is scope for crop mix optimization in Gaza. For instance, citrus consume more than half of total
irrigation water (or 40 million m3 per year) but generates only 13 percent of total agricultural
income. .The trend is already toward the replacement of citrus by higher-value crops such as
tomatoes or other vegetables and will likely continue in the future. The concept of measuring the
value of water by its incremental contribution to agricultural income can be developed.
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Amir (1996) developed a linear programming model as a decision support tool for planning
agricultural production under various water amounts, qualities, timing and prices. By selecting
the optimal mix of water consuming activities (crops and fishponds), the model maximizes the
annual agricultural net income of a given area. The constraints are mainly water requirements for
each combination between four qualities of water (fresh, recycled, brackish and surface), and
three seasons (winter, transition and summer). The decision variables are the land areas of the
activities. The main components of the agricultural model are shown below (Amir, 1996):
a. Objective function:
maxZ= X, [Z WRC, - E (P• )]
j i,j
where: WRCj: water related contribution, defined as the gross income of an area unit of the
activityj minus the direct expenses (machinery, labor, materials, fertilizers),
except the expenses for water
Pj: price of 1 m3 of the i water type (quality and season), i = 1,...,12;
WU:  demand of water of type i for an unit area of the activity j;
Xj: land area of the activityj (i=l,...n decision variables)
Area constraints:
EXjk <Ak
where: Xjk : area of activity j in the category k;
Ak: total area available for category k
The constraints ensure that the sum of the areas of the crops under each category k will not
exceed the area available for that category. The categories are: all activities, all irrigated
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activities, crops of the same group (field, orchards, flowers, etc.), crops irrigated by the same
water quality (fresh, recycled, brackish, surface), crops grown during the same season
Water constraints:
I wU Xj W,
where: W,.: demand for water type i per unit area of cropj
W,: total available amount of water type i
7.2.2.2 Gain-From-Trade Models
The Gaza Strip has an environment where water use is limited by resource scarcity and where the
value of water varies between different uses. Thus, provided conveyance systems and appropriate
water institutions are in place, trade for water-use rights is expected, both between farmers and
urban users and amongst farmers. A farmer would be better off selling water-use rights if the
present value of these rights - calculated as the expected value of the discounted marginal
product of water - is less than the price offered by a buyer (Heame, 1995). The difference
between the value of the water-use right to the buyer and its value to the seller is society's gains-
from-trade.
These concepts can be formalized using the following equations (adapted from Hearne, 1995).
Let us assume that each farmer plants one crop in a particular location every year. The value to a
farmer i of an endowment of water-use rights V,' (W,') is the present value of a discounted stream
of profits that can be earned with the use of the water:
(I(W) (W,', R, P)
V,' (Wi) = r)' t=(1,2,3,...)
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where: IT :
R:
P:
farmer i's profit function in year t;
pre-determined quantity of water-use rights available to farmer i in year t;
a vector of exogenously input prices;
the exogenously determined output price
Given an alternative cost of acquiring these water-rights, pW(A), the buyer's (e.g. a municipality
or an urban water company) maximum willingness-to pay for water-use rights, V, (w,) can be
determined as follows:
V,"(w)= PW(A) (PX, PW U, D;)
where: w;: water rights purchased or obtained through alternative means by the buyer (e.g.
urban water company) in year t;
P,X : a vector of input prices;
P, : the least cost input price of water rights that are either purchased or obtained
through alternative means
W,u",: the buyer's stock of available water rights in year t;
D;: the amount of water that the buyer (urban water company) is required to supply to
its customers in year t
For simplicity, assume that an urban water company is buying water-use rights w from farmer i.
The net gains-from-trade to society from this transaction is the difference between the value of
the water to the buyer and seller less the transactions costs:
GFT,i' (w)= [ y"(w) - Vt (w( Wt1 - w))] - TCU 'i (w)
where:: GFT,"' (w):
TCu,'(w) :
i(w( 14tiWl, - W)):
the gains-from trade to society of a transfer of w from farmer i to
the buyer (municipality, water company)
the total transactions costs of a transfer of w from farmer i to
the buyer (municipality, water company)
the value of water-use rights w, as a percentage of the average
value of total post-trade water-use rights (W,'I - w)
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7.2.2.3 General Microeconomic Models
The demand for water is a factor of economics, specifically the quantities of a commodity that
consumers are willing to purchase at various prices. Demand is specified by two variables:
quantity and price. Depending on the users and the markets, demand curves for water can vary
significantly. For instance, consumers are willing to pay very high prices for residential and
commercial water; industrial users are willing to pay considerably less, and agricultural users pay
the least. Only small quantities are demanded at high prices and large quantities are demanded at
low prices (Rogers, 1993).
The supply curve is created by arranging, in ascending order of cost, the supplies from various
sources and at different costs. For example, the first step of the curve would be surface water cost
($0.2/ m3 ), the second, groundwater ($0.3/ m3). The next least expensive would be wastewater
reclamation ($0.5/ m3), and so on until desalinated water which is available in almost infinite
quantities but at a high price ($1.2/ m3).
Economic efficiency requires that:
* marginal benefit of use must be equal or greater than marginal cost of supply
* marginal benefit per unit of resource is equal across all uses
In theory it is possible to derive demand and supply curves which show:
* the marginal benefit obtained from consumption (and the willingness to pay)
* the marginal cost of supply and the willingness to supply at given prices
The most efficient economic solution occurs when the amount a consumer is willing to pay
matches the supply price. Accordingly, the market would be at equilibrium at Q=Q* and p=p*,
thus maximizing the net benefits from water (shaded area) (see
Figure 30).
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Figure 30 - Supply and Demand Curves
Economically efficient water allocation is derived from the maximization of the aggregate annual
economic benefits to both water sellers and water buyers, given water availability in any given
year. This approach has been proposed by Fishelson (1993) and Fisher et al. (1995). This
procedure determines water transfers between water sources (e.g. groundwater, wastewater) and
users (domestic, agricultural sector). Let:
qij be the amount of water supplied by source j to user i;
qj be the total amount of water supplied by source j, q.j= i, qij, j = 1, ...,n;
qi be the amount of water consumed by user i, qi = -jqij;
qj be the annual amount of water available to source j; the qj are assumed to be independent,
stochastic variables with known means E(qj);
cj(q) be the cost function of transporting q units of water from source j to user i; this cost is
assumed to be paid by the consumers;
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a2cij Ocij>0 Ž>0
aq2 ' aq
Dj (q) is the inverse demand function for water of user i;
Sj (q) is the inverse supply function in source j;
The economically efficient allocation of region's water resources is derived, for each realization
of the qj, from the following optimization:
qi* q*j
max ( D(q)dq - cY(qq) )- ( Sj(q)dq )
q o J J 0
s.t. q*j < qjVj
qij20 V i,j
This optimization maximizes the net benefit from water, that is, the area between the demand
curve and the marginal cost curve. Thus, Q* is the optimal amount of water to deliver (Figure
30). If the constraint on the quantity of water at a particular supplier is not effective (compared
with the demand for this water), then the water at source j is not scarce, implying that the shadow
price of water at j, reflecting the scarcity rent associated with the resource, would equal zero. In
this case, the cost to user i of source j water would equal marginal extraction cost plus marginal
transfer cost (from source j to recipient i). The differences in conveyance cost vary accordingly
for different buyers. When the quantity of water supply at source j is binding, so that q.j=qj, the
shadow price of water at the source would be greater than zero, that is, scarcity rent is now
strictly positive, and would be added to the other costs to reflect the full opportunity cost of
water.
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7.2.2.4 Macroeconomic Models
It is particularly important to gain a better understanding of the role of water in the economy.
Water contributes to the economy to various degrees. For instance, industry and services can
provide a thousand times more jobs and 20000 times more financial return than would a crop
producing enterprise using the same amount of water (Allan, 1996).
Rogers et al. (1993) challenged the traditional approach of water resources planning in
developing countries. Their proposal is a methodology that attempts to establish the link between
the water resources investment sector and macroeconomic policies. They propose to cast the
evaluation of water projects more broadly across sectors, including the overall economy. Given
the size of water investments in developing countries economies, they call for some
understanding as to the strategic importance of public investment situated in one sector. Rogers
et al. built a economy-wide model for Bangladesh which incorporated a detailed water sector and
its macroeconomic linkages. Figure 31 shows the inputs and the outputs of these models.
Typically, the models would be used separately by different agencies within a country with little
or no coordination of the solutions.
MACRO-
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Agricultural
Value-Added
Capital
Agricultural Agricultural
Value-Added Exports
Foodgrain
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Figure 31 - Schematic of the macroeconomic models (Rogers, 1993)
Rogers et al. proposed the integration of the two models into one optimizing model as shown in
Figure 31. They argued that by doing so, it would force the institutions involved in the planning
process to integrate their plans and provide output that is relatively easily understood by the
policy makers.
Input-Output Models
An approach using input-output techniques could be used for the analysis of the linkages
between the water sector and the economy. Such a model could be used to predict the impact of
various water allocation strategies on the economy and the labor force. For instance, it may help
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MACROECONOMIC-
WATER SECTOR
INTEGRATED MODEL
planners in assessing the third-party effects of water reallocation scenarios, and in preparing for
mitigation actions.
An input-output account summarizes all the flows of goods and services that occur in an
economy. Each firm in the economy is assigned to a set of n production sectors. The basic logic
of the input-output account is that the output of each sector is made up of two aggregate
components: intermediate demand, which is the sale of goods and services from a production
sector to another, andfinal demand, which is the sales of goods and services for a "final" purpose
such as consumption, investment, export, or sales to the public sector. Correspondingly, the
expenditures of each sector can be broken down into two components: intermediate expenditures,
which is the purchase of goods and services from other sectors, and value added, which includes
payments to labor, capital, and the public sector (taxes) (Xu et al., 1994). simplified input-output
table for a regional economy is shown in Table 19.
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Table 19 - Simplified Set of Input-Output Accounts
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The basic logic of the input-output model is that in order for the final demand of some sector to
expand - as, for example, in the case of increased exports of agricultural products - the output of
other sectors must expand as well (Xu et al., 1994). Most economic activities consume water.
The quantity of water consumed, and its distribution across categories such as agriculture,
industrial, etc. depends on the sectoral composition of the increase in output. Thus, given some
assumptions about the relationships between sectoral outputs and land uses, it should be possible
to project the amount of water necessary to accommodate an increase in final demand in a given
sector. Furthermore, an increase in sectoral output will produce an increase in employment. The
extra purchasing power will give rise to increased demand for water.
7.2.3 Optimizing the supply-demand match: Demand Models (CVM)
Investment projects require that decisions be made not only on location, but also on the level of
service to be provided and on the prices to be charged. Sometimes overly ambitious, high-tech
solutions to problems are proposed and implemented when simpler, low-cost alternatives would
have been more appropriate. But it also happens that low-tech solutions are provided when
people desire a higher level of service. In both cases resources are misallocated: the technology
selected is inappropriate, and soon the facilities are underutilized (Whittington, 1994). For
instance, in the Gaza Strip, it is uncertain whether households will be willing to pay for large
quantities of costly desalinated water. It is possible that poor households would prefer to be
supplied with low grade water while having access to high quality water through vendors or
autonomous water stations (see Section 5.9).
Demand curves can be constructed to determine whether residential customers are willing to pay
for a higher level of service. Typically, households have a different demand curve for water
associated with different uses (Figure 30). This information can enable planners to estimate the
potential economic benefits of a new water supply project. For instance, in Gaza, a water
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resource planner would like to know how a household would respond to the opportunity to have
water of better quality - consumption patterns and willingness-to-pay.
2 3 4 5 6 7
Water Demand (units of water)
Figure 32 - Household's Water Demand Curve (adapted from Whittington, 1994)
A survey instrument can be helpful to provide detailed information about community
preferences. In the past 25 years, contingent valuation method (CVM) has rapidly become a
standard method to estimate the benefits for nonmarket commodities. While controversy about
CVM still exists, it is increasingly used in cost-benefit planning studies and in estimating the
economic benefits of an improved water supply. The contingent valuation method seeks to
measure the economic value that individuals place on water by asking them outright how much
they would pay for various levels of service (i.e. quantity, quality of water, reliability). In
essence, it creates a hypothetical market, a sort of "what if' situation. One of the advantages of
CVM is that respondents' answers to questions are easy for policy makers to interpret and
understand. One possible drawback is the possibility that the respondent may not know (or may
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know but do not tell the truth) how he would react if offered a better service level at a specified
price.
In addition to households, CVM could also be applied to agricultural users to assess their
willingness to pay (and to accept) wastewater for crop irrigation.
Jordan et al. (1993) carried out a survey of Georgia's residents to study people's willingness to
pay for improvements in drinking water quality and people's perceptions of potential
groundwater contamination. The aggregate willingness-to-pay could serve as an estimate of
benefits to consumers from improvements in drinking water quality.
Whittington et al. (1993) conducted a contingent valuation survey in Kumasi, Ghana, to estimate
households' willingness to pay for two types of improved sanitation services. The findings
indicated that CV surveys can be successfully carried out in cities in developing countries for
public services and that reasonably reliable information can be obtained on household demand
for different water supply and sanitation technologies.
Contingent valuation techniques can be useful for quantifying environmental values, although
anyone using such numbers must be aware of the severe limitations and uncertainties of the
method. For instance, one study estimated total visitor and nonvisitor benefits from the
preservation of Mono Lake levels to be about $40 per California household, well above the cost
of $0.22 per household that would be needed to preserve lake levels by replacing the Los
Angeles diversions with water from other sources (National Research Council, 1992).
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7.2.4 Application of Models to Water Supply/Demand Alternatives
Various supply-side and demand-side alternatives have been proposed and individually assessed
in Chapter 5 and 6. In order to compare the effects of different strategies and define priorities in
the implementation of water policies, these alternatives need to be integrated in a comprehensive
analytical framework. However, simple auxiliary models can be made first to assess the different
options individually before attempts are made to design a larger model.
Groundwater models can help defining aquifer management strategies aimed at safeguarding the
remaining freshwater resources of the Gaza Strip. Technical issues pertaining to the development
and the management of a large-scale distribution system - conveying potable and recycled water
- can be assessed with network design models. Agricultural models can measure the economic
benefits of optimizing cropping patterns. Gain-from-trade models can provide policy-makers
with estimates of the costs and benefits of reallocation strategies. By developing a range of "what
if' scenarios, a microeconomic model can help performing benefit-cost and welfare
consequences analysis of investments by comparing changes in benefits to the capital cost.
Finally, third-party impacts of reallocation policies and economic implications of a greater
reliance on virtual water can be assessed by means of a macroeconomic model such as an input-
output model. However, water resources need to be planned in a multidisciplinary context:
social, environmental, institutional and political factors must be considered. Typically, a
technical or economic model does not account for these factors; therefore, alternative evaluation
techniques need to be defined.
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7.3 Preliminary Assessment ofAlternatives
7.3.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are major uncertainties in Gaza with respect to the future
economic, financial, social and political situation. It is unclear how the political situation will
develop, it is unknown whether foreign donors will sustain their financial support, it is uncertain
how the economy will develop, to name but a few uncertainties. Persistently unstable conditions
caused by internal and external factors do hardly permit to extrapolate past trends. The best water
strategy can be defeated by unforeseen changes in the economic or political environment. In such
a "world of uncertainty" where no credible optimum can be defined, a scenario approach is a
useful planning technique that can help to forecast possible developments. The desirability of a
particular option can be assessed in terms of its feasibility and implementation potential,
regardless of the scenario. For instance, the protection of the northern aquifer freshwater
resources will belong to the theoretical optimal water allocation strategy and should therefore be
given priority. Conversely, seawater desalination may be considered only if appropriate financial
and human resources are available, and if it appears that regional water trading will not take
place in the foreseeable future.
7.3.2 Assessment of constraints and definition of priorities
Further research is needed to assess the technical feasibility and the economic benefits of the
proposed alternatives. To this end, several optimization models were presented in this chapter..
However, technical and economic optimality, while a necessary condition, is not sufficient to
formulate a sound water policy. It was shown in previous chapters that, in the Gaza Strip,
financial, political and institutional factors are determinant and are clearly overriding technical
and economic issues. Therefore, there is a need to incorporate these factors in the analysis. This
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is no easy task, since they are they are difficult to measure and subject to a high degree of
uncertainty. In Table 20, attempt is made to assess the feasibility of the various alternatives
presented and evaluated in Chapters 5 and 6.
Variables were rated as follows:
++: very favorable, +: favorable, o: neutral, -: unfavorable, --: very unfavorable
Potential (in million m3/year):
Low: <10 million m3/year, Medium: 10-50 million m3/year, High: >50 million m3/year
Water cost (in $/ m3):
Low: <$0.20/ m3 , Medium $0.20-0.50/ m3, High >0.50/ m3
-Cu
: 3 M
Option
Groundwater pr tection (potable quality) Low Low + + + + o - o + +
Reduction of Unaccounted-for-Water Medium Medium o o o + + N/A + + +
C4J -' En
Water Conservation (domestic/industrial) Low LowMe - o + + + N/A + +CDQ 3 C DOption Crop Mix Medium N/A o + o o N/A + +Groundwater protection (potable quality) Low Low + + + + N/A - - /  -  +
Reduction of Unaccounted-for-Water Medium Low Mediumo o + + N/A + + +
Water Conservation (domestic/industrial) Low LowMe o o + + + N/A + +
Efficiency in Irrigation Medium Medium + + + + ++ N/A o +
Optimizing Crop Mix Medium +N/A + o + N/A + +
Water Pricing (domestic/industrial) Low Low + + + N/A + oN/A - + +
Reallocation to urban uses Medium Lowigh + - + - - N/A - o
Swap freshwater vs. Recycled wastewat HMedium Low o + o N/A + o+
Use of saline water in agriculture Medium Low + + + + + + N/A + + - -
Supply Segregation N/A Medium +o + o + N/A + - -
Artificial Recharge Low Low + + - + - + + +
Water imports High High + - + 0- -- --
Wastewater Recycling and Reuse High Medium + 0 - + + N/A + 0
Brackish water Desalination Low High + o - - + + N/A + +
Sea water Desalination High High o - - - - + + N/A +
Virtual Water High Low + + - + - + + +
Weather Modification Low High I- - -- + + - + +
Table 20 - Multicriteria Assessment of Alternatives
Table 21 summarizes the main constraints pertaining to each alternatives and proposes a
preliminary priority ranking.
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agriculture
Supply Segregation
Artificial Recharge
Water imports
Wastewater Recycling
and Reuse
Brackish water
Desalination
Sea water Desalination
Virtual Water
Weather Modification
Optimal reduction of UFW linked to
water pricing
Public awareness, Financing of water
saving devices
Financing of irrigation systems
Underpricing of irrigation water
Access to external markets for high-value
agricultural products
Political issues
Institutional issues with water markets
Need to build conveyance systems
Conveyance systems, reliability of
treatment plants, incentives for farmers
Introduction of technologies (cooperation
with Israel)
Selection of distribution system (dual
system, trucking, water stations)
Land availability (pools), aquifer
Contamination, O&M (reinjection wells)
Political issues (agreement on water
rights, Israel's willingness-to-sell)
Selection of appropriate treatment
technology, O&M, conveyance systems
O&M, damage to aquifer
Financing, O&M, brine disposal
Exports need to grow to pay for
additional food imports
Unpredictability of results
Cooperation with Israel
High Priority
High priority
Medium priority
Medium priority
Medium priority
Medium priority
High priority
High priority
High priority
Medium priority
Depends on outcome of
negotiations (high pr.)
High priority
Medium priority
Low priority
Medium priority
Low priority
Table 21 - Assessment of Alternatives - Constraints and Priorities
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protection
Several alternatives seem particularly promising: fresh groundwater protection for potable use,
reduction of UFW, conservation, wastewater recycling and reuse, swap freshwater vs. recycled
water, supply segregation. These alternatives should be further evaluated, using benefit-cost
analyses and the models described in Section 7.2.
7.3.3 Scenarios
Feasibility of alternatives will be closely linked to the political situation. The definition of a
water strategy will be dependent on donor funding, prospects for regional cooperation, internal
politics and capacity building. Accordingly, in order to account for future uncertainties, three
socio-economic development scenarios are formulated. Each of them is based on a set of
assumptions that are a mix of a wide range of conditions (MOPIC, 1996).
Status Quo Scenario
The status quo scenario is based on extrapolation of recent developments.
Main assumptions:
* The peace process remains stalled, and there is significant potential for political unrest. Final
status talks have been postponed indefinitely. Strategic uncertainty affects the decision
process. In the water sector, there is a slow progress in building capacity and appropriate
legal and regulatory systems.
* Little capital investment has taken place and the economy is still in a state of crisis.
Unemployment remains at very high levels.
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* A major share of donor funding supplements government budget. Private foreign investment
is restricted to investment in housing by expatriate Palestinians. As a result, investments in
infrastructure are very limited.
* Due to population growth, water withdrawals increase and further damage the aquifer. Most
of the water pumped into the network is brackish.
* Water salinity affects the agricultural sector. Many farmers, particularly citrus growers, are
driven out of business or have to shift to salt-tolerant crops.
* Several wastewater treatment plants have been completed. However, lack of funding limits
the possibilities to reuse wastewater for crop production.
Consequences for the water sector:
* Supply segregation alternative is implemented. More than half of the population is supplied
from autonomous water stations and/or bottled water to meet their potable water needs.
* Groundwater protection zones have been established to safeguard the remaining portion of
freshwater.
* Small brackish water desalination plants have been completed and supplement high quality
water supply.
* Techniques to use saline water in irrigation are being introduced.
Autonomous Growth Scenario
The autonomous growth scenario assumes that Gaza develops its own economy with little
interaction with Israel. Access to foreign markets, notably in the Arab countries and Europe, is
significantly improved. Export oriented growth and an influx of foreign funds contribute to the
development of a strong economic base.
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Major assumptions:
* Full formal government power is established for the Palestinians, although sovereignty is
limited in matters related to defense, foreign affairs, and natural resources management.
Relations with Israel remain tense.
* Access to foreign markets is secured by the completion and full operation of the Gaza seaport
and airport
* Sufficient funds (from domestic and foreign sources) are available to finance the heavy
investments in infrastructure
Consequences for the water sector:
* A large scale water distribution system covering the entire Gaza Strip has been built. The
system enables the transfer of water of different qualities - freshwater, brackish and recycled.
* Treated wastewater is extensively used in irrigation. As a result, large quantities of freshwater
are made available for urban uses.
* Institutional mechanisms have been established to enable water marketing. Economic growth
and competition for land provide incentives for water transfers.
* Water-intensive crops such as citrus are no longer produced; instead, they are now imported.
* Pricing, introduction of water-saving technologies, and implementation of awareness
programs contribute to active water conservation in the urban and agricultural sector.
* Additional water resources are made available to Gaza through seawater desalination and/or
imports from Egypt.
* Cooperation programs with foreign consultants and universities promote capacity building
and development of human resources
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Social Welfare Scenario
Open borders, regional trade and cooperation, and a "warm" peace with Israel characterize the
social welfare scenario. Lower birth rates and free movement of persons between Gaza and the
West Bank contribute to the reduction of population pressure.
Major assumptions:
* A successful final peace settlement results in normalization of political and trade relations
with all neighboring countries. Regional cooperation in all fields of mutual interest has
become a reality, and shared natural resources are jointly managed.
* Decisions on investments in the water sector are made largely on the basis of considerations
of socio-economic development and regional cooperation, rather than on political and
security issues.
Consequences for the water sector:
* Water is traded on a regional basis, and allocated according to economic principles. As a
result, irrigation water is reallocated from the Israeli to the Palestinian sector, for the benefit
of both. Israeli consumers can purchase food at a lower price, and Palestinians can further
develop their economy.
* Food self-sufficiency policies become less relevant because of increased regional security
and improved terms of trade. As a result, irrigation water use declines, particularly in Israel,
thereby freeing additional water for urban uses. Desalination projects and imports of water
can be replaced by an increased reliance of imports of virtual water.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Recommendations
The Gaza Strip's water resources crisis is threatening people's livelihoods and economic growth.
Currently, the poor overall performance of the water and sanitation sector is critical; moreover,
the imbalance between supply and demand is expected to worsen due to the high population
growth rate. But the looming disaster is not inevitable. It can be averted, but the need for action
is urgent and will require a concerted and sustained effort. This will demand massive investments
in rebuilding and expanding the water infrastructure, and the development of an appropriate
institutional framework.
This thesis contended that the current water crisis is partly the product of misallocation of water
resources, both in the Gaza Strip as well as the regional level. Underpricing and poor efficiency
of water systems have led to a waste of scarce water resources. In Gaza, more than half of the
water pumped into the network is lost, and the agricultural sector is consuming the lion's share of
water while generating negligible or even negative marginal benefits. Some future plans, such as
seawater desalination, if implemented, will only exacerbate the current misallocation. Indeed,
desalination at costs of $1 per cubic meter will not be efficient as the quantity equivalent to the
total current domestic consumption, which is used to grow citrus, yields an income of less than
$0.30 per cubic meter. In this thesis, it had been shown that many options on the supply- and
demand-side exist, and that they should be carefully evaluated in an integrated framework.
Appropriate models should be developed to determine the sets of optimal allocation of water
under different socio-economic scenarios.
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Models can lead to a better understanding of what will happen if certain actions are taken or not
taken, and which of several possible combinations of alternatives is likely to be the optimal
solution. However, models do not account for the highly unpredictable social, economic, legal
and political processes which influence water planning and management in the Gaza Strip.
Consequently, a technically and economically optimal solution may be unacceptable to the
policy makers because it contradicts immediate political imperatives. Policy makers have a
marked preference for solutions that do not make any waves. For instance, a reallocation of water
is politically difficult because those who may loose will likely scream louder than those who will
gain. Here, decision-makers may feel safer in inaction than action. Therefore, while models can
help in discovering tradeoffs and joint gains, it should be recognized that there is no one uniquely
right solution, and that the traditional decision-making approach is incremental.
Although considerable work remains to be done in the formulation of a water policy, where
optimization models may help define long-term plans, a desirable incremental approach would
include the following elements:
Short-term Actions
* Establish groundwater protection zones to preserve Gaza's remaining freshwater resources to
guarantee potable water needs for the coming 50 years
* Establish a separate distribution system for high quality water. The immediate objective of
this investment should include access to drinking water of good quality for all cities and rural
communities.
* Continue to rehabilitate the water systems in order to achieve a significant reduction in water
losses
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* Pursue the renovation and upgrading of wastewater collection and treatment systems and
initiate wastewater reuse in irrigation. Reuse of wastewater in agriculture (particularly for
citrus production in the first stage) will free up freshwater for higher-value use.
* Promote water conservation by introducing watersaving technologies, and by launching
public awareness campaigns
Medium-term Actions
* Build a distribution system that covers the entire Gaza Strip. The system should enable the
transfer of water of different quality - freshwater, recycled waters - and promote efficient
allocation of water of among competing local users. In the long run, this system could be
integrated into a regional water network operating on the basis of tradable water rights.
* Price water at its true opportunity cost, while keeping lifeline use affordable to the poor.
* Identify new water supplies to keep up with the growth of consumption and the reduction of
groundwater extraction to safe yields. Several alternatives have been proposed in this study,
ranging from small-scale options (rainwater harvesting, artificial recharge, brackish water
desalination) to more ambitious schemes (seawater desalination, inter-regional transfers).
They will have to be studied carefully in the framework of integrated water resources
management.
The successful implementation of these alternatives will depend upon the availability of funds
and donor support, human resources development, and the establishment of an appropriate
institutional framework.
Most of the funding will have to come from multilateral and bilateral donors. In the long term,
when the Gaza Strip has achieved institutional and political stability required to attract major
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private investment, government or international banks' guarantees could make private financing
of water projects possible. To ensure the sector's sustainability, cash generation should be
increased and operation and maintenance of the water systems should be self-financed.
As shown in earlier chapters, markets and prices can improve the allocation of water among
competing users. In Gaza, policy makers should gradually shift from regarding water as a free
and renewable resource to understanding its economic value, and change policies to emphasize
proper incentives, pricing, and regulation.
In order to avoid duplication and fragmented actions, government and donor efforts in the water
sector will have to be harmonized. In particular, clear guidelines and standards should be rapidly
defined, as well as the level of service to be provided. The technologies selected should be
appropriate for the factor endowments and stage development of the Gaza Strip. Central policy
making should remain with a single independent water authority but operational management
should be decentralized. A better quality of service at lower cost will be achieved by
decentralizing water service delivery responsibilities to local governments and transferring some
functions to financially autonomous entities, and community organizations such as water user
associations. A critical factor for the success of any water resources development is the real
involvement of all users of water resources in a region. This implies that the planning and
implementation of water programs and policies must be subjected to the widest public scrutiny,
involving participation by all interested parties. This will require institutional structures which
are responsive to public concerns.
The main problem of the donors' program is its lack of emphasis on developing human resources
when, in fact, water professionals in the Gaza Strip are in desperate need of appropriate skills
training. A constructive step that the donor community can take is to assist in the training of the
next generation of water experts in the region. One of the most valuable benefits of such
programs would be the creation of an informal network of individuals in Israel and Gaza with
personal relationships and shared understanding of the region's management issues.
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The long term solution to the region's water problems will rest in the reevaluation of agricultural
policies. Food exports - that is, exports of virtual water - will probably need to be discontinued.
The gradual removal of subsidies for irrigation water will improve access to local markets for
food imports and decrease water consumption in agriculture. Additional water resources will
therefore be freed up for urban uses, and opportunities for regional water trading - based on
economic principles - will open up. A recent Israeli report called for a significant increase in
charges for water supplied to the agricultural sector, while offering farmers alternative help. In
any case, urbanization and economic growth will lead to a gradual decline of the importance of
agriculture in the economy. However, food self-sufficiency policies are dictated by security and
political imperatives, and will remain in place as long as the conflictual atmosphere prevails in
the region. While the current political situation does not encourage optimism, it is clear that the
resolution of Gaza's water problems is predicated upon the recognition of equitable water rights
for the peoples of the region and the establishment of a favorable political and economic climate.
A social and political explosion is looming in the Gaza Strip, which will be compounded by the
destruction of the aquifer. However, as discussed in this thesis, solutions do exist. They will
depend on the financial support of the donor community, Israel's goodwill, and the political will
and management ability of the Palestinian leadership to formulate and implement a sound water
policy. When all this comes to pass, Gaza can become again that for which it has been famous
for centuries: a key commercial outpost, and the first source of freshwater north of the Sinai
Desert for caravans traveling between Asia and Africa.
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